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Abstract 
 
The market conditions in the banking sector, the corporate governance structure of banks, 
and the financial accounting practices have been highlighted among the key causes of the 
global financial crisis of 2007-2010. In this thesis, I analyse the ‘dark side’ of competition 
by casting the spotlight on the relationship between competition, corporate governance, 
financial stability, and financial misreporting. I also bring corporate governance into the 
fray by analysing its link to financial misreporting. Probing the interplay between banking 
sector competition, corporate governance, financial stability and financial misreporting 
provides a fantastic setting to tap into and provide unique insights across the accounting, 
banking and finance domains. 
           In putting together this piece of work, I extracted data from sources including 
Bankscope, Compustat, SEC enforcement releases and the World Bank Doing Business 
survey among others. In the 1st chapter, I regress financial stability proxies against various 
competition/concentration proxies using the GMM estimator with an instrumental 
variable technique to address potential endogeneity. In the 2nd chapter I use difference-
in-difference analysis to analyse how changes in the competitive landscape in the US 
financial services industry instigated by the financial crisis as an exogenous factor led to 
an increase in misreporting incidences. The 4th chapter is an evaluation of how five 
corporate governance dimensions impacted on financial misreporting in US commercial 
banks subject to SEC enforcement actions from 2000 to 2016. 
           I uncover strong evidence to support the competition-fragility view, without yet 
being able to disprove the competition-stability view. My results suggest that greater 
banking competition yields riskier loan portfolios, but this increased risk is more than 
offset by banks holding higher capital and liquidity thresholds. I also study the link 
between competition and incidences of financial misreporting in the US financial services 
industry and the results suggest a significantly positive association between competition 
and financial misreporting. Furthermore, there is evidence that an exogenous increase in 
competition because of the financial crisis also fuelled financial misreporting incidences 
in the financial services industry. I then investigate the impact of corporate governance 
on financial misreporting in US commercial banks subject to SEC enforcement actions. 
My results are mixed across the five corporate governance dimensions utilised for this 
study. Consistent with the ‘agency cost’ hypothesis, I find a negative association between 
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board size and financial misreporting, yet CEO power asserts a positive association with 
financial misreporting in violation of both the ‘stewardship’ and ‘entrenchment’ 
hypotheses. The equity-based portion of executive compensation is negatively related 
with misreporting, whereas there is a positive association between the cash-based portion 
and misreporting. 
           My research not only contributes to literature on competition, market power, bank 
risk, financial stability, corporate governance, and financial misreporting; but also 
provide several practical and theoretical implications for regulators, academics, 
governments and policymakers on the effective and efficient regulation of the governance 
and competitive landscapes in financial services. I specifically shine the spotlight on 
emerging literature on the pervasive effects (dark side) of competition from a purely 
financial services perspective and within the context of the global financial crisis of 2007-
2010.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
1.1. Background and motivation 
           The aftermath of the global financial crisis has seen competition and corporate 
governance take centre stage among the key causes of the crisis. Financial stability’s place 
as a key mandate of the bank regulation and supervision authorities is firmly established. 
The financial crisis of 2007-10 altered the competitive landscape and market structure 
within the banking system in a fundamental sense. This has culminated in the 
competition-financial stability relationship coming under sharp focus as an area of 
immense research interest. Studies in this area have largely been split between the 
competition-fragility and competition-stability views. The competition-fragility view 
advanced by Keely (1990) and supported by the likes of Hellman (2000), Beck et al. 
(2006) & Craig & Dinger (2013) posit that increased competition negatively impacts the 
stability of the financial system. The competition-stability view fronted by Boyd & De 
Nicolo (2005) and supported by Schaeck & Cihak (2012) and Carletti & Leonello (2014) 
among others, argues for the beneficial impact of competition on financial system 
stability. A third literature strand postulating non-linearity in the competition-financial 
stability nexus has since emerged fronted by Martinez-Miera & Repullo (2008) and 
garnered support from Jimenez et al. (2013) among others. 
           There generally has been a consensus about the welfare-increasing impact of 
competition on the wider economy Adam Smith (1776). There is however an emerging 
literature casting the light on the ‘dark side’ or pervasive effects of competition. I delve 
into this terrain and probe the interplay between competition and financial misreporting. 
I split and analyse literature on this into two broad clusters i.e. competition-restraining 
and competition-misreporting hypotheses. The competition-restraining hypothesis speaks 
to and touts the beneficial effect of competition on financial misreporting i.e. increased 
competition has a disciplining effect on managers and result in better financial disclosures 
since the opportunity cost of misreporting is greater in an ultra-competitive environment 
Hart (1983); Darrough & Stoughton (1990); Gentzkow & Shapiro (2008); Besley & Pratt 
(2006). The competition-misreporting hypothesis runs counter to this and essentially 
postulates that competition increases the occurrences of financial misreporting incidences 
Milgrom & Roberts (1992). Shleifer (2004) argues that competition triggers a ‘race to the 
bottom’ among firms in a competitive industry as they bid to outdo each other. In this 
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case the opportunity cost of not ‘following the grain’ is equally great in an opposite sense 
to the one alluded to under the competition-restraining hypothesis Verrecchia (1990); 
Mullainathan & Shleifer (2005); Bloom et al. (2010); Bagnoli & Watts (2010). Extant 
literature on this subject mainly document the impact of competition on accounting-based 
proxies of earnings management. In my thesis, I adopt Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Releases of the US Securities & Exchange Commission as an objective-
based proxy for financial misreporting. Furthermore, I investigate whether the global 
financial crisis altered the competitive landscape in the US financial services industry. 
           Corporate governance features prominently among the key causes of the financial 
crisis. Richard (2008) attribute the crisis to the degree of complexity ushered into banking 
on the back of innovation resulting from the liberalisation of financial services. According 
to Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga (2010), investment banking is widely responsible for the 
crisis that emanated from the US and spread into a global phenomenon. Johnson (2004) 
posits effective corporate governance as leading to greater accountability, which in turn 
implies transparent, honest and informative reporting of financial information. The 
governance of banking institutions has really come to the fore as an area of intense 
research interest in the post-crisis period Beltratti & Stulz (2012); Pathan & Faff (2013). 
Banks are highly leveraged institutions which automatically raises some corporate 
governance implications Hagendorf (2014). The issue of opacity, allied with the 
complexity of the banking model, makes it difficult for shareholders to keep track of bank 
operations DeAndres & Vallelado (2008). Against this background, I investigate whether 
corporate governance – proxied by five dimensions i.e. board size, block-ownership, CEO 
power, compensation mix and insider representation – is responsible for financial 
misreporting in US commercial banks subject to SEC enforcement actions. To this end, I 
adopt Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases of the US Securities & Exchange 
Commission as an objective-based proxy for financial misreporting.  
           The next three sections of this chapter provide brief outlines of the motivation, 
methodology, findings and contributions of the three research areas that constitute this 
thesis i.e. bank competition and financial stability in the G7 bloc, competition and 
financial misreporting in the US financial services industry and corporate governance and 
financial misreporting in US commercial banks subject to SEC enforcement actions. 
 
1.2.     Market power, bank risk and financial stability in the G7 countries 
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           The stability of the financial system has always been one of the key objectives of 
bank regulators and supervisors. The global financial crisis of the late 2000s has 
fundamentally altered the structure of the banking industry, putting the relationship 
between competition, bank risk, and financial stability at the centre of academic interest. 
The competition-fragility view which posits that intensified competition in banking 
negatively influences the stability of the financial sector has been the dominant view. 
Keely (1990), through a seminal paper on the topic, demonstrates that competition drives 
margins down, erodes profits and shrinks the franchise value of banks. All this 
incentivises banks to be riskier, which in turn induces higher insolvency rates and threaten 
the stability of the financial system. A burgeoning literature has emerged challenging 
Keeley (1990)’s doctrine and documents a positive link between market power and bank 
risk-taking. Indeed, Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) show that banks with market power have 
the ability to charge higher interest rates to firms and this raises borrowers’ credit risk as 
a result of moral hazard. An interesting third view has since filtered through fronted by 
Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) and report a non-linear (U-shaped) relationship 
between competition and risk.  
           In order to investigate the relationship between competition and financial stability 
in the G7 economies, I seek to address two main research questions. (1) whether the 
impact is homogeneous across several risk types i.e. credit, insolvency, capital and 
liquidity risk, and (2) whether the financial crisis as an exogenous factor altered the 
direction of impact in any significant way. A contentious issue in examining the 
competition-risk-stability nexus is the adoption of bank concentration measures to proxy 
for competition and I address this by employing three measures of market concentration 
(i.e. the lerner index, the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index and the C5 ratio), as well as a 
pure measure of bank competition (i.e. boone indicator), in my empirical analysis. I am 
also alive to endogeneity issues that tend to blight a study of this nature i.e. through 
reverse causality (risk determines competition) or correlation between the market power 
determinants. I respond to and address endogeneity concerns by using the commonly used 
instrumental variable (IV) technique. 
           My results provide support for the competition-fragility view, without necessarily 
disproving the competition-stability view. More specifically, I document that while 
higher competition results in increased credit risk via the loan channel; riskier banks are 
likely to hold higher capital buffers in mitigation. The implication from this result is that 
in so far as banks are concerned, less competition contributes to a higher degree of 
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financial stability. The trade-off is that such concentrated banking systems also provide 
fertile ground for ‘too-big-to-fail’ (TBTF) institutions to breed subjecting the banking 
system to greater risk overall. In sum, I argue that the benefits of competition need to be 
balanced against those of concentration towards the maintenance of the overall soundness 
of the banking system. 
           Research on the competition-risk nexus in banking remains contested with no 
academic consensus emerging yet on whether competition results in higher or lower 
stability levels. This research contributes to and extends current literature by shedding 
more light on this contentious relationship. I also account for both the linear and nonlinear 
aspects of the examined relationship. Moreover, I take a broader view by adopting and 
incorporating into one model four individual risk types, i.e. credit risk, insolvency risk (z-
score), capital risk and liquidity risk and to proxy for financial stability. My findings have 
some important implications for banks, regulators, governments and multilateral financial 
institutions on the management of bank risk for overall system soundness. 
  
1.3.     Competition and financial misreporting in the US financial services industry 
           The general consensus in the mainstream economics and finance domains has been 
that competition is a force for good in so far as the attainment of positive economic 
outcomes is concerned. An emerging literature however challenges this notion of 
competition being beneficial to the wider economy. In this paper, I delve into this 
emerging debate on the pervasive effects (dark side) of competition and focus on the 
interplay between competition and financial misreporting in the US financial services 
industry. I advance two broad and diverging mechanisms through which competition can 
affect financial misreporting i.e. the competition-restraining and the competition-
misreporting hypotheses. The Competition-restraining hypothesis posits the notion that 
firms in more competitive industries are less likely to misreport and follow better 
disclosure and financial reporting practices Gentzkow & Shapiro (2008); Besley & Pratt 
(2006). The counter theory to this is the competition-misreporting hypothesis which 
postulates that firms that operate in more competitive environments will have less 
forthcoming and informative disclosure policies and are more likely to misreport Bloom 
et al. (2010); Bagnoli & Watts (2010). These contradictory notions on the relationship 
between competition and financial misreporting in theoretical studies across the 
accounting, economics and finance domains provide the basis and theoretical 
underpinning for my study.  
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           The research questions I seek to answer for a more refined understanding of the 
link between competition and financial misreporting are based on the interplay between 
competition, financial misreporting and the financial crisis as follows: (1) Did the 
financial crisis impact on financial misreporting incidences in the United States financial 
services industry? (2) Did the financial crisis alter the competitive landscape in the 
financial services industry, and (3) Does the intensity of competition lead to increased 
financial misreporting incidences in the financial services industry? I regress my main 
financial misreporting proxy i.e. SEC AAERs against four competition proxies (market 
size, ease of entry, product substitutability and HHI sales) and a battery of carefully 
selected control variables. I make use of Difference-In-Difference analysis to identify 
exogenous shifts in competition, as well as to evaluate how the financial crisis impacted 
on the occurrence of incidences of financial misreporting in the financial services industry 
in the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. 
           I find that there exists a positive and significant effect of competition on financial 
misreporting i.e. competition escalates the possibility of financial misreporting incidences 
occurring. I also document a positive and significant relationship between the crisis 
variable and competition. These results firmly suggest that the financial crisis altered the 
competitive landscape in the financial services industry.  
           To the best of my knowledge, mine would be the first paper of its kind to 
exclusively focus on a financial services sample and establish a link with financial 
misreporting. By way of contribution, my research adds to and extends the burgeoning 
research probing the so-called the “dark side” of competition within markets that shines 
a light on the negative and undesirable effects of competition in altering the way firms 
behave in the market place. Governments, regulators and academics alike ought to 
critically consider the pervasive effects of competition in policy-making, compliance, 
welfare and other economic deliberations. 
 
1.4     Corporate governance and financial misreporting in US commercial banks 
           According to Acharya and Richardson (2009) the financial crisis can be attributed 
to the degree of complexity ushered into banking on the back of innovation resulting from 
the liberalisation of financial services. The degree of complexity and opacity synonymous 
with the banking intermediation model raise serious corporate governance issues, which 
makes this a compelling setting for empirical based research to be instituted. Increased 
transparency is one of the key aims of corporate governance reforms worldwide and 
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effective governance by boards of directors is seen as influencing the quality of financial 
reporting. The governance of financial institutions has really come to the fore in the crisis 
aftermath Beltratti and Stulz (2012); Pathan and Faff (2013). In this paper, I innovate and 
contribute to extant literature by bringing together two hot and current topics in banking 
literature into one study based on a sample of 17 listed US commercial banks from 2000-
16.  
           My main research question seeks to uncover how five carefully selected corporate 
governance dimensions affect financial misreporting in US commercial banks subject to 
SEC enforcement actions. To this end, I regress my main financial misreporting 
dependent variable (i.e. SEC AAERs) against my corporate governance proxies based on 
five dimensions (i.e. board size, equity ownership, CEO duality, compensation mix and 
insider representation) and a battery of control variables (i.e. financial leverage, large 
international auditor, insolvency risk, bank size, SOX and financial crisis). I further 
decompose the five corporate governance dimensions into sixteen factors to make for a 
more comprehensive list of proxies that facilitates for richer analytical insight into the 
topic e.g. I collapse the board size dimension into four factors i.e. total board size, fraction 
of which female, fraction of which on the audit committee and fraction of which on the 
compensation committee. I adopt and utilise the instrumental variable technique (IV) in 
order to address endogeneity issues emanating from reverse causality and 
multicollinearity resulting from serial correlation among the corporate governance 
factors. 
           I document a negative association between board size and financial misreporting 
consistent with the ‘agency cost’ hypothesis. However, the relationship reverses when 
using a quadratic term of the same variable. Moreover, the CEO power asserts a positive 
effect on misreporting in violation of both the ‘stewardship’ and ‘entrenchment’ 
hypotheses. Additionally, the equity portion of executive compensation is negatively 
related with misreporting; whereas the association is positive between the cash portion 
and misreporting.        
           My findings have got practical implications and speaks to the wider discussion 
around executive compensation as a critical aspect of bank regulation. Most specifically, 
I motivate compliance monitors, regulators and shareholders alike with regards to the 
ongoing agenda for reforms to executive compensation packages. 
           Even though I use the same dataset for Chapters 3 & 4, the studies have different 
thrusts thereby necessitating application of different samples and methods. In Chapter 2, 
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my study contributes to financial misreporting literature by showing that industry 
attributes like competition could play an important role in influencing firms’ propensity 
to misreport e.g. manage earnings. This is against the backdrop of extant literature on 
financial misreporting primarily focusing on identifying firm-specific determinants of 
misreporting e.g. managerial incentives and corporate governance characteristics. In this 
respect, my study is in sync with recent research which suggests that higher order factors 
at the industry or country level play a more prominent role in influencing firm policy and 
governance than firm level factors (e.g. Doidge et al. 2007). I focus my study on the US 
financial services industry firms (SIC Codes 6000-6999) subject to SEC enforcement 
actions from 2000 to 2016. In Chapter 3 I revert to convention and accord prominence to 
how firm-level factors influence financial misreporting using a sample of listed 
commercial banks subject to SEC enforcement actions in the United States from 2000 to 
2016. The variations in sample, variables and methodology can therefore be justified on 
this basis. 
           In probing the competition-financial stability relationship in Chapter 2, I use the 
Instrumental Variable Technique with a GMM estimator Berger et al. (2009), Schaeck & 
Cihak (2012); whereas I effect a slight variation and adopt the two-step ‘system’ GMM 
estimator (within a dynamic panel framework) Arrelano & Bover (1995); Blundell & 
Bond (1998) to evaluate the relationship between corporate governance and financial 
misreporting in Chapter 4 Beltratti & Stulz (2012); Pathan & Faff (2013). It is a common 
strength of the two models that they can be employed in both contexts to address 
endogeneity concerns arising from an examination of the phenomena under consideration 
in my study i.e. competition, corporate governance, financial stability and financial 
misreporting. In Chapter 4 for example, endogeneity concerns can arise from possible 
interrelationships among corporate governance characteristics such as board size, block-
ownership, CEO power, insider representation, compensation mix and financial 
misreporting Wintoki et al. (2012). I use the lagged dependent variable as the only 
instrument in my dynamic panel estimations because of a fairly small sample size in 
Chapter 4, using many instruments would result in estimation bias. Using the lagged 
dependent variable among the regressors (Athanasoglou et al., 2008) can also cure the 
well-known persistence in bank profits (Berger et al., 2000). Against this backdrop, using 
the two-step ‘system’ GMM estimator was more suited to the study of the relationship 
between corporate governance and financial misreporting in Chapter 4 compared with the 
instrumental variable technique with a GMM estimator that I used in Chapter 2.  
8 
 
           The rest of my thesis proceeds as follows. In chapters 2, 3, and 4 I present my 
studies on the previously outlined research topics via the medium of three papers. To be 
more precise, Chapter 2 investigates the interplay between market power, bank risk and 
financial stability in the G7 bloc. Chapter 3 explores the association between competition 
and financial misreporting the US financial services industry. Chapter 4 examines the 
impact of corporate governance on financial misreporting in US commercial banks 
subject to SEC enforcement actions. Finally, Chapter 5 provides the concluding remarks. 
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Chapter 2 – Market structure, bank risk and financial      
                          stability: New evidence from the G7 economies 
 
2.1.     Introduction  
           The stability of the financial system has always been one of the key objectives of 
bank regulators and supervisors. The global financial crisis of the late 2000s has 
transformed the market structure of the banking industry to a great extent. A new 
landscape has been created due to the number of mergers and acquisitions which have 
taken place from the onset of the crisis in 2007 onwards. In addition, many banking 
institutions have either gone bankrupt, or received financial assistance in the form of 
bailouts during the crisis. As a result, a relationship which is once again in the forefront 
is that between competition, bank risk, and financial stability.  
           Until recently, it was almost widely accepted that intensified competition in 
banking negatively influences the stability of the financial sector. This view, which is 
widely known as the competition-fragility view, is central in the Charter Value (CV) 
hypothesis that focuses on the liabilities side of banks’ balance sheets examining 
competition in the deposit markets. Keeley (1990), who is recognised as the grounding 
father of this hypothesis, demonstrates that competition drives down margins erodes 
profits and shrinks the franchise value of banks; and with less to lose, banks have strong 
incentives to engage in riskier investment activities which induce higher insolvency rates 
and threaten the stability of the financial system.  
           A burgeoning literature that has more recently turned to examine both the 
liabilities and the assets side of banks’ balance sheets challenged Keeley (1990)’s 
doctrine, documenting a positive link between market power and bank risk-taking. 
Indeed, Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) show that banks with market power have the ability 
to charge higher interest rates to firms and this raises borrowers’ credit risk as a result of 
moral hazard. Boyd et al. (2006) and De Nicolo and Loukoianova (2007) provide among 
others further empirical support to this negative link between market concentration and 
financial stability.  
           A third view on the competition-risk-stability nexus is provided by Allen and Gale 
(2004). Based on a variety of modelling approaches, they investigate the relationship that 
holds between competition and financial stability and find no clear trade-off between the 
two variables. In a similar vein, Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) report a non-linear 
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(U-shaped) relationship between competition and risk. Their model - which extends that 
of Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) - reveals that as the number of banks increases and 
competition becomes more intense, total bank risk decreases. Nevertheless, the sign of 
the examined relationship holds up to some certain level of competition. Beyond that 
level, banks are found to take more risk thus exerting a harmful impact on the stability of 
the system. 
           Even though the link between competition and financial stability is a widely 
researched area, there is yet no academic consensus on whether competition results in 
higher or lower stability levels. In this paper, I contribute to current literature by shedding 
more light on this contentious relationship. Towards this, I test all three views that 
currently hold in the literature by accounting for both the linear and nonlinear aspects of 
the examined relationship. Moreover, while previous research is largely focused on a 
single bank risk type as a proxy for stability (see, e.g. Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005; Schaeck 
and Cihak, 2012), I take a broader view adopting three individual key risk types, i.e. credit 
risk, capital risk, and liquidity risk together with a measure of overall bank risk captured 
by the z-score as a proxy for financial stability. Such an approach allows me to provide a 
richer insight and a more comprehensive response to a crucial research question which 
asks whether the impact of competition is homogeneous across different risk types. A 
major issue in examining the competition-risk-stability nexus has been the adoption of 
bank concentration as a proxy for competition. To address this, I clearly distinguish 
between competition and concentration by employing three measures of market 
concentration in our empirical analysis as well as a pure measure of bank competition. 
           I conduct a cross-country analysis based on the commercial banking sectors of the 
G7 economies. My focus on these economies is due to several important reasons. First, 
the G7 banking sectors were seriously hit by the crisis and have therefore undergone 
considerable changes in their market structure due to large-scale bailouts, mergers, 
acquisitions and failures. Second, the G7 countries account for more than 50% of the GDP 
of the global economy. Third, an understanding of the competition-risk dynamics in the 
leading world economies is vital because the latter set the tone for other economies to 
follow in so far as best practice in bank regulation and supervision is concerned. Finally, 
G7 is the most representative set of economies in terms of banking and financial services 
sophistication, business models, and standards to which all other western-type economies 
wish to adhere. My data period extends from 2000 to 2015, thus including the period 
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preceding the global financial crisis which erupted in 2007-10, the crisis years as well as 
the post-crisis era. 
           I provide support to the competition-fragility view, without yet being able to reject 
the competition-stability view. More specifically, my results suggest that while higher 
competition results in increased credit risk via the loan channel; riskier banks are likely 
to hold higher capital buffers in mitigation. The implication from this result is that in so 
far as banks are concerned, less competition contributes to a higher degree of financial 
stability. The trade-off is that such concentrated banking systems also provide fertile 
ground for ‘too-big-to-fail’ institutions to breed subjecting the banking system to greater 
risk overall. In sum, I argue that the benefits of competition need to be balanced against 
those of concentration towards the maintenance of the overall soundness of the banking 
system.  
           The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the related 
literature through the lenses of the three prevalent views. Section 3 develops the 
hypotheses to be tested. Section 4 presents the data set, the model variables and the 
underlying empirical methodology. Section 5 reports and discusses the empirical findings 
and their policy and business implications. Section 6 presents the robustness analysis I 
conduct, whereas Section 7 offers a set of concluding remarks. 
 
2.2.     Literature review  
           The literature on the competition-risk-stability nexus can essentially be distilled 
into three broad strands: the Charter Value Hypothesis (henceforth, CV Hypothesis), the 
Boyd and DeNicolo (2005) Hypothesis (henceforth, BDN Hypothesis), and the Martinez-
Miera and Repullo (2010) Hypothesis (henceforth, MMR Hypothesis). 
 
     2.2.1.     The CV Hypothesis 
           The CV hypothesis reflects the competition-fragility view and has been the 
conventional view on the competition-risk-stability nexus, which is backed by a large 
body of literature. Following the widespread deregulation and the relaxation of state 
branching restrictions in the U.S. banking sector during the 1980s, Keeley (1990) 
commissioned a ground-breaking study. Based on a data set that extended from 1971 to 
1986, he regressed the capital-to-asset ratios of 85 large U.S. bank holding companies on 
their market-to-book asset ratios, utilising Tobin’s q as the key measure of market power. 
He founded that increased competition erodes market power, decreases profit margins, 
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and, eventually, results in shrinking bank charter values. This mechanism provides banks 
with incentives to take on more risk to compensate for the squeeze in profitability. 
Restrained competition, on the other hand, encourages banks to protect their higher 
franchise values by pursuing safer policies and this has a positive impact on the stability 
of the system. 
           Against the background of the negative impact of competition on the stability of 
the banking system, the reasoning behind the stability-enhancing effect of concentrated 
systems becomes apparent. Greater market power for a bank is linked to greater charter 
value. As an intangible asset, the charter value can only have meaning if the bank remains 
alive. One can clearly glean from this fact that the opportunity cost of going bust is higher 
for banks with a greater charter value. Therefore, charter value has a restraining effect on 
bank risk-taking behaviour and can, in fact, render the task of regulators to maintain 
financial stability less cumbersome. The need to preserve charter value is greater and 
these banks naturally tend to behave more prudently, e.g., through keeping more equity 
capital as a buffer against financial turmoil or an economic downturn, by holding less 
risky portfolios, or by presiding over lean loan portfolios. 
           The Glass Steagall Act (GSA) of 1933 was specifically crafted to curb competition 
in banking by limiting the scope of activities banks could venture into and restricting 
entry through stringent licensing and high capital requirements. Keeley (1990) conducted 
his study against the background of the gradual dilution of GSA on the back of heavy 
lobbying from large and systemically-important banks in the U.S. for greater 
liberalisation, which would allow for mergers and acquisitions essentially culminating in 
banks transacting insurance business and growing their investment banking portfolios 
among other activities. An argument can be made that during the period from 1933 when 
the GSA was introduced to 1999 when it was repealed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 
there had not been many bank failures and panics comparable to the magnitude and scale 
of bankruptcies during the global financial crisis of 2007-10.  
           Hellmann et al. (2000) focus on the liabilities side of bank’s balance sheet to 
investigate whether capital requirements are an effective regulatory tool to curb moral 
hazard in a highly liberalised environment. In line with Keely (1990), they document that 
increased competition in the deposit market undermines prudent behaviour leading to 
depressed profitability which, in turn, destroys charter values, thereby escalating the 
incentives for moral hazard. They cite the Japanese banking crisis and the U.S. Savings 
and Loans crisis as examples of excessive risk-taking that yielded enormous social costs. 
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They attribute this to the financial liberalisation process, which pulled down branching 
restrictions and barriers to entry with the purpose to render the banking system more 
competitive. This phenomenon is more acute in an environment with comprehensive 
deposit insurance coverage. In other words, banks have stronger incentives to take on 
more risks in a market where a government safety net is in existence thus making the 
system more fragile. Like Smith (1984), who proposes deposit rate ceilings as a more 
effective and appropriate regulatory measure to rein in deposit market competition, 
Hellman et al. (2000) argue that deposit rate controls are more efficient than capital 
requirements as an instrument to curb the market-stealing effect and, at the same time, to 
incentivise banks to behave more prudently.  
           Consistent with the afore-mentioned findings, Craig and Dinger (2013) show that 
deposit market competition leads to an upsurge in the cost of bank liabilities, which results 
in a squeeze in bank profitability. This alters bank behaviour and leads to a depletion of 
bank charter values thereby reducing financial stability. Gan (2004) and Beck et al. (2006) 
also endorse the CV hypothesis. Gan (2004) casts the spotlight on the Texas real estate 
crisis and employs the logarithmic transformation of the number of thrifts and the number 
of bank branches in a town as the two measures of competition in his empirical analysis. 
He finds that competition reduces banks’ franchise value, which in turn induce banks to 
take on more risk. Using an international sample of banks, Beck et al. (2006) reaches the 
conclusion that the likelihood of a financial crisis is lower in economies with concentrated 
banking systems. 
           The findings of two recent studies are also consistent with the CV hypothesis as 
reflected in the competition-fragility view. Berger et al. (2009) study the impact of 
competition on financial stability using a sample of 8,325 banks from 23 industrial 
countries from 1999 to 2005. The results reveal a negative relationship between market 
power and loan portfolio risk. Also, they find that banks in competitive environments 
tend to hold higher capital buffers as a risk-mitigating technique that offsets the increased 
credit risk in their portfolios. Along the same lines, in a sample consisting exclusively of 
Spanish banks, Jimenez et al. (2013) document a positive relationship between market 
power in the loan market and portfolio risk. They found that the amount of non-
performing loans decreases as the market becomes more concentrated and, as a result, 
financial stability is promoted. 
           Other studies examine the competition-risk-stability nexus from a market structure 
perspective, providing support to the CV hypothesis. For instance, Bordo et al. (1995) 
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compare the performance of the Canadian and U.S. banking systems in terms of efficiency 
and stability based on historical data. They observe a period during which the Canadian 
banking market steadily turned from a system with many competing banks to an oligopoly 
through a large number of consolidations and report a greater stability in the Canadian 
system compared to the U.S. system in terms of failure rates during that period. They 
point to the oligopolistic nature of the Canadian system as the main reason for its relative 
stability compared to the fragmented and competitive nature of that of the U.S. The 
broader implication is that a more concentrated banking market can be synonymous with 
stability, which provides support to the competition-fragility view. A system dominated 
by a few large banks is more stable because these banks have higher charter values, 
implying greater opportunity cost of failure thereby making banks more prudent in their 
risk-taking behaviour. 
           The relevance of market structure in the competition-risk relationship was brought 
into question by Matutes and Vives (1996), who argue that competition does not 
necessarily create instability by itself. They show that bank vulnerability and bank runs 
can take off in spite of competition; put it otherwise, they can occur under any market 
structure. However, a recent paper by Mirzaei et al. (2013) rebuts the assertion of market 
structure irrelevance in so far as bank profitability and stability are concerned. It is found 
that greater market power leads to higher profitability in advanced economies. Higher 
profitability, in turn, implies safer banks, and, hence, greater financial stability. Lee and 
Hsieh (2013) also explore the competition-profitability relationship focusing on Chinese 
banks and provide support to the findings of Mirzaei et al. (2013). They reach the 
conclusion that competition strengthens overall financial stability by improving the 
profitability of banks. Most recently and in direct contradiction with the CVR hypothesis, 
Fiordelisi & Mare (2014) used the lerner index as the market power / competition proxy 
to assess the relationship between competition and bank soundness among a large sample 
of European cooperative banks between 1998 and 2009 and found a positive association 
between competition and banking system stability. 
 
     2.2.2.     The BDN Hypothesis 
           A considerable argument can be mounted against the focus of the studies outlined 
above on a specific channel, i.e., either on the deposit or the lending channel. However, 
commercial banks, being in the business of taking deposits and providing credit, compete 
in either channel simultaneously. Therefore, papers that embrace this fact and develop 
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models that cater for and accommodate both channels are expected to produce more 
robust findings. Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) argue that existing research on financial 
stability assume that competition is allowed in deposit markets while suppressed in credit 
markets. Hence, they proceeded to introduce models where competition is allowed in both 
markets. Studies that belong to this strand of literature challenge the mainstream CV 
hypothesis / competition-fragility view, documenting a positive relationship between 
market power and bank risk. 
           Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) establish the competition-stability view showing that 
enhanced market power in the loan market results in higher bank risk as the higher interest 
rates charged to loan customers make it harder for them to repay their loans. Further, 
higher rates exacerbate the moral hazard incentives of borrowers to shift into riskier 
projects due to adverse selection considerations. They also claim that a highly 
concentrated banking market may lead to excessive risk-taking if banks are considered to 
be too-big-to-fail and, as such, are more likely to be explicitly or implicitly protected by 
the government safety net. 
           The postulations of Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) on the impact of high rates on 
borrowers’ risk-taking behaviour are strongly supported by an earlier study, that of 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). The latter study posits that higher interest rates increase the 
riskiness of loan portfolios by exacerbating adverse selection and moral hazard. When 
rates are high, it is more likely that bank loans will be directed to risky borrowers, who 
are willing to invest in high-risk investment projects aiming for higher returns. In other 
words, higher rates tend to deter safe borrowers from the credit market, but they constitute 
an inducement to venture into riskier projects, thus increasing the probability of default. 
This eventually results in an increase in non-performing loans, which ultimately 
undermines financial stability. 
           In line with Boyd and De Nicolo (2005), the studies of Boyd et al. (2006, 2009) 
and that of De Nicolo and Loukoianova (2007) provide empirical support to the negative 
link between market concentration and financial stability. Overall, this strand of literature 
builds upon the competition-stability view according to which a more concentrated 
banking system with a smaller number of entities leads to an upsurge in total problem 
loans and insolvencies thus enhancing the probability of systemic distress. This view is 
in line with the Too-Big-To-Fail (TBTF) doctrine (Mishkin, 1999), which suggests that 
managers of large banks with high market power usually follow a gambling policy taking 
risky financial decisions. This happens because they share the belief that in case the 
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gamble does not win, authorities will not allow big banks to fail because the whole system 
might collapse. In this way, a more monopolized banking system leads to greater risk-
taking, which is detrimental to bank soundness. 
           The findings from an earlier study by Boyd and Graham (1991) who approach the 
examined relationship from an angle where they seek to answer the question whether 
large banks fail less often than small banks in the U.S., contradict the postulations of 
Bordo et al. (1995) as presented in Section 2.1. Boyd and Graham (1991) find that the 
cumulative annual failure rate for large banks is higher than that for small banks.  The 
intuition behind this is that a market punctuated by small banks (implying a higher level 
of competition) is more stable than a concentrated market punctuated by a few big banks. 
           The relationship between competition and financial stability has also been 
explored from the perspective of bank capitalisation. Schaeck and Cihak (2012) use 8,584 
bank-year observations from 10 European countries to test whether increased competition 
causes banks to hold higher capital ratios. Their findings support the BDN Hypothesis: 
banks hold more capital as a buffer when operating in a more competitive environment 
and this enhances the stability of the system. In a similar vein, Allen et al. (2011) examine 
the relationship between credit market competition and capital regulation. They posit that 
where credit markets are competitive, market discipline from the asset side of the balance 
sheet induces banks to hold increased levels of capital as a way to commit to monitor and 
attract safe borrowers. Higher capital enhances the charter value of banks thereby 
increasing financial stability. An interesting question to pose here is whether holding 
capital above the regulatory minima is sufficient to maintain financial stability. Several 
banks went bankrupt during the 2007-10 crisis despite holding higher capital thresholds. 
This suggests that the ‘welfare-maximising’ capital level for banks may be well above 
the regulatory minima depending on how stringent they have been pitched in the first 
place.  
           In another study that reinforces the stability-enhancing effect of competition on 
financial stability, Inderst (2013) shows that corporate borrowers care about the financial 
strength of a bank because this determines to a significant extent their future access to 
credit. He argues that where banks’ risk positions are transparent to commercial 
borrowers, prudence can become a key competitive variable as competition restrains the 
risk appetites of such banks thereby improving overall stability. 
           Carletti & Leonello (2014) posit the argument that competition is beneﬁcial to 
ﬁnancial stability as it induces banks to behave prudently and hold more liquidity. This 
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ties in with the conclusion reached in Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) and establishes the 
study firmly in the competition-stability view. It is noteworthy to state that the two studies 
converge in their key postulations even though the former one is focused on liquidity risk 
while the latter on credit risk as the source of instability. 
           Akins et al. (2014) examine the relationship between competition and financial 
stability in the post-crisis period focusing on the U.S. real estate market and find that 
banks which face less competition are more likely to engage in risky activities and, hence, 
to fail. In a similar vein, Beck et al. (2013) find a negative relationship between market 
power and bank risk-taking. They emphasise that the strength of the relationship between 
the two variables varies across countries based on the institutional environments. Schaeck 
et al. (2009) also conclude that greater competition results in a reduction in bank risk-
taking. More concretely, they find that the likelihood of experiencing a financial crisis is 
lower for countries with more competitive banking systems. Boyd et al. (2009) find that 
when competition is higher, borrower risk is lower, and the loan-to-asset ratio is higher, 
implying that the bankruptcy risk of banks is lower. 
           In a recent study on the interplay between competition, efficiency and stability 
Schaeck and Cihak (2014) empirically examine the mechanism through which 
competition contributes to banking system stability as widely suggested in most of the 
recent papers on the competition-risk nexus in banking. They use representative data from 
the European banking system from 1995-2005 and exploit the unique features of a 
relatively new competition measure i.e. the Boone Indicator to investigate the mechanism 
through which competition contribute to financial stability. The results found efficiency 
to be the conduit through which competition enhances the stability of the banking system. 
Efficient banks are by extension more stable thereby ultimately enhancing the stability of 
the system as a whole. However, competition-enhancing policies need to be augmented 
by efficient regulation to have positive effects on bank efficiency and stability. A plethora 
of studies have since filtered through in emphatic support of the competition-stability 
view i.e. BDN hypothesis. Akins et al. (2016) examined the link between competition and 
financial stability in the context of the financial crisis and vouched for the competition-
stability view i.e. banks facing less competition are more likely to engage in risky 
activities, face regulatory intervention and thus more likely to fail. In another recent paper 
supporting the BDN hypothesis on the competition-risk nexus in banking, Anginer et al 
(2014) examined the correlation in the risk-taking behaviour of banks using bank-level 
measures of competition. They document a negative relationship between competition 
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and systemic risk i.e. that competition encourages banks to take on more diversified risks, 
making the banking system more fragile to shocks. Contributing to the same research area 
and more specifically on competition and bank opacity, Jiang et al. (2016) posed the 
question whether regulatory reforms that lowered barriers to competition increased or 
decreased the quality of information banks disclose to the public. They found that an 
intensification of competition reduced abnormal accruals, loan loss provisions and the 
frequency of financial statement restatement. They also document that competition 
reduced opacity yet enhanced the ability of markets to monitor banks. Most recently on 
the competition-risk nexus, Goetz (2017) investigated whether an increase in competition 
leads to an increase or decrease in bank stability and found that deregulation lowered 
entry barriers into urban banking, and this had the positive effect of increasing market 
competitiveness. This increased market contestability improves bank stability by 
reducing banks’ failure probability, share of non-performing loans and increases 
profitability.  
 
     2.2.3.     The MMR Hypothesis 
           In a break from either the pure competition-fragility or competition-stability views 
as presented in the preceding sections, Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) document a 
non-linear relationship between competition and financial stability. Their model extends 
that of Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) revealing that, as the number of financial institutions 
increases, and competition is boosted, a decrease in bank risk-taking is reported. 
However, this relationship holds up to a certain point. Beyond that point, competition 
leads banks to increase their risk and this becomes harmful for systemic stability. 
           There are essentially two competing forces, which ultimately yield this U-shaped 
relationship: the risk-shifting and the margin effects. The former positively influences 
financial stability via the reduction in borrowers’ default rates because of lower loan rates. 
The intuition behind this is that, when banks charge lower rates, the ability of borrowers 
to repay their loans increases.  On the other hand, the margin effect shows that lower loan 
rates diminish bank revenues from performing loans thereby limiting the capacity of 
banks to withstand financial shocks and turbulences. In sum, the model hints at an 
optimum level of competition beyond which the trend reverses.  
           Assessing the impact of competition on bank risk-taking, Jimenez et al. (2013) also 
provide evidence of a non-linear relationship between the two variables. They use data 
from the Spanish banking system in both the deposit and credit markets to endorse the 
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MMR Hypothesis. Nevertheless, their findings hold true only when pure concentration 
measures are used to proxy competition; when the Lerner Index is utilised instead, the 
results support the CV Hypothesis.  
           A relevant body of emerging literature widely embraces and acknowledges the 
uniqueness of banking institutions in terms of the environment and the market dynamics 
within which they operate. Liu and Wilson (2013) focus on the Japanese banking industry 
to test whether the relationship between competition and risk varies across different types 
of banks, i.e., city versus regional banks. Their empirical results are interestingly mixed. 
The impact is not homogeneous but rather varies based on the risk level of the bank in 
relation to the competitiveness of the environment within which the bank operates. They 
find competition to have a positive impact on the risk profile of the less risky banks, and 
a negative impact on their risky counterparts. Drawing from a sample of 17 Latin 
American countries between 2001 and 2008, Tabak et al. (2013) assessed how bank size 
and market concentration affect performance and risks. They found systemically-
important banks to outperform others in terms of both profit and cost i.e. implying support 
for the charter-value hypothesis this way. However, an unequal banking market in terms 
of assets is detrimental to the performance of smaller banks, thus decreasing the stability 
of the whole system. Regulators therefore ought to work to reduce the size gap between 
large and small banks as a result. 
 
2.3.     Hypotheses development  
           I can now rely on the literature reviewed in Section 2 to describe the channels 
through which competition and concentration affects risk and, in turn, financial stability 
and to proceed to formulate the relevant hypotheses to be tested. 
 
     2.3.1.     Competition and insolvency risk  
           Insolvency risk has been widely used in the empirical banking literature as a proxy 
for financial stability (see, e.g., Schaeck et al., 2009; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Berger et 
al., 2009; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Houston et al., 2010; Lepetit and Strobel, 
2013). Most of these studies find that insolvency risk increases in more concentrated 
banking markets. In other words, the likelihood of bank failure is lower under competitive 
market conditions, which is in line with the BDN Hypothesis. This array of literature 
provides the basis and directly leads into the development of my first hypothesis: 
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H1: Stronger competition reduces bank insolvency risk and, hence, contributes to a 
sounder financial system 
 
     2.3.2.     Competition and credit risk  
           The findings in the literature are mixed with regards to the impact of competition 
on credit risk. Studies that support the CV Hypothesis document a negative relationship 
between market power and credit risk. In particular, they show that greater market power 
leads to a decrease in loan portfolio risk, thus promoting financial stability. Along the 
same lines, they find that competition exerts a detrimental impact on loan portfolio risk. 
The BDN Hypothesis, on the other hand, illustrates that banks with market power earn 
monopoly rents by charging higher interest rates on loans making it harder for borrowers 
to service their loans. Further, that higher interest rates increase adverse selection 
problems in that safer borrowers are discouraged increasing the likelihood of risky 
projects being funded, which leads to an increase in non-performing loans, thus ultimately 
undermining financial stability. All these result in an increase in the level of credit risk in 
the economy, which constitutes a threat for the stability of the system. This mixed 
literature on the impact of competition on credit risk set the tone for the formulation of 
my second hypothesis, which is in line with the BDN Hypothesis: 
H2: Lower competition is synonymous with increased credit risk 
 
     2.3.3.     Competition and capital risk  
           The stability-enhancing effect of competition on bank capital adequacy seems to 
be indisputable in all three literature strands as presented in Section 2. A higher capital 
threshold translates into a higher charter value, and this, in turn, increases the opportunity 
cost of failure. Consequently, banks have incentives to act more prudently and take less 
risky investment decisions, thereby promoting financial stability. In addition, the 
assertion of Allen et al. (2011) that banks in competitive environments hold higher capital 
levels as a means to attract safer borrowers further endorses the positive relationship 
between competition and the level of capital buffers. It therefore follows that creditworthy 
borrowers are attracted to banks with higher capital levels as they are most likely to 
benefit from close monitoring which adds value to their project. According to Schaeck 
and Cihak (2012), borrower performance improves with increased and close monitoring 
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from the lending bank as the borrower benefits from the financial expertise of the bank. 
The above informs and guides the formation of my third hypothesis: 
H3: Competition has a restraining effect on financial stability as it compels banks to hold 
higher capital ratios 
 
2.3.4.     Competition and liquidity risk 
           Liquidity risk, together with capital risk, lies at the centre of Basel III regulations 
in response to the latest crisis. Whilst the extant literature on the competition-risk-stability 
nexus widely utilise credit risk as the conduit through which banks import risk into the 
financial system, liquidity risk can be an equally devastating avenue of instability. Indeed, 
the maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities can become a crucial source of risk 
if banks are unable to raise liquidity on demand (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2007). 
When liquidity conditions tighten, borrowing becomes expensive and illiquid assets are 
disposed at ﬁre sale prices. Ultimately, this leaves banks unable to withstand any liquidity 
shocks and, as such, exposed to insolvency. Carletti and Leonello (2014) show that 
competition is beneﬁcial to ﬁnancial stability as it induces banks to behave prudently and 
hold more liquidity. In other words, the opportunity cost of holding reserves is greater in 
more concentrated markets. A similarity can be gleaned from this with my preceding 
capital risk hypothesis where there is broad support for the stability-enhancing effect of 
competition on capital thresholds. To this end, I cast the spotlight on liquidity risk and 
frame my fourth hypothesis: 
H4: Competition induces banks to strengthen their liquidity positions as a means of 
safeguarding their franchise value 
 
2.4.     Empirical analysis 
           There are mainly two approaches in the literature to assess the competition-risk-
stability nexus: the cross-country and the single-country set-up. The former approach 
provides an insight into the average relationship between competition and risk for a set 
of countries (see, e.g., the studies of Turk Ariss (2010) on developing countries and that 
of Berger et al. (2009) on a set of industrialised economies). In my empirical analysis, I 
adopt and apply the cross-country approach to the G7 economies, i.e., Canada, France, 
German, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and the United States. 
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     2.4.1.     Sample banks 
           There has been a broader agreement amongst bank regulators on the ‘ring-fencing’ 
of commercial from investment banking activities as a means of separating the safe from 
the risky banking arms. This imposes the need to focus on the competition-risk-stability 
nexus from a purely commercial banking perspective. I therefore exclusively focus on 
commercial banks by filtering out the cooperative, savings, and investment banks as well 
as the credit unions/associations. Even though some of these institutions primarily take 
deposits and grant loans, they often have other business objectives to satisfy. In addition, 
they do not attract the same regulatory scrutiny and oversight as commercial banks, which 
makes their analysis a rather arduous and misdirected exercise.  
           I obtain my sample of commercial banks from the Bureau van Dijk Bankscope 
database. As shown in Table 2.2, the initial sample consists of 53,616 bank-year 
observations within the jurisdiction of the G7 group of countries over the period 2000-
2015. I apply several filtering rules to eliminate all the non-representative data. Firstly, I 
exclude the banks with missing observations for more than half of our sample period (that 
is, 8 years or more), and also those with missing income statement data. Secondly, I leave 
out those with negative equity values. And, finally, I exclude all banks with equity levels 
in the top and bottom 1% of the tail distribution as a means of combating the likely 
dominance of my study by the U.S. banks, which comprise the majority of my sample 
banks. Applying these filtering rules provides me with a sample of 49,625 bank-year 
observations, which is composed of 2,899 commercial banks. The bank-year observations 
and the number of banks for each of the G7 economies are presented in Table 2.3. 
 
     2.4.2.     Regression analysis 
           My regression model is based on a panel data set and takes the following 
specification: 
 
𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝑏𝑜 + 𝑏1𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑐 + 𝑏2𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑐
2  + 𝑏3𝑅𝑉𝑡𝑐 + 𝑏4𝐼𝑉𝑡𝑐 +  𝑏5𝑀𝐶𝑡𝑐 + 𝑏6𝐼𝐵𝑖𝑡𝑐 +
𝑏7𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑐  +  𝑏8𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑐  +  𝑏9𝐶𝑅𝑡𝑐 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑐        (2.1) 
 
           In this equation, the subscripts 𝑖, 𝑡, 𝑐 refer to bank, time and country respectively. 
All the bank-level variables are estimated as the average of a particular variable obtained 
for each bank for each period per country i.e. I initially calculate at the bank-year level 
and then average by country on a yearly basis between 2000 and 2015. This allows me to 
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maintain (and not average out) vital phenomena at the bank-level which could otherwise 
be lost by country-level averaging of bank-specific variables. The country-level variables 
are averaged for each period per country and included in the regressions Berger et al. 
(2009); Fiordelisi & Mare (2014). 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 is a vector of bank-specific risk estimates which 
is proxied by the z-score, non- performing loans to total loans ratio (NPLTL), equity to 
total assets ratio (ETAR) and cash deposit ratio (CDR) (for insolvency, credit, capital and 
liquidity risk respectively); 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑐 is a vector of the linear term of the competition and 
concentration measures i.e. Lerner Index, Boone Indicator, C5 ratio and HHI loans. 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑐
2  is a vector of the quadratic term of the competition measures (i.e. Lerner index, 
Boone indicator, C5 ratio & HHI loans). This has been built into the model to allow for 
the non-linear hypothesis advanced by Martinez-Miera & Repullo (2010) which contends 
that the competition-financial stability relationship is non-linear; 𝑅𝑉𝑡𝑐 is the country-level 
regulation variable and measures the overall quality of supervision in a country i.e. 
capital stringency (CAPSTRI); 𝐼𝑉𝑡𝑐 is the country-level institutional framework variable 
and captures the strength of institutions in a country i.e. depth of information sharing 
(DINFOS); and 𝑀𝐶𝑡𝑐  is the country-level macroeconomic variable capturing variations 
in the macroeconomic environments of the sample countries i.e. GDP growth (GDPGR). 
Country-specific variables i.e. regulatory, institutional and macroeconomic 
variables change slowly over time. I consider the last updated dataset to be the 
current one until a new and up to date set comes along Beck et al. (2013); 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡𝑐 
represents a bank-level variable capturing individual characteristics of bank 𝑖 at time 𝑡 in 
country 𝑐 i.e. bank size (BANSIZ) Berger et al. (2009); 𝐼𝐵𝑖𝑡𝑐 is a bank-level variable 
capturing individual characteristics of bank 𝑖 at time 𝑡 in country 𝑐 i.e. the interbank 
ratio (IBANK) Fiordelisi et al. (2014) 𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑐 is a bank-level variable capturing individual 
characteristics of bank 𝑖 at time 𝑡 in country 𝑐 i.e. asset composition (ASSCOMP) Berger 
et al. (2009); 𝐶𝑅𝑡𝑐 is a crisis dummy to capture the effect of the global financial crisis 
and is equal to 1 for the crisis years (from 2007 to 2010), otherwise equal to zero for the 
non-crisis years (pre & post-crisis periods); and 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑐 is a vector of the random errors.  
           I retrieve bank-level financial information from the Bankscope database 
(ASSCOMP, IBANK, BANSIZ, ZSCORE, NPLTL, ETAR, LERNER, HHIL& CR5); 
while country-level variables data are obtained from the World Bank Development 
Indicators (GDPGR) (Business (2011), Fraser Index (LEGRI) (Gwartney et al. (2008), 
the Heritage Foundation (BANFRE) (Miles et al. (2006), Barth et al. (2013) (ACTRES, 
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PERGO), Beck et al. (2010) (CAPSTRI), Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2005) (DEPINS), 
Financial Structure Database (DINFOS, STOMTU)1. Again, country-specific variables 
i.e. regulatory, institutional and macroeconomic variables change slowly over time. 
I consider the last updated dataset to be the current one until a new and up to date 
set comes along Beck et al. (2013). The Bankscope database reports detailed balance 
sheet and income statement information for both private and public banks of any given 
country. The database has been widely used in the banking literature and provides 
harmonised data that allows for cross-country comparisons as is the case in this study. 
           I adopt the Instrumental Variable (IV) technique with General Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimator to address the potential endogeneity issues of the competition and 
concentration measures in this paper Berger et al. (2009); Schaeck & Cihak (2012). 
Endogeneity can arise from reverse causality e.g. when a bank’s degree of market power 
is dependent on the riskiness of its loan portfolio. A bank that swells its loan portfolio as 
a growth strategy assumes greater risk, but the resultant increase in profitability accruing 
to the bank may be a source of increased power for the bank in the market place.  
           Heteroscedasticity is a common challenge in using empirical data and has the 
effect of rendering the usual diagnostic tests for endogeneity invalid when present. In the 
presence of heteroscedasticity, the Instrumental Variable (IV) coefficient estimates 
remain consistent but the estimates of their standard errors are inconsistent, and this 
ultimately prevents valid inference and thus renders the GMM estimator inefficient. Prior 
to running the GMM regressions, I therefore test for heteroscedasticity using the Breusch-
Pagan and Cook-Weisberg tests and they both confirm its presence. This justifies my 
choice of the GMM estimator introduced by Hansen (1982) as it is widely touted to be 
the most effective to use when confronted with Heteroscedasticity of an unknown form 
as is the case here.  
           I use the first-stage F-statistic to test for the relevance of the instrumental variables; 
rejecting the null hypothesis implies that the variables are not exogenous. I proceed to 
utilise Hansen’s J-Statistic of over-identification to test for instrument validity; rejecting 
the null hypothesis implies that the instruments are invalid. The GMM estimator is 
adopted to address the likely endogeneity of competition and concentration measures but 
it can only apply in the absence of heteroscedasticity Hansen (1982). In using the 
                                                          
1 Table 2.1 provides an outline of the descriptions, sources and abbreviations of the dependent, 
explanatory and instrumental variables used for this study.  
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instrumental variable technique with a GMM Estimator, I follow Berger et al. (2007) and 
adopt activity restrictions, banking freedom and percentage of government owned banks 
as instruments for the competition proxies. Schaeck & Cihak (2007) and Schaeck & Cihak 
(2012) used the same instruments, but with a 2SLS technique. Activity restrictions 
determine the scope of banks’ business activities and are proxied by an index taking on 
values between (1) and (4) for categories that capture information on whether banks can 
engage in securities, insurance, and real estate activities, and if they can hold stakes in 
non-banks. The activities are classified as unrestricted (1), permitted (2), restricted (3), or 
prohibited (4) and higher values indicate greater restrictions. I source this variable from 
Barth et al. (2013). I adopt and use banking freedom as an indicator of banking system 
openness. The index offers data on whether foreign banks can operate freely, on the 
difficulties faced when establishing banks, and on government influence over credit 
allocation. The index ranges from (1) to (5), higher values indicate fewer restrictions and 
I source this variable from the Heritage Foundation Berger et al. (2009). Finally, I also 
use the percentage of government-owned banks in a market as an instrument and I source 
it from Barth et al. (2013). Percent of government owned impacts the competitive 
situation directly in much the same fashion as banking freedom; the impact being more 
pronounced as it leaves banks susceptible to political decisions. Table 2.1 presents the 
key variables used in this paper at a glance.  
  
     2.4.3.     Competition measures 
           Nicolo et al. (2006) conclude that the probability of bank failure is higher in 
concentrated markets. However, upon closer scrutiny, the results are not so emphatic. The 
correlation coefficient and the regression parameter estimate between concentration and 
financial stability are negatively significant (i.e., -0.06 & -0.0004 respectively), implying 
a trade-off between competition and financial stability. However, both are very close to 
zero, thereby hinting at a possible lack of an economically meaningful relationship 
between concentration and stability.  
           There is an important point to note: both Boyd and De Nicolo (2005), Boyd et al. 
(2006, 2009) and De Nicolo and Loukoianova (2007) draw their conclusions from using 
pure concentration measures to estimate market structure. It has become widely accepted 
in the competition-risk nexus in banking that competitive conduct in banking cannot be 
sufficiently estimated using concentration indicators. In evaluating the degree of 
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competition in the German banking industry, Moch (2013) reinforces the argument that 
concentration measures cannot proxy for contestability. 
           I utilise the lerner index as the main measure of concentration. It is a proxy for 
profits that accrue to a bank as a result of its pricing power in the market and has been 
widely used in literature. The lerner index proxies for current and future profits resulting 
from pricing power, thus ties in perfectly with the charter value theoretical postulation. 
The index describes a firm’s market power and is defined as: 
 
𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 
𝑃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑀𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝑖,𝑡
        (2.2) 
 
where: 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the price of total assets i.e. proxied by the ratio of total revenue (interest and 
other income) to total assets for bank 𝑖 at time 𝑡; 𝑀𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is the marginal cost of total assets 
for bank 𝑖 at time 𝑡. The index ranges from a high of 1 to a low of 0, with high numbers 
implying greater market power. For a perfectly competitive firm 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑀𝐶𝑖,𝑡 and therefore 
meaning no market power. 𝑀𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is estimated from a translog cost function using the 
ratios of personnel expenses to total assets, interest expense to total deposits and other 
operating & administration expenses to total assets as the three input prices for labour, 
funds and fixed capital respectively. The translog cost function is as follows: 
ln 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1 ln 𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 
𝛽2
2
ln 𝑄𝑖𝑡
2
+  ∑ 𝛾𝑡𝑐 ln 𝑊𝑖𝑡𝑐 +  ∑ ∅𝑐 ln 𝑄𝑖𝑡 ln 𝑊𝑖𝑡𝑐 +  ∑ ∑ ln 𝑊𝑖𝑡𝑐 ln 𝑊𝑖𝑡𝑐 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡
3
𝑗=1
3
𝑐=1
3
𝑐=1
3
𝑐=1
  
           (2.3) 
where: 𝑄𝑖𝑡 represents is a proxy for the bank output (i.e. total assets) for bank i at time t  
(Berg & Kim, 1994). Witc is a vector of the three input prices of labour, funds and fixed 
capital and are calculated as the ratios of personnel expenses to total assets2, interest 
expenses to total deposits and other operating & administrative expenses to total assets 
respectively. 𝛽, 𝛾 and ∅ in Equation (3) are the coefficients to be estimated. To capture 
the specifities of each bank, i introduce year fixed effects with standard errors and 𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 
is then calculated as follows: 
                                                          
2 We divide personnel expenses by total assets because the Bankscope database lacks data for the number 
of bank employees for many banks. A similar approach has been followed by many relevant papers (e.g. 
Claessens & Laeven (2004). 
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𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 =  
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡
𝑄𝑖𝑡
 [𝛽1 + 𝛽2 ln 𝑄𝑖𝑡 + ∑ ∅𝑐 ln 𝑊𝑖𝑡𝑐
3
𝑐=1 ]     (2.4) 
 
           I consider the fact that the lerner index is computable at the bank-level as giving it 
an edge over the other market structure-based proxies of competition like the HHI and 
the C5 ratio. By way of advantages, the lerner index better captures the theoretical concept 
of bank franchise value by measuring a bank’s pricing power Beck et al. (2013). By 
utilising both bank asset and funding information, the lerner index also captures the 
impact of pricing power on both the asset and liabilities sides of the balance sheet Beck 
et al. (2006). Additionally, its computation does not require the banking system to be in 
long run equilibrium, unlike the H-statistic as an example. Finally, it does not rely on the 
precise definition of geographic product markets. This is vital against the backdrop of 
banks scaling geographic boundaries and operating in various jurisdictions on a global 
basis. 
           I adopt and use the boone indicator to further improve the credibility and 
robustness of the lerner lndex as my main competition proxy. The boone indicator is a 
pure measure of the degree of competition and is calculated as the elasticity of profits to 
marginal costs. To obtain the elasticity, the log of profits (measured by return on assets) 
is regressed on the log of marginal costs. It is estimated thus:  
 
𝑙𝑛 𝜋𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑙𝑛 𝑚𝑐𝑖,𝑡,𝑐      (2.5) 
 
where; 𝜋𝑖,𝑡,𝑐 denotes average profits;  𝑚𝑐𝑖,𝑡 denotes marginal costs and 𝛽 is the boone 
indicator. The subscripts 𝑖, 𝑡, 𝑐 refer to bank, time and country respectively. The 
estimated coefficient 𝛽 (computed from the first derivative of a trans-log cost function) 
is the elasticity. I follow the lead of Delis (2012) and relax the assumption of a constant 
marginal cost across all banks in the industry and estimate it for each bank-time in the 
sample. This is a notable departure from most of prior literature on the estimation of both 
the boone indicator and lerner index. Koetter and Poghosyan (2009) tout this as highly 
important in ensuring a minimum level of robustness for market power estimates like the 
Boone indicator. To this end, I estimate marginal cost  (𝑚𝑐𝑖,𝑡) using the following linear 
cost function: 
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𝑙𝑛 𝑡𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑐 = 𝛼0,𝑖𝑡𝑐 + 𝛼1,𝑖𝑡𝑐  𝑙𝑛 𝑞𝑖𝑡𝑐 + 𝛼2,𝑖𝑡𝑐  𝑙𝑛 𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑐 + 𝛼3,𝑖𝑡𝑐  𝑙𝑛 𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑐   (2.6) 
 
where; 𝑡𝑐 is the total cost of bank 𝑖 operating in country 𝑐 at time 𝑡, 𝑞 is bank output, 𝑑 
is the value of bank deposits, 𝑤 are the prices of inputs, and 𝜀 is the stochastic 
disturbance. I obtain bank- and time-specific coefficients for Equation (6) with the same 
local regression technique used to estimate Equation (5). The profits of banks with lower 
marginal costs (higher efficiency) are expected to increase, i.e. 𝛽 should be negative. A 
lower market power implies that the value of 𝛽 will be larger in absolute terms (more 
negative). The rationale behind the indicator is that higher profits are achieved by more-
efficient banks3. Therefore, the more negative the boone indicator the higher the degree 
of competition is because the effect of reallocation is stronger. The boone indicator is 
touted as having superior attributes to the lerner index as a pure measure of competition. 
Firstly, the lerner index is heavily devalued because it cannot capture the degree of 
product substitutability (Vives 2008). Secondly, the theoretical foundations underpinning 
the lerner index as a measure of competition are not robust i.e. some studies present 
models where higher competition result in higher price-cost margins (LI). Finally, the 
lerner index may be thought of as not only measuring bank competition, but also the 
strength of the profit maximizing incentives of banks Delis (2012). 
           I also introduce and report the results of the two concentration proxies i.e. the C5 
Ratio (CR5) and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI Loans) to augment the lerner 
index and boone indicator and thereby enrich my insight and analysis of the competition-
risk dynamics in the G7 in the period under review. The CR5 ratio is the proportion of 
total banking assets held by the Big 5 banks in each of my sample countries. It is the norm 
in banking literature to compute both these measures at the country level and I uphold 
and conform to this practice in this paper. The HHI is a widely accepted measure of 
market concentration and is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm 
competing in a market, and then summing the resulting numbers. It is estimated thus: 
 
                                                          
3 For more details on the rationale behind the Boone Indicator and its derivation, see Boone et al. (2005) 
and Boone (2008) 
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𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑡,𝑐 =  ∑ (𝑀𝑆𝑖,𝑡)
2𝑛
𝑖=1         (2.7) 
 
where: where 𝑀𝑆𝑖,𝑡 represents the market share of firm 𝑖 and there are 𝑛 firms in the 
market. For a cross-country study of this nature both measures have the benefit of not 
needing any transformation since they are already computed at the country level. Even 
though banking markets now generally transcend geographic national boundaries and the 
fact that competition has a pronounced international feel to it, some products e.g. retail 
deposits and small business loans are largely competed for on a local basis while 
wholesale credits and off-balance sheet liabilities are competed for internationally Berger 
at al. (2009). 
           I acknowledge the potential impact to my regression model emanating from the 
fact that these competition proxies are estimated rather than measured. The assumptions 
made in formulating these proxies also potentially bring some noise into my regressions. 
Firstly, studies that examine competition and concentration in banking conclude that 
concentration (i.e. C5 ratio) is a poor proxy for competition Claessens and Laeven (2004). 
Other measures of competition such as the Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-Statistic require 
restrictive (and unrealistic) assumptions about the market existing in long-run equilibrium 
to hold. Another major pitfall of the HHI is that it gives much heavier weight to firms 
with large market shares than those with smaller ones because of squaring the market 
shares Berger et al. (2009). The Lerner index’s key shortcoming is the fact that it does 
not capture product substitutability Vives (2008), and it also does not capture risk premia 
in the prices of a bank’s products and services. While the Boone (2008) model neither 
assumes long-run equilibrium, nor suffer from the problem relating to product 
substitutability, it has a major flaw in that it assumes constant marginal costs. What 
matters for the Boone (2008) indicator is how aggressively the more efficient banks 
exploit their cost advantage to reallocate profits from the least efficient banks in the 
market. Regardless of all these pitfalls in the formulation and estimation of my 
competition proxies, they have been widely used in literature on the competition-risk 
nexus in banking to inspire my confidence as to their robustness in this respect.   
 
     2.4.4.     Bank risk  
           In so far as liquidity risk is concerned, Drehmann and Nikolaou (2008) itemise 
liquidity into three broad clusters i.e. market liquidity, central bank liquidity and funding 
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liquidity. However, in the Geneva Report on the World Economy, Ferguson et al. (2008) 
underscore the distinction between the three liquidity types and conclude that all three are 
vital to the preservation of financial stability. I am quick to point that I adopt and refer to 
funding liquidity for purposes of this paper. I feel our primary focus on the funding 
liquidity of banks is justified given the centrality of banks in distributing liquidity in the 
financial system. Committee (2008) defines funding liquidity as the ability of banks to 
meet their liabilities, unwind or settle their positions as they come due. In the same vein, 
the IMF sings a similar tune and marks out funding liquidity as the ability of solvent 
institutions to make agreed upon payments in a timely fashion. However, references to 
funding liquidity have also been made from the point of view of traders (Brunnemeier 
and Pedersen, 2007) or investors (Strahan, 2008), where funding liquidity relates to their 
ability to raise funding at short notice. The wider debate in the competition-risk nexus has 
been dominated by the use of credit risk as the financial stability proxy. In practice 
though, credit risk is not the only source of risk taking by banks as they are also subject 
to liquidity risk emanating from their role as liquidity providers (e.g. Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983). The recent financial crisis was essentially a result of the maturity 
mismatch between assets and liabilities which left banks unable to raise liquidity on 
demand, ultimately resorting to costly borrowing or auctioning illiquid assets to raise 
liquidity. 
           The Z-score can be simply explained as the number of standard deviations by 
which returns have to fall from the mean to wipe out a bank’s equity. In other words, it 
measures the distance from insolvency. The Z-score combines profitability, leverage and 
return volatility in a single measure and is used as an inverse proxy for a firm’s probability 
of failure at the bank level. According to Lepetit & Strobel (2013), the Z-Score is a risk 
measure commonly used in the empirical banking literature to reflect a bank’s probability 
of insolvency. It plays an important role in the assessment of both individual bank risk as 
well as overall financial stability. 
 
𝑍𝑖,𝑡 =  
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐸/𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡
                   (2.8) 
 
where: 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡  is the return on assets for bank 𝑖 at time 𝑡. 𝐸/𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡  is the capital asset 
ratio for bank 𝑖 at time 𝑡 and bank insolvency is taken to be a state where (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝐸/𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡) ≤ 0. 𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 𝑖𝑠 the standard deviation of return on assets bank 𝑖 at time 𝑡. The 
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Z-Score is an accounting-based risk measure and risk is taken to be the variability or 
change in 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡. While 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 can be easily computed from the data set available, 
𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 cannot be easily computed because of the unavailability of daily, weekly and 
monthly data. Financials are normally done quarterly; hence this variable has to be 
estimated. A larger z-score indicates higher bank stability and less overall bank risk. The 
score increases with higher profitability and capitalisation levels, and it decreases with 
unstable earnings (reflected by a higher (𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡). The Z-score is a bank-level inverse 
proxy of the probability of failure of a bank, thus I use one observation per bank, although 
we use multiple years of data in computing our dependent variables. 
           The non-performing loans to total loans (NPLTL) ratio is our credit risk proxy, it 
is measured as the ratio of equity to total assets and a higher NPLTL ratio is indicative of 
a riskier loan portfolio. The equity to total assets (ETAR) ratio is our capital risk proxy. 
It is measured as the ratio of equity to total assets and a higher ETAR ratio indicates a 
stronger capitalisation level, thus lower bank risk. Finally, the Cash deposit ratio (CDR) 
is our liquidity risk proxy and indicates how much of a bank’s core funds are channelled 
towards the bank’s lending activities. It is the proportion of a bank’s lending to the 
deposits it mobilises. All three ratios (i.e. NPLTL, ETAR & CDR) are calculated at the 
bank level from data collected from the Bankscope database. 
 
     2.4.5.     Regulatory, institutional and control variables  
           It is also worth considering the wider regulatory, institutional and macroeconomic 
environments when evaluating the competition-risk relationship. Regulatory variables 
used in this paper came from surveys conducted by Barth et al. (2013). The country-level 
regulatory, institutional and macroeconomic data / variables are adopted as control 
variables to proxy for the variations in economic development and collateral and 
bankruptcy laws among the G7 group of countries. Bank-level control variables are also 
built into the models to control for variations at the bank level. Country-level regulations 
change slowly over time; thus, previously available survey data can be used until a new 
survey becomes available. It is vitally important that we have a discussion on how 
country-specific factors may create cross-country variation in the competition-stability 
nexus by borrowing extensively from existing theories on the subject.  
           𝑅𝑉𝑡,𝑐 is the regulatory variable in Equation (1) and relates to capital stringency 
(CAPSTRI). It is a proxy variable for the strength of capital regulation in a country. Allen 
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et al. (2011) contends that stringent capital requirements (and deposit insurance) can help 
in controlling bank risk-taking, even against the background of cut-throat competition in 
the banking sector. I therefore surmise from this that tighter capital regulation may lessen 
the negative impact that competition tends to have on stability within the financial system. 
The Capital Stringency index indicates whether there are explicit requirements regarding 
the amount and source of capital that a bank should have. A higher index indicates greater 
stringency and the index ranges from 2 to 10 with an average of 5.8.      
           𝐼𝑉𝑡,𝑐 in Equation (1) corresponds to a variable which evaluates the institutional 
quality in the countries examined. The institutional framework and financial system 
structures within which banks operate also have a direct influence on the competition-
stability relationship. The institutional framework may affect the scope for adverse 
selection and moral hazard by entrepreneurs. I use depth of information sharing 
(DINFOS) obtained from the World Bank Development Indicators to reflect the 
institutional environment. It is an indicator which captures the difference in information 
content between the credit registries in different countries. Credit registry institutions are 
public or private entities which collect information on the creditworthiness of borrowers 
and can help reduce both adverse selection and moral hazard problems that are inherent 
the lending business. The index ranges between 0 and 6, with a higher value indicating 
that more information is available. In jurisdictions with developed information sharing 
systems, borrowers know it will be harder to access finance at other banks if they default 
on their current loan. Such borrowers have an incentive to repay thereby positively 
impacting on the stability of the system. Greater market power will therefore not be as 
detrimental to financial stability because better information sharing systems will lower 
the entrepreneurs’ incentive to take on more risk.  
           The variable 𝑀𝐶𝑡,𝑐 in Equation (1) relates to the variable representing the 
macroeconomic environment and monetary conditions in country 𝑐 at time 𝑡 and within 
a specific country. I extract GDP Growth (GDPGR) from the World Bank Development 
Indicators (WDI) and slot it into all the regressions to control for variations in economic 
development among the G7 countries.  
           I also control for the interbank ratio (IBANK), and loans to assets ratio 
(ASSCOMP) to proxy for bank size, bank capitalisation and asset composition 
respectively. According Berger et al (2009), bank size, bank capitalisation and asset 
composition directly impacts the risk-taking appetite of a banking institution. The charter 
values of larger and well-capitalised banks tend to have a restraining effect and thus make 
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such banks conservative in terms of risk-taking. Ultimately this makes banks safer and 
leans heavily on the competition-fragility hypothesis in the competition-risk nexus. These 
variables are all derived from the Bankscope database and are computed at the bank level 
to reflect individual bank characteristics.      
      
     2.4.6.     Descriptive statistics  
           Tables 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 present the Descriptive Statistics while Table 2.7 is a 
presentation of the Correlation Matrix for the key variables employed in our baseline 
regressions. I have four dependent variables i.e. the ratio of non-performing loans to total 
loans (credit risk), the z-score (insolvency risk), the equity to total assets ratio (capital 
risk) and the cash deposit ratio (liquidity risk). The main explanatory variable is the lerner 
index which is our competition measure, but we also include the boone indicator and two 
traditional concentration measures i.e. C5 ratio and HHI loans in the baseline regressions 
as alternative measures to our main competition proxy. In the model, I control for both 
asset composition and bank size and include bank capitalisation and the ratio of total loans 
in total assets as bank controls. I also collect country-level data relating to the respective 
countries from the World Bank Development Indicators (GDPGR), Fraser Institute 
(LEGRI) and the Heritage Foundation (BANFRE) to proxy for the business 
environments, collateral and bankruptcy laws and variations in economic development of 
the countries respectively. 
           In Table 2.4 the mean sample of the z-index is 51.73 and is similar to the 56.76 in 
Berger et al. (2009). Moreover, my sample mean for the non-performing loans to total 
loans and equity to total assets ratios are 1.16% and 9.46%, which is comparable to 1% 
and 12% respectively in Berger et al. (2009). At 21.96, the mean sample of the lerner 
index can also be compared to the 22 in Berger et al. (2009). The sample mean lerner 
index in Fiordelisi & Mare (2014) however bucks this trend at a high 52.28. This could 
be attributed to the fact that the sample is exclusively constituted with cooperative banks 
(even though the study is a cross-country analysis as well). My sample mean for the 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI Loans) at 4.36% compares favourably with Berger 
et al. (2009) at 4%, although there are variations based on a country-by-country analysis 
of the competition / concentration measures in Table 2.5; or based on the periodical 
analysis in Table 2.6. The sample mean for our pure competition measure i.e. the boone 
indicator at -0.0321 compares favourably with Delis (2012). 
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           In Table 2.5 the mean lerner index for Canada in 2000 is 17.1% and rises to 39.7% 
in 2015. A higher lerner index symbolises greater banking sector concentration. I augment 
my analysis by using the C5 ratio which was at 67.6% in 2000 and rose to 86.9% in 2015, 
further confirming the shift towards even greater concentration in the Canadian banking 
sector. When I break down the analysis based on whether pre-crisis, crisis-years or post-
crisis periods; the mean lerner index for Canada is 17.02%, 15.9% and 34.2% 
respectively. The mean C5 ratio is 85.5%, 93.2% and 86.5% respectively for the pre-
crisis, crisis-years & post-crisis periods respectively.   
           In so far as the US is concerned, the average C5 ratio in Table 2.5 is 28.1% in 2000 
and rises to 47.2% in 2015. The lerner index also rises from 19.6 in 2000 to 32.5% in 
2015; whereas the boone indicator weakens from -0.078 in 2000 to -0.041 in 2015; all 
this exhibiting a shift to greater concentration i.e. competition-fragility. When broken 
down to a periodical analysis i.e. whether pre-crisis or post-crisis period in Table 2.6, the 
mean lerner index at 22.7% pre-crisis and 29.1% post-crisis further confirms this trend 
towards greater concentration. This pattern holds when we bring the Boone and HHI 
Loans into play for our analysis. The competition-fragility view holds that concentrated 
systems are more stable overall than competitive ones. The case of Canadian banks makes 
for particularly interesting reading in supporting this notion as they seem to have been the 
most resilient through the crisis period in our sample. Canada has the highest average 
concentration ratios based on the CR5 ratio with an average score of 0.894 in the pre-
crisis, crisis-years and post-crisis periods. Despite apparent homogeneity in the 
competitive situation in the G7 countries, notable peculiarities in terms of the competition 
dynamics exist among the countries. 
           The trends as they relate to the US and Canada in terms of gravitating towards 
greater concentration (i.e. less competition) largely holds in the other five countries in our 
sample i.e. France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom. The pattern is towards 
greater concentration in the later years of our study than the earlier years as per Table 2.5. 
This situation is consistent even when we base our analysis on Table 2.6 which breaks 
down our numbers per period i.e. whether pre-crisis, crisis-years or post-crisis. Average 
competition scores as captured by the Lerner Index for the European members of the G7 
group i.e. France, Germany, Italy are much lower than the United States. The UK system 
also became progressively concentrated (based on the C5 ratio) from the pre-crisis to the 
post-crisis periods (0.586 to 0.769), largely confirming the large taxpayer bailouts of 
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some of the big commercial banks. This essentially had the effect of maintaining (if not 
increasing) the big banks’ shares of the market.  
           The first cluster of variables that influence the competition-risk relationship relate 
to the institutional framework i.e. depth of information sharing (DINFOS) and stock 
market turnover (STOMTU). Better information sharing among banks lowers moral 
hazard and adverse selection in bank lending as it is harder for borrowers to access 
funding with other banks once they default with one. This lowers risk overall and makes 
for a more stable system overall. Stock market turnover is an indicator of financial market 
development and existence of alternative funding sources for entrepreneurs. Both 
DINFOS and STOMTU are positively and significantly correlated with each other, 
implying therefore that countries with developed markets and greater information sharing 
are likely to be more stable, notwithstanding the competitive situation obtaining. As far 
as regulation and supervision is concerned, the main thrust is to protect bank charter 
values. Deposit protection insurance (DEPINS) helps to control risk-taking and bank 
runs, despite the state of competition in the respective jurisdiction Allen et al. (2011). 
More stringent capital regulation may limit the negative impact competition has on 
financial stability. A generous deposit insurance scheme negatively impacts financial 
stability i.e. incentivises risk-taking. The correlation table shows a positive and significant 
correlation between deposit insurance and both institutional variables i.e. depth of 
information sharing and stock market turnover. Activity restrictions are negatively and 
significantly correlated with systemic stability (Z-Score) i.e. countries with riskier 
banking systems also tend to experience higher activity restrictions (ACTRES). When 
analysing the correlation between the lerner index (LERNER) and the other variables, I 
find that the relationship between competition and financial system soundness is stronger 
in jurisdictions with developed systems of information sharing, developed stock markets, 
generous deposit insurance schemes and higher activity restrictions.  
 
2.5.     Discussion of the empirical results  
           In this section I present the results of our regression analysis. I estimate GMM 
regressions with robust standard errors clustered at the country level to correct for within-
country correlation. In tables 2.8, 2.9, 2.10 and 2.11 I present and report the results of the 
Breusch-Pagan and Cook–Weisberg statistics conducted to test for the presence of 
heteroscedasticity in the dataset. As alluded to earlier on, I adopt four dependent variables 
to proxy for financial stability. In Table 2.8 I measure credit risk using the non-performing 
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loans to total loans ratio; in Table 2.9 I measure insolvency risk using the z-score; in Table 
2.10 I measure capital risk using the equity to total assets ratio; and in Table 2.11 I 
measure liquidity risk using the cash deposit ratio. The tables also include the results of 
the diagnostic tests run to verify the relevance (first stage F-test) and validity (Hansen’s 
J-test) of the instruments of measures of competition i.e. the lerner index, boone indicator, 
C5 ratio, and HHI loans. The results support the presence of heteroscedasticity, and thus 
justify my use of the GMM estimator. I include either the lerner index, boone indicator, 
C5 ratio and HHI loans in all our regressions as measures of banking industry competition 
and I instrument these measures with indicators of activity restrictions, banking freedom 
credit market regulations. As mentioned earlier, I include a quadratic term in the equations 
to allow for a nonlinear relationship between measures of financial stability and 
competition within banking.  
           Table 2.8 shows my regression results using the ratio of nonperforming loans to 
total loans as the credit risk (loan portfolio risk) proxy. The Lerner index linear term 
coefficient is positive and statistically insignificant, whereas the quadratic term 
coefficient is positive and significant in the first column of Table 2.8. The same pattern 
of results holds true for my pure competition measure (the Boone indicator) in the second 
column i.e. that the Boone indicator linear term is positive and statistically insignificant, 
while the quadratic term coefficient is positive and significant4. This need not be an issue 
in so far as interpretation of the results is concerned. According to Berger et al. (2009) it 
is not essential that either term be significant. In other words, the significance of the 
curvilinear (quadratic term) term stands by itself regardless of the significance of the 
linear term in the regression Fungacova et al. (2017). To evaluate the type of relationship 
between the variables of interest, the inflection point of each quadratic function is 
calculated and compared with the distribution of the data. In differential calculus an 
inflection point is a point on a curve at which curvature or concavity changes sign from 
plus to minus or vice versa. Using column 1 coefficients in Table 2.8 for illustrative 
purposes, the inflection point is -0.208. This is approximately the 4th percentile of the 
Lerner index distribution; which by implication means that more than 96% of the data 
lies above the inflection point. When I ally this phenomenon with the fact that the Lerner 
quadratic term coefficient is positive, the relationship between the degree of market power 
                                                          
4 It is not essential that either term be significant for interpretation purposes i.e. the significance of the 
curvilinear (quadratic) term stands by itself regardless of the significance of the linear term in the 
regression. 
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(as well as the Boone indicator) and the credit risk proxy (i.e. nonperforming loans to 
total loans ratio) is significantly positive. In so far as the market structure proxies are 
concerned i.e. the C5 ratio and HHI Loans in the 3rd and 4th columns of Table 2.8 
respectively, the results obtained for the C5 ratio and HHI loans market power measures 
indicate that linear term coefficients for both are positive and significant, while the 
quadratic term coefficients for both measures are negative and significant. I introduce the 
quadratic term to uphold non-linearity in the competition-risk nexus in line with the 
postulation of Martinez-Miera & Repullo (2008). Because the quadratic term coefficients 
are negative for both market power measures used in this study, the relationship between 
both market power measures and the credit risk proxy is concave. This implies that the 
relationship is positive up to a certain point beyond which it reverses to negative, or vice 
versa. The inflection points are 0.253 and 0.186 for the C5 and HHIL respectively.  A 
significant and positive link can therefore be established between both market power 
measures and the credit risk proxy (NPL/TL ratio) based on the results of both the linear 
and quadratic terms i.e. that greater market power leads to an increase in the credit risk 
profile of banks through riskier loan portfolios. This is well in sync with the findings of 
Boyd & De Nicolo (2005), hence firmly grounding this study in the competition-stability 
sector of the argument when credit risk is the financial stability proxy. When banks have 
more market power, it also follows that they command higher rates on their loan portfolios 
thus increasing risk on those portfolios. The results are consistent across the three 
different proxies of market power i.e. more market power is associated with riskier loan 
portfolios. 
           Table 2.9 show the regression results of the z-score as a proxy for insolvency risk. 
A higher z-score derives from higher earnings or more capital and is indicative of more 
financial stability. The inflection points for the lerner index, boone indicator, CR5 and 
HHI loans ratios (0.328, 0.306, 0.194 and 0.216 respectively) all occur above the 99th 
percentile of the Lerner index data, implying a positive relationship between all proxies 
of market power and the Z-index as a proxy for insolvency risk. The quadratic term 
coefficients have a downward-oriented parabola shape i.e. are negative and significant 
across all four competition/market power proxies. The negative quadratic term 
coefficients across all four competition/market power measures used in this study indicate 
a concave relationship between market power measures and the insolvency risk proxy. 
This implies non-linearity (u-shaped) in the competition-financial stability relationship 
Martinez-Miera & Repullo (2008) i.e. that the relationship is positive up to a certain point 
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beyond which it reverses to negative, or vice versa. The linear term coefficients are 
positive and statistically significant for all four proxies, also implying a positive 
relationship between the z-score and all the measures of competition/market power used 
in this study. Greater market power is associated with lower overall bank risk in this 
instance. This supports the competition-fragility views fronted by the like of Wagner 
(2010) among others and seem to be at variance with the findings from the earlier findings 
using NPLTLs as the credit risk proxy. Under the competition-fragility view, 
concentration is considered as healthy as it safeguards bank charter values while 
competition increases risk and erodes charter values. At this point, having considered the 
NPLTL and the z-score as risk proxies, the results imply that greater market power is 
associated with increased credit risk through the loan channel, but it also results in lower 
insolvency risk. The big puzzle is how greater market power banks enjoy lower 
insolvency risk against the backdrop of the earlier findings indicating increasing credit 
risk for the same banks. Does this necessarily need to be interpreted as a contradiction or 
there could be other forces at play? It is logical that higher franchise value banks enjoy 
greater market power and are therefore likely to command higher loan rates, hence 
ultimately increasing the riskiness of their loan portfolios. However, the fact that banks 
with more market power also enjoy greater overall financial stability (based on the z-
score) seems to suggest that they insulate their charter values from the higher credit risk 
through other means. The answer could possibly lie in economies of both scale and scope, 
as well as in robust and sound risk management methods. Or it could simply be that 
greater market power banks cushion themselves against increased credit risk in their 
portfolios through holding higher capital thresholds. I further probe and analyse the 
competition-risk nexus in banking by bringing into play the results of the impact of 
market power on capital risk using the equity to assets ratio and liquidity risk using the 
cash deposit ratio. 
           Table 2.10 presents the results of the relationship between competition and risk, 
with capital risk as the financial stability proxy. The inflection point for the Lerner index 
occurs around the 50th percentile of the data, thus no significant positive or negative 
relationship exists between the lerner index and capital risk. The same intuition holds for 
the results of the boone indicator and the capital risk proxy i.e. the equity to assets ratio. 
With regards to the market power / concentration measures, the inflection point for the 
C5 ratio is -0.028. The quadratic term coefficient is 2.138 and upward oriented such that 
a positive and significant relationship is established between the C5 ratio and capital risk. 
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The positive sign when regressing HHI loans as the explanatory variable means that this 
pattern holds using the HHI loans as well i.e. that is there is a positive and significant 
relationship between HHI loans and the capital risk proxy.  These findings indicate that 
capital thresholds are higher for banks with greater market power when we utilise either 
HHI loans or the C5 ratio to proxy for financial stability, while the results for the Lerner 
index supposedly imply that half the banks with greater market power hold deeper equity 
capital in reserve.  
           In so far as Table 2.11 is concerned, the aim is to establish whether banks operating 
in highly competitive market landscapes do indeed strengthen their liquidity as a cushion 
to safeguard their franchise values considering the increased insolvency threat. From the 
three competition proxies already analysed, I have established that market power is 
synonymous with increased credit risk via the loan market, but also results in banks 
holding higher capital thresholds for a reduction in overall bank risk as proxied by the z-
score. I must analyse the results from my liquidity risk proxy against the background of 
and in conjunction with our key findings from these three proxies. The results under our 
main competition proxy i.e. the lerner index indicate that the inflection point of 0.217 
occurs around the 71st percentile of the data, thus I can establish a significant and positive 
relationship between the lerner index (and the boone indicator inflection point of 0.255) 
and the cash deposit ratio. This result is maintained when I bring the results of both the 
C5 ratio and HHI loans into the mix with inflection points of −0.0206 and 0.286 
respectively. Against this backdrop, a significant and positive relationship emerges 
between the competition proxy and liquidity risk i.e. the findings indicate that liquidity 
thresholds are higher for banks in low competition environments. When I link these 
results to the results from the other proxies discussed in the preceding paragraphs, a more 
vivid picture emerges regarding the competition-risk nexus in banking. Greater market 
power leads to an increase in credit risk via the loan market, but this increase is 
counteracted and compensated by banks holding more equity capital and increased 
liquidity thresholds for a reduction in overall bank risk as proxied by the z-score. 
           To conclude, greater market power for commercial banks in the G7 group of 
advanced economies result in increased credit risk, but insolvency risk is perhaps 
tampered, in part, by holding higher capital and liquidity thresholds. Banks with greater 
market power have higher capital and liquidity thresholds and this goes a long way in 
explaining the lower insolvency (overall) bank risk. It could also be that insolvency risk 
for banks with greater market power is lower primarily because of their higher franchise 
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values. Banks with greater market power seem less exposed to overall bank risk, even 
though credit risk increases through the loan market. Market power also seems 
synonymous with higher capitalisation levels; thus, an overall conclusion can be reached 
from this about the merits of the competition-fragility view on the competition-risk 
relationship in banking. Market power results in higher bank franchise values. The C5 
ratios seem to confirm that banking systems in the G7 Advanced economies are fairly 
concentrated. Prudential regulation of banks can actually be considered as tailored to 
protect and entrench the franchise values of existing banks by making it harder and 
onerous for new players to penetrate the banking sector. No wonder ‘too-big-to-fail’ 
remains a topical challenge well after the financial meltdown of 2008. The big puzzle is 
how to achieve a balance between having a competitive banking sector without 
necessarily compromising the stability which concentrated systems seem to engender 
based on empirical results from this paper. 
  
2.6.     Robustness analysis   
           For robustness purposes, I run various checks on our main models5 and the main 
results are presented in Table 2.12 below. Firstly, I run regressions on a sample of banks 
that fall foul to the filtering rules and drop out of my sample during the entire period of 
our study. This I implement in order to probe survivorship bias which we believe could 
significantly impact the conclusions we arrive at on the competition-risk nexus in 
banking. My results are robust to this phenomenon. Secondly, I exclude the quadratic 
term from our baseline regressions and impose a strictly linear relationship between 
competition and financial stability. This quadratic term arises from the key postulation of 
Martinze-Miera & Repullo (2008) who posited that the relationship between competition 
and financial stability is in fact non-linear. My main results still hold when we exclude 
the quadratic term from the model. Thirdly, I adopt and use a winsorised z-score as the 
main financial stability proxy i.e. I winsorise the z-score at the 1st and 99th percentile and 
the findings still fall in line with our reported results. Fourthly, I strip out the United States 
from the sample and run the regressions based on the other six G7 member states. This I 
do to deal with the outlier aspect pertaining to the domination of my sample by US banks. 
Again, my results hold. I also decide to strengthen my analysis by adopting the boone 
                                                          
5 I experiment with additional measures of liquidity risk (liquid assets to total assets ratio) and credit risk 
(loan loss provisions to total loans ratio) and did not find any significant changes in the results my main 
variables. 
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indicator6 as the main competition proxy in place of the lerner index and the results are 
robust to this change as well. The boone indicator is a more modern competition proxy 
than the lerner index and the trend in recent literature on the competition-risk nexus in 
banking has gravitated towards the boone indicator as a more robust measure of 
competition. Additionally, even though I clustered robust standard errors at the country-
level in my baseline regressions, I follow the lead of Beck et al. (2013) and cluster robust 
standard errors at the bank level as a further robustness check. A possibility exists that 
observations of a given bank are not independent over time i.e. they correlate. Again, my 
main results hold despite this change. Finally, I utilise alternative control variables to run 
the main regressions. These include GDP per capita and unemployment Schaeck & Cihak 
(2014); Berger et al. (2009), Inflation Liu & Wilson (2014) and loan loss provisions to 
total assets Schaeck & Cihak (2014). A substantial drop in GDP growth is a strong 
indicator that banking problems might emerge Hutchison & McDill (1999), while 
increasing inflation is accompanied by bank failures Mannasoo & Mayes (2009). It is 
quite comforting to report that my main results hold despite effecting these changes in the 
variables mix. The robustness tests are consistent and confirm the main findings regarding 
the four financial stability proxies i.e. greater concentration in banking markets is 
synonymous with increased credit risk via the loan channel. However, greater market 
power ultimately results in lower overall levels of risk i.e. insolvency risk. The main 
reason could be because banks with greater market power hold higher capital thresholds 
and also strengthen their liquidity positions, another of my key hypotheses confirmed by 
the robustness tests. 
           Because my study period encompasses the crisis years i.e. 2007-10, to strengthen 
the crisis dimension and context of my study, I extend my analysis by examining if the 
global financial crisis influenced the relationship between bank competition and financial 
stability. The crisis could well have affected both competition and financial stability. 
Firstly, the large-scale reorganisations, mergers and acquisitions in the crisis aftermath 
could have altered the competition dynamics in the G7 banking markets by reducing the 
number of competitors. Secondly, the financial crisis could also have impacted financial 
stability and increased overall risk in the system through the proliferation in loan losses, 
                                                          
6 I follow the lead taken by Delis (2012) and derive estimates of market power using the Boone Indicator 
for robustness purposes. Using the Boone Indicator (BI), bank profitability intuitively increases with 
lower marginal costs (i.e. efficiency). A lower market power (higher competition) implies that the value 
of BI is larger in absolute terms. 
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as well as the lowering of incentives for banks to invest in soft information which 
amplified system-wide information asymmetry. To evaluate the impact of the global 
financial crisis, I redo my estimations by adding a dummy variable which equals one for 
the crisis years (i.e. 2007-2010) and an interaction term between the dummy variable and 
the competition measure(s). I denote several striking results in Table 2.12. In the first 
instance, the interaction term between the crisis variable and my competition proxies is 
always significant; suggesting that the crisis period indeed impacted the relationship 
between bank competition and financial stability. Second, the interaction term in all 
specifications has an opposite sign from the competition measure; supporting the view 
that crisis periods dilute the impact of bank competition on financial stability. This 
conclusion is important in that it suggests that the impact of bank competition on financial 
stability changes during crisis periods, suggesting that policy prescriptions need to adjust 
and factor this into account. While my results largely hold, careful consideration need to 
be given during crisis periods because conventional policies may not necessarily apply. 
 
2.7.     Concluding remarks  
           Literature on the competition-risk-stability nexus remains mixed and inconclusive 
despite the depth, variation and amount of debate that has been invested on this area so 
far. The conventional CV Hypothesis i.e. competition-fragility view contends that 
banking sector competition leads to diminution of the market power of existing banks, 
leading to falling profitability, and ultimately results in reduced bank franchise values. 
This chain of events has a tendency of incentivising banks to venture into riskier activities 
to make up for the squeeze in profits. On the other hand, the BDN Hypothesis i.e. 
competition-stability view is the alternative view and uses the loan market channel to 
postulate that more market power in the loan market actually results in higher bank risk 
as the higher interest rates charged to loan customers make it harder for them to repay the 
borrowed loans. There has been widespread support for both arguments, making the 
competition-financial stability nexus one of the most contested spaces in banking 
literature. My model allows for simultaneity in terms of the operation of financial stability 
proxies i.e. credit risk, capital risk, liquidity risk and insolvency risk. Greater market 
concentration results in increased credit risk via the loan market but insolvency risk does 
not necessarily increase in tandem. I model insolvency risk to be a product of the trade-
off between credit risk, capital risk and liquidity risk to argue that the stability from 
concentrated banking systems is primarily due to the fact that banks naturally increase 
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their capitalisation and liquidity thresholds in light of competition. This increase in 
capitalisation and liquidity risk is sufficient to make up for the increased credit risk to 
yield a lower insolvency risk overall. Banks in concentrated systems could yet be safer 
overall even though they have increased credit risk through riskier loan portfolios. Greater 
market power yields higher franchise values; thus high franchise value banks have a 
greater incentive to protect such values through alternative techniques e.g. reduced capital 
risk in this instance. An interesting proposition for future study would be to probe the 
alternative techniques utilised by greater market power banks to mitigate increased credit 
risk to yield a reduction in insolvency risk. I regressed three financial stability proxies i.e. 
credit risk, capital risk, liquidity risk and insolvency risk on three measures of competition 
(market power) i.e. lerner index, HHI loans and C5 ratio using bank-level data for the G7 
group of advanced economies. I use the instrumental variable technique with a GMM 
estimator and adopt adopting activity restrictions, banking freedom, and the percent of 
government-owned banks as instruments to account for the endogeneity of market power. 
My results are broadly in the conventional “competition-fragility” sector of the argument 
without necessarily disproving the “competition-stability” view. Even though greater 
market power leads to increased credit risk – thereby lending support to the competition-
stability view – it also results in falling insolvency risk overall (competition-fragility 
view). The answer to this puzzle could well be explained by the increasing capitalisation 
for such banks. It could well be that banks with greater market power offset increased 
credit risk through the loan market by holding higher capital and liquidity thresholds. 
Even after factoring the supposed upheavals of the crisis years (i.e. 2007-10) and the 
mergers and acquisitions and public bailouts that followed, it would appear the market 
structure architecture has virtually remained the same. The bailouts only plugged holes 
and were essentially a de-facto recapitalisation of stressed and dying banks such that the 
market shares of the banks were unaltered, ultimately meaning the competition dynamics 
in the system have remained the same as before the crisis struck.  
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Table 2.1   Variable descriptions, sources and abbreviations.  This table presents all variables that I use in the econometric analysis. The abbreviation of each variable and the sources I 
use to collect the data are also reported. 
Variable  Abbreviation Description Data source 
Dependent variables:    
Z-score ZSCORE Computed at the bank level. Larger z-score indicates higher bank stability Bankscope 
    
Equity to total assets  ETAR 
The bank level ratio of equity to total assets. A higher capitalisation ratio indicates lower 
risk 
Bankscope 
    
Non-performing loans to total loans  NPLTL 
The ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. A higher value indicates a risky loan 
portfolio 
Bankscope 
   
Bankscope 
Cash deposits ratio CDR 
Cash in hand & balances held at central bank to total deposits. Depositors' trust in bank is 
enhanced when the bank maintains a higher cash deposit ratio 
   
Independent variables:   
Lerner index LERNER 
Bank level measure of the mark-up of price over marginal costs. Higher values indicate 
lower banking sector competition 
Bankscope 
    
Boone indicator BOONE 
A pure measure of the degree of competition and is calculated as the elasticity of profits to 
marginal costs. 
Bankscope 
    
C5 ratio CR5 
The total market shares of the five biggest banks in a country. A higher ratio indicates 
higher concentration, thus less competition 
Bankscope 
    
HHI loans HHIL 
A country-level indicator of bank concentration. Higher values indicate greater market 
concentration 
Bankscope 
    
Capital stringency CAPSTRI 
Indicates whether there are explicit requirements relating to the amount and source of 
capital a bank should have. Ranges from 2 to 10 and a higher index indicates greater 
stringency 
Beck et al. (2010) 
    
Deposit insurance coverage DEPINS 
Reduces the risk of bank runs, thus increases financial stability. Proxied by deposit 
insurance coverage relative to GDP per capita 
Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2005) 
    
Bank size BANSIZ The natural logarithm of total assets Bankscope 
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Asset composition ASSCOMP 
The loans to assets ratio 
Bankscope 
    
Bank capitalisation ETAR The total equity to total assets ratio Bankscope 
    
GDP growth GDPGR 
The rate of growth of the real gross domestic product (GDP) of a country. Accounts for 
variations in economic development among countries. 
World Bank Development 
Indicators 
Depth of information sharing DINFOS 
The strength of information content of the credit bureaus in a country 
Financial Structure Database 
    
Stock market turnover STOMTU Ratio of the total shares traded to average real market capitalisation Financial Structure Database 
    
Legal rights index LEGRI 
An index measuring the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws facilitate bank 
lending. Higher score means laws tuned to expand credit 
Fraser Index 
    
Instrumental Variables:    
Activity restrictions ACTRES 
An index and takes on values between (1) and (4), with higher values indicating greater 
restrictions on bank activities and nonfinancial ownership and control. 
Barth et al. (2007) 
    
Percent of government owned PERGO Percentage of banks owned by government within a certain jurisdiction Barth et al. (2007) 
    
Banking freedom BANFRE 
Index informs whether foreign banks are allowed to operate freely, difficulties when setting 
up domestic banks and government interference in credit allocation. Higher score, fewer 
restrictions 
Heritage Foundation 
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Table 2.2 Sample selection. This table presents a breakdown of how we arrived at our final sample based on 
bank-year observations and after applying several filtering rules as detailed 
Details Observations 
Initial sample 53,616 
Filters applied:  
Banks with missing observations for more than half of the sample period  3,129 
Observations with missing income statement data      63 
Observations with negative equity values      15 
Observations with equity values in the top 1% of the tail distribution     397 
Observations with equity values in the bottom 1% of the tail distribution      387 
Final sample 49,625 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.3 List of countries, bank-year observations and number of banks. This table presents the bank-year 
observations and the number of banks per country in our sample. 
Country Bank-year observations Number of banks 
Canada 328 57 
France 2,137 168 
Germany 280 54 
Italy 477 99 
Japan 168 30 
United Kingdom 3,331 304 
U.S. 42,904 2,187 
Total 49,625 2,899 
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Table 2.4 Descriptive statistics. This table presents the summary statistics for the key dependent risk 
variables (i.e. non-performing loans to total loans ratio, z-score, equity to total assets ratio and cash deposits 
ratio) employed in our baseline empirical analysis. We model the dependent risk variables as a function of 
competition, regulatory and institutional variables and a set of control variables (i.e. to cater for the 
regulatory, institutional and macroeconomic environments in the respective countries). Activity 
restrictions, banking freedom and percentage of government owned are utilized in the regressions as 
instrumental variables for the competition (and concentration) proxies. We report the number of 
observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum for all the variables. The outlines, 
descriptions and the relevant data sources for all the variables are available in Table 2.1. 
Variables  Obs. Mean Std. Dev Minimum Maximum 
Non-performing to total loans  45 982 0.0116 0.0091 0.0000 0.1568 
Z-score  45 017 51.7326 44.3786 4.0562 227.7648 
Equity to total assets  49 625 0.0946 0.0720 -0.0842 0.7547 
Cash to deposits  49 625 0.0723 0.0696 -0.0745 0.8213 
Lerner index  49 625 0.2196 0.1503 -0.2096 0.6283 
Boone indicator  49 625 -0.0321 0.00881 -0.0408 -0.0200 
C5 ratio  49 625 0.0497 0.0612 0.0428 0.8538 
HH index (loans)  49 625 0.0436 0.0493 0.0296 0.8667 
Depth of information sharing  49 625 7.0572 0.5301 6.0016 7.9885 
Bank size  49 625 13.0529 1.2166 7.3036 19.5557 
Asset composition  49 625 0.0400 0.0176 0.0000 0.2800 
Bank capitalisation  49 625 0.5973 0.1814 0.0000 0.9762 
GDP growth  49 625 0.0031 0.1930 -0.0054 0.0220 
Banking freedom  49 625 2.4237 0.6142 0.9934 3.1784 
Activity restrictions  49 625 7.1359 1.1634 3.9010 9.7732 
Legal rights index  45 973 5.6336 0.8320 8.9284 7.4762 
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Table 2.5     Descriptive statistics. This table presents the coefficients for our proxies of bank market power, market structure and competition (Lerner Index, Boone Indicator, CR5 ratio and HHI (loans) per year and per country over the 
sample period i.e. 2000 -2015. Our sample is based on the G7 group of advanced economies which include Canada (CAN), France (FRA), Germany (GER), Italy (ITA), Japan (JAP), United Kingdom (UKI) and the United States (USA).  
YEAR 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
COUNTRY                 
CAN: Lerner 
Boone 
C5 
HHI 
0.171 
-0.111 
0.676 
0.050 
0.159 
-0.104 
0.785 
0.071 
0.187 
-0.113 
0.822 
0.028 
 
0.170 
-0.188 
0.903 
0.026 
0.170 
-0.151 
0.917 
0.025 
0.170 
-0.127 
0.959 
0.031 
0.164 
-0.105 
0.924 
0.038 
0.152 
-0.085 
0.919 
0.047 
0.165 
-0.055 
0.945 
0.055 
0.222 
-0.018 
0.958 
0.031 
0.239 
-0.026 
0.849 
0.066 
0.377 
-0.073 
0.843 
0.051 
0.403 
-0.080 
0.833 
0.049 
0.399 
-0.077 
0.836 
0.055 
0.409 
-0.078 
0.865 
0.052 
0.397 
-0.078 
0.869 
0.052 
FRA: Lerner 
Boone 
C5 
HHI 
0.143 
-0.023 
0.699 
0.018 
0.143 
-0.023 
0.699 
0.016 
0.141 
-0.031 
0.673 
0.015 
0.159 
-0.026 
0.687 
0.015 
0.197 
-0.025 
0.716 
0.016 
0.205 
-0.025 
0.739 
0.016 
0.193 
-0.034 
0.748 
0.014 
0.176 
-0.031 
0.763 
0.015 
0.145 
-0.014 
0.750 
0.015 
0.201 
0.000 
0.787 
0.015 
0.222 
-0.039 
0.799 
0.015 
0.142 
0.002 
0.762 
0.015 
0.180 
-0.008 
0.767 
0.015 
0.188 
-0.004 
0.754 
0.015 
0.207 
-0.010 
0.796 
0.015 
0.179 
-0.007 
0.775 
0.015 
                 
GER: Lerner 
Boone 
C5 
HHI 
0.131 
-0.079 
0.879 
0.003 
0.121 
-0.009 
0.883 
0.004 
0.145 
-0.030 
0.893 
0.011 
0.162 
-0.028 
0.880 
0.010 
0.172 
-0.032 
0.858 
0.010 
0.166 
-0.038 
0.882 
0.010 
0.199 
-0.039 
0.864 
0.009 
0.147 
-0.040 
0.869 
0.008 
0.137 
0.040 
0.870 
0.006 
0.176 
-0.026 
0.872 
0.007 
0.218 
-0.028 
0.880 
0.008 
0.077 
-0.030 
0.863 
0.007 
0.131 
-0.036 
0.873 
0.007 
0.108 
-0.031 
0.854 
0.007 
0.134 
-0.019 
0.994 
0.007 
0.116 
-0.029 
0.893 
0.007 
                 
ITA: Lerner 
Boone 
C5 
HHI 
0.198 
-0.042 
0.888 
0.007 
0.170 
-0.033 
0.847 
0.011 
0.166 
-0.048 
0.764 
0.009 
0.178 
-0.032 
0.818 
0.008 
0.172 
-0.136 
0.934 
0.007 
0.213 
-0.010 
0.481 
0.007 
0.241 
-0.009 
0.497 
0.007 
0.234 
-0.018 
0.571 
0.007 
0.197 
0.021 
0.634 
0.007 
0.204 
0.009 
0.654 
0.007 
0.203 
0.014 
0.691 
0.007 
0.041 
0.034 
0.706 
0.007 
0.078 
0.030 
0.701 
0.007 
0.055 
0.037 
0.726 
0.007 
0.080 
0.023 
0.774 
0.007 
0.063 
0.030 
0.734 
0.007 
                 
JAP: Lerner 
Boone 
C5 
HHI 
0.260 
0.008 
0.426 
0.008 
0.253 
0.003 
0.464 
0.009 
0.224 
0.019 
0.501 
0.008 
0.250 
0.009 
0.517 
0.007 
0.250 
0.001 
0.524 
0.006 
0.268 
-0.005 
0.519 
0.006 
0.284 
-0.008 
0.514 
0.006 
0.277 
-0.066 
0.502 
0.006 
 
0.232 
-0.005 
0.586 
0.006 
0.196 
-0.005 
0.588 
0.006 
0.228 
-0.013 
0.582 
0.006 
0.411 
0.016 
0.571 
0.006 
0.389 
0.007 
0.568 
0.006 
0.389 
-0.003 
0.576 
0.006 
0.389 
-0.006 
0.605 
0.006 
0.396 
0.000 
0.583 
0.006 
                 
UKI: Lerner 
Boone 
C5 
HHI 
0.117 
-0.067 
0.465 
0.012 
0.099 
-0.078 
0.502 
0.011 
0.112 
-0.065 
0.504 
0.010 
0.132 
-0.065 
0.482 
0.010 
0.136 
-0.052 
0.813 
0.013 
0.144 
-0.038 
0.658 
0.013 
0.159 
-0.037 
0.675 
0.015 
0.153 
-0.081 
0.742 
0.014 
0.143 
-0.074 
0.779 
0.014 
0.160 
-0.073 
0.757 
0.014 
0.161 
-0.031 
0.759 
0.014 
0.222 
-0.016 
0.762 
0.014 
0.117 
-0.002 
0.751 
0.014 
0.242 
-0.034 
0.741 
0.014 
0.265 
-0.021 
0.798 
0.014 
0.212 
-0.021 
0.813 
0.014 
                 
USA: Lerner 
Boone 
C5 
HHI 
0.196 
-0.078 
0.281 
0.018 
0.196 
-0.068 
0.294 
0.025 
0.239 
-0.062 
0.308 
0.011 
0.252 
-0.056 
0.311 
0.016 
0.257 
-0.055 
0.367 
0.013 
0.243 
-0.064 
0.392 
0.016 
0.210 
-0.077 
0.415 
0.020 
0.184 
-0.083 
0.438 
0.019 
0.180 
-0.059 
0.448 
0.016 
0.192 
-0.038 
0.452 
0.018 
0.223 
-0.039 
0.483 
0.018 
0.313 
-0.039 
0.471 
0.017 
0.315 
-0.041 
0.468 
0.018 
0.337 
-0.041 
0.471 
0.018 
0.335 
-0.041 
0.479 
0.017 
0.325 
-0.041 
0.472 
0.017 
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Table 2.6 Descriptive statistics. Table presents the descriptive statistics for our competition and 
concentration measures over the pre-crisis, crisis-years and post-crisis periods in the countries that 
constitute the G7 group of advanced economies. 
Period Country 
Pre-crisis: 2000-06 
 Lerner 
Boone 
CR5 
HHIL 
 
Canada 
0.17023 
-0.12833 
0.85509 
 0.03866 
France 
0.16978 
-0.02708 
0.70641 
0.01591 
Germany 
0.15653 
-0.03658 
0.87692 
0.00808 
Italy 
0.20850 
-0.0445 
0.74702 
0.00777 
Japan 
0.25540 
0.00376 
0.49494 
0.00725 
UK 
0.14636 
-0.05731 
0.58568 
0.01193 
US 
0.22755 
-0.06577 
0.33829 
0.01703 
Crisis-years:2007-10 
Lerner 
Boone 
CR5 
HHIL 
 
0.15881 
-0.07011 
0.93199 
0.05111 
 
0.16052 
-0.02264 
0.75668 
0.01532 
 
 
0.14175 
-0.03981 
0.86921 
0.00724 
 
0.21560 
0.00184 
0.60280 
0.00667 
 
0.25426 
-0.00589 
0.54400 
0.00605 
 
0.14811 
-0.07775 
0.76043 
0.01360 
 
0.18188 
-0.07088 
0.44257 
0.01771 
Post-crisis: 2011-16 
Lerner 
Boone 
CR5 
HHIL 
 
 
0.34161 
-0.05866 
0.86416 
0.05060 
 
0.18831 
-0.00954 
0.77712 
0.01514 
 
0.11630 
-0.02834 
0.88995 
0.00723 
 
 
0.10732 
0.02514 
0.71219 
0.00671 
 
0.39585 
-0.00052 
0.58180 
0.00599 
 
0.19712 
-0.02821 
0.76870 
0.01418 
 
0.29140 
-0.03994 
0.47071 
0.01756 
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Table 2.7 Correlation matrix. This table provides information on the correlation between the various proxies of bank market power, market structure and competition, as well 
as the country-specific variables used throughout this paper. The correlation coefficients reported in this table are averages at the country level. All competition or market 
structure measures are constructed such that an increase indicates more market power or concentration. The table contains pairwise correlation coefﬁcients as well as p-values 
(in parenthesis) that indicate the signiﬁcance of the correlation. *, **, & *** correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance respectively. 
Variables  LERNER CR5 HHIL DINFOS CAPSTRI ACTRES GDPGR LEGRI BANSIZ ETAR 
Lerner index 1.000          
           
C5 ratio 0.0821** 1.000         
  (0.0122)          
Herfindahl H index (loans)  0.025* 0.854** 1.000        
  (0.364) (0.000)         
Depth of information sharing  0.274* 0.152* 0.136*** 1.000       
  (0.164) (0.224) (0.046)        
Capital stringency  -0.131* 0.132* 0.052* -0.147* 1.000      
  (0.118) (0.077) (0.363) (0.231)       
Activity restrictions 0.052* -0.142* 0.128* 0.047* 0.038** 1.000     
 (0.197) (0.294) (0.357) (0.691) (0.754)      
GDP growth  0.287* 0.104* 0.057* 0.107* 0.045* -0.141*** 1.000    
  (0.418) (0.432) (0.332) (0.373) (0.738) (0.207)     
Legal rights index  0.189* 0.069* 0.076* 0.254* 0.098* -0.067* 0.047* 1.000   
  (0.626) (0.261) (0.384) (0.038) (0.396) (0.608) (0.594)    
Interbank ratio  0.228* 0.328* -0.125* 0.265* 0.152* 0.067* 0.048*** 0.153** 1.000  
  (0.091) (0.126) (0.273) (0.023) (0.222) (0.534) (0.671) (0.224)   
Bank capitalisation  0.107* -0.033* 0.063* 0.149* -0.087* 0.161* 0.511** 0.429* -0.198* 1.000 
  (0.198) (0.204) (0.356) (0.227) (0.412) (0.148) (0.582) (0.000) (0.076)  
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Table 2.8 The effect of market power on credit risk. This table shows bank-level GMM regressions with robust 
standard errors clustered at the country level to correct for within-country serial correlation7. The dependent 
variable to proxy a bank’s credit risk is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. The explanatory variables 
utilised in this study are outlined and defined in Table 2.1. The indicators of competition i.e. lerner index, boone 
indicator, C5 ratio and HHI loans are instrumented using activity restrictions, banking freedom, and percent of 
government owned banks. Bank size, legal rights index and GDP growth are also included in all regressions to 
control for variations in the business environment, the legal framework and economic development of the 
respective countries. The first stage F-statistic tests the relevance of the instrumental variables; rejecting the null 
hypothesis implies that the variables are not exogenous. The Hansen’s J-statistic tests the validity of the 
instruments used; rejection implies that the instruments are not valid. The χ2 test of heteroscedasticity includes 
the Breusch–Pagan and the Cook–Weisberg tests. We use and report the results of the Chow test to ascertain 
whether there was a structural break in the data for the global financial crisis years i.e. 2007-2010; accepting the 
null hypothesis implies no structural breaks exist in the data8. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses below 
estimated coefficients. 
Dependent variable: CREDIT RISK 
Competition / Market Power Measure 
Lerner index Boone indicator C5 ratio HHI loans 
Degree of competition (linear term) 28.146 108.129 158.609 267.174 
 (20.528) (33.368) (41.315)* (117.555)* 
Degree of competition(quadratic term) 
52.532 
(22.219)** 
48.427 
(56.147)** 
-484.360 
(133.411)** 
-752.448 
(218.362)* 
Inflection point -0.208 -0.213 0.253 0.186 
Sign of the relationship + + + + 
Bank size 
-1.263 
(0.422)* 
-1.784 
(0.397)* 
-0.588 
(0.061)* 
-0.254 
(0.124)** 
Banking freedom 
3.384 
(1.172)** 
1.723 
(1.063)** 
0.604 
(0.852) 
-1.640 
(1.475) 
Legal rights index 
1.636 
(0.538)* 
1.558 
(0.509)* 
-0.851 
(1.303) 
0.452 
(1.043) 
GDP growth 
-18.578 
(3.375)* 
-23.394 
(2.977)* 
-3.505 
(7.551) 
2.756 
(15.084) 
Number of banks 2 663 2 680 2 689 2 689 
First stage F-test 21.845 33.678 21.329 38.358 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen’s J x2 3.177 2.632 4.518 3.461 
P-value 0.208 0.208 0.108 0.166 
x2 test of heteroskedasticity 318.593 734.441 7 857.112 7 136.532 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Chow test F-statistic 247.5612 221.128 216.0356 286.1952 
R-squared  0.0563*** 0.0678*** 0.1641*** 0.1861*** 
***, ** & * correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance respectively. Robust standard errors appear in parenthesis 
below the estimated coefficients. 
                                                          
7 I prefer to air on the side caution and cluster robust standard errors at the country level because observations of a 
given bank are highly likely to be independent over time across the period with the financial crisis Berger et. al 
(2009); Turk-Ariss (2010). Clustering at the higher level (i.e. country level) is more conservative (and likely better) 
as it allows for the possibility of correlations between the errors in the observations within a given country, since the 
residuals from all the observations within a country will get multiplied by the residuals of all the other observations in 
that country. I however cluster robust standard errors at the bank level as a robustness check (Table 2.13). 
8 I use Chow tests to compare the coefficients we obtain for the sample of commercial banks in the pre-crisis years of 
our sample (i.e. 2000-2006) with the coefficients in the full sample to verify whether there is significant variation 
between the two sample sets. The null hypothesis in the Chow test is that the coefficients as a group are not 
significantly different from each other. 
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Table 2.9 The effect of market power on insolvency risk. This table shows bank-level GMM regressions with 
robust standard errors clustered at the country level to correct for within-country serial correlation. The 
dependent variable to proxy a bank’s insolvency risk is the z-score. The explanatory variables utilised in this 
study are outlined and defined in Appendix A. The indicators of competition i.e. Lerner index, Boone indicator, 
C5 ratio and HHI loans are instrumented using activity restrictions, banking freedom, and percent of government 
owned banks. Bank size, legal rights index and GDP growth are also included in all regressions to control for 
variations in the business environment, the legal framework and economic development of the respective 
countries. The First Stage F statistic tests the relevance of the instrumental variables; rejecting the null 
hypothesis implies that the variables are not exogenous. The Hansen’s J statistic tests the validity of the 
instruments used; rejection implies that the instruments are not valid. The χ2 test of heteroscedasticity includes 
the Breusch–Pagan and the Cook–Weisberg tests. We use and report the results of the Chow test to ascertain 
whether there was a structural break in the data for the global financial crisis years i.e. 2007-2010; accepting the 
null hypothesis implies no structural breaks exist in the data. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses below 
estimated coefficients. 
Dependent variable: INSOLVENCY RISK 
Competition / Market Power Measure 
Lerner index 
Boone 
indicator C5 ratio HHI (loans) 
Degree of competition (linear term) 6.737 9.231 12.534 7.174 
 (2.647)** (3.714)** (4.512)* (3.225)** 
Degree of competition (quadratic term) 
-15.612 
(3.121)* 
-32.455 
(7.462)* 
-48.343 
(17.334)* 
-19.634 
(8.543)** 
Inflection point 0.328 0.306 0.194 0.216 
Sign of the relationship + + + + 
Bank size 
-0.026 
(0.067) 
0.038 
(0.023) 
0.116 
(0.016)* 
0.118 
(0.004)* 
Banking freedom 
-0.206 
(0.136) 
-0.218 
(0.174 
-0.516 
(0.078)* 
-0.586 
(0.084)* 
Legal rights index 
-0.018 
(0.021) 
-0.027 
(0.052) 
0.008 
(0.039) 
-0.052 
(0.028) 
GDP growth 
0.632 
(0.294)** 
0.814 
(0.319)** 
1.475 
(0.368)* 
1.754 
(0.396)* 
Number of banks 2 826 2 844 2 853 2 853 
First stage F-test 27.685 18.432 25.796 11.974 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Hansen’s J x2 0.752 0.683 1.168 2.503 
P-value 0.347 0.319 0.294 0.136 
x2 test of heteroskedasticity 5 832.253 3 765.442 1 645.413 2 145.532 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Chow test F-statistic 144.2167 181.7324 113.8111 266.4202 
R-squared 0.0516*** 0.0664*** 0.1743*** 0.1524*** 
***, ** & * correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance respectively. Robust standard errors appear in 
parenthesis  below the estimated coefficients. 
 
 
 
 
 
53 
 
 
2.10 The effect of market power on capital risk. This table shows bank-level GMM regressions with robust 
standard errors clustered at the country level to correct for within-country serial correlation. The dependent 
variable to proxy a bank’s capital risk is the equity to assets ratio. The explanatory variables utilised in this study 
are outlined and defined in Appendix A. The indicators of competition i.e. lerner index, boone indicator, C5 
ratio and HHI loans are instrumented using activity restrictions, banking freedom, and percent of government 
owned banks. Bank size, legal rights index and GDP growth are also included in all regressions to control for 
variations in the business environment, the legal framework and economic development of the respective 
countries. The first stage F-statistic tests the relevance of the instrumental variables; rejecting the null hypothesis 
implies that the variables are not exogenous. The Hansen’s J-statistic tests the validity of the instruments used; 
rejection implies that the instruments are not valid. The χ2 test of heteroscedasticity includes the Breusch–Pagan 
and the Cook–Weisberg tests. We use and report the results of the Chow test to ascertain whether there was a 
structural break in the data for the global financial crisis years i.e. 2007-2010; accepting the null hypothesis 
implies no structural breaks exist in the data. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses below estimated 
coefficients. 
Dependent variable: CAPITAL RISK 
Competition / Market Power Measure 
Lerner index 
Boone 
indicator C5 ratio HHI loans 
Degree of competition (linear term) -0.4312 -0.7542 0.1933 0.7430 
 (0.6841) (0.3364) (0.3624) (0.2387)* 
Degree of competition (quadratic term) 
1.1613 
(0.9782) 
1.2481 
(0.8243) 
2.1382 
(1.1731)*** 
-1.0674 
(0.5812)*** 
Inflection point 0.2091 0.1843 -0.0283 0.332 
Sign of the relationship + / - + + + 
Bank size 
-0.0063 
(0.1067) 
-0.0071 
(0.2248) 
-0.0128 
(0.0021)* 
-0.0128 
(0.0034)* 
Banking freedom 
0.0264 
(0.0261) 
0.0398 
(0.0118) 
0.0327 
(0.0162)** 
0.0336 
(0.0168)** 
Legal rights index 
0.0062 
(0.0053) 
0.0038 
(0.0066) 
-0.0236 
(0.0074)* 
-0.0058 
(0.0037)** 
GDP growth 
0.0634 
(0.0321)*** 
0.1468 
(0.0228)*** 
0.1784 
(0.0381)* 
0.1214 
(0.0328)* 
Number of banks 2 826 2 844 2 853 2 853 
First stage F-test 21.5842 18.4126 21.2850 13.4631 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 
Hansen’s J x2 2.8641 2.0368 0.4276 0.4443 
P-value 0.1135 0.1076 0.5096 0.5231 
x2 test of heteroskedasticity 1 605.5836 3 421.3268 7 155.1316 8 248.8506 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Chow test F-statistic 121.1103 154.1471 182.6344 176.5632 
R-squared 0.0724*** 0.0836*** 0.1741*** 0.1307*** 
***, ** & * correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance respectively. Robust standard errors appear in 
parenthesis below the estimated coefficients.  
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Table 2.11 The effect of market power on liquidity risk. This table shows bank-level GMM regressions with 
robust standard errors clustered at the country level to correct for within-country serial correlation. The 
dependent variable to proxy a bank’s liquidity risk is the cash deposits ratio. The explanatory variables utilised 
in this study are outlined and defined in Appendix A. The indicators of competition i.e. lerner index, boone 
indicator, C5 ratio and HHI loans are instrumented using activity restrictions, banking freedom, and percent 
of government owned banks. Bank size, legal rights index and GDP growth are also included in all regressions 
to control for variations in the business environment, the legal framework and economic development of the 
respective countries. The first-stage F-statistic tests the relevance of the instrumental variables; rejecting the 
null hypothesis implies that the variables are not exogenous. The Hansen’s J-statistic tests the validity of the 
instruments used; rejection implies that the instruments are not valid. The χ2 test of heteroscedasticity includes 
the Breusch–Pagan and the Cook–Weisberg tests. We use and report the results of the Chow test to ascertain 
whether there was a structural break in the data for the global financial crisis years i.e. 2007-2010; accepting 
the null hypothesis imply no structural breaks exist in the data. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses 
below estimated coefficients. 
Dependent variable: LIQUIDITY RISK 
Competition / Market Power Measure 
Lerner Index 
Boone 
Indicator C5 Ratio HHI Loans 
Degree of competition (linear term) -0.7126 -0.4378 0.1744 0.7304 
 (0.5908) (0.2674) (0.3266) (0.2473)* 
Degree of competition (quadratic term) 
1.0931 
(0.8878) 
0.8942 
(0.7421) 
1.9182 
(1.2131)*** 
-1.0598 
(0.5372)*** 
Inflection point 0.2177 0.2548 -0.0206 0.286 
Sign of the relationship + / - + + + 
Bank size 
-0.0057 
(0.1106) 
-0.0042 
(0.1009) 
-0.0119 
(0.0026)* 
-0.0117 
(0.0029)* 
Banking freedom 
0.0283 
(0.0242) 
0.0239 
(0.0367) 
0.0364 
(0.0156)** 
0.0294 
(0.0159)** 
Legal rights index 
0.0071 
(0.0057) 
0.0058 
(0.0041) 
-0.0244 
(0.0062)* 
-0.0062 
(0.0044)** 
GDP growth 
0.0674 
(0.0321)*** 
0.0723 
(0.0424)*** 
0.1686 
(0.0322)* 
0.1482 
(0.0286)* 
Number of banks 2 899 2 894 2 831 2 831 
First stage F-test 19.3328 23.1814 27.7742 13.3293 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0009 
Hansen’s J x2 2.7814 1.9916 0.3843 0.4213 
P-value 0.1088 0.3263 0.5362 0.5613 
x2 test of heteroskedasticity 1 352.9175 4 742.8127 6 979.1443 7 103.3363 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Chow test F-statistic 124.4553 118.6041 166.8444 172.6128 
R-squared 0.0693*** 0.0831*** 0.1927*** 0.1294*** 
***, ** & * correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance respectively. Robust standard errors appear in 
parenthesis below the estimated coefficients. 
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2.12 Robustness Analysis. The Pre-Crisis, Crisis & Post-Crisis Periods. This table shows bank-level GMM regressions 
with robust standard errors clustered at the country level to correct for within-country serial correlation for the pre-crisis 
(2000-2006), crisis (2007-2010) and post-crisis (2011-2015) periods. The dependent variable to proxy financial stability is 
the Z-score. The explanatory variables utilised in this study are outlined and defined in Appendix A. The indicators of 
competition i.e. boone indicator and C5 ratio are instrumented using activity restrictions, banking freedom, and percent of 
government owned banks. Loan loss provisions to total assets ratio, bank size, unemployment, inflation and GDP per capita 
are also included in all regressions to control for variations in the business environment, the legal framework and economic 
development of the respective countries. The first-stage F-statistic tests the relevance of the instrumental variables; 
rejecting the null hypothesis implies that the variables are not exogenous. The Hansen’s J-statistic tests the validity of the 
instruments used; rejection implies that the instruments are not valid. The χ2 test of heteroscedasticity includes the 
Breusch–Pagan and the Cook–Weisberg tests. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses below estimated coefficients. 
PERIOD PRE-CRISIS CRISIS POST-CRISIS 
Dependent variable:  
Z-Score 
Boone 
Indicator 
C5 
Ratio 
Boone 
Indicator 
C5 
Ratio 
Boone  
Indicator 
C5 
Ratio 
Competition 
-2.5083 
(0.6127)*** 
0.7571 
(0.5433)*** 
-0.04075 
(0.5673)*** 
0.701097 
(0.5031)*** 
-0.0419 
(0.5843)*** 
0.7221 
(0.5182)*** 
Competition x Crisis 
(Interaction Term) 
9.8594 
(0.9165)*** 
-11.9606 
(2.5070)*** 
9.1291 
(0.9412)*** 
-11.0746 
(2.3213)*** 
9.4030 
(0.9694)*** 
-11.4068 
(0.3909)*** 
Loan loss provisions 
 to total assets  
-14.4756 
(21.5851)*** 
-15.0463 
(-21.879)*** 
-13.4033 
(19.9862)*** 
-13.9318 
(-20.259)*** 
-13.8054 
(-20.585)*** 
-14.3498 
(-20.867)*** 
Total assets (natural log) 
-0.0244 
(0.0564)* 
-0.0252 
(0.0815)* 
-0.0226 
(0.0522) 
-0.0233 
(0.0755)* 
-0.0233 
(0.0538)* 
0.0246 
(0.0777)** 
Unemployment 
5.9908 
(0.2948)*** 
-3.6830 
(0.0257)* 
-0.0271 
(0.0253) 
-0.0238 
(0.0207)* 
5.7136 
(0.2812)*** 
-3.5125 
(0.0245)*** 
Inflation 
0.0034 
(0.0000)*** 
0.0032 
(0.0000)*** 
0.0031 
(0.0000)*** 
0.0030 
(0.0000)*** 
0.0032 
(0.0000)*** 
0.0031 
(0.0000)*** 
GDP per capita 
15.3e-06 
(0.0000)*** 
12.62e-06 
(0.0000)*** 
14.2e-06 
(0.0000)*** 
11.75e-06 
(0.0000)*** 
14.63e-06 
(0.0000)*** 
12.12e-06 
(0.0000)*** 
Banking freedom 
-0.2240 
(0.1665) 
-1.2929 
(0.1916) 
-0.2074 
(0.1542) 
-1.1971 
(0.1774) 
0.2136 
(0.1588) 
-1.2330 
(0.1827) 
Number of banks 2 899 2 856 2 899 2 858 2 872 2 876 
First stage F-test 24.5562 27.2707 22.7372 27.1025 23.4193 27.9156 
Prob > F (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 
Hansen’s J x2 0.9836 0.9478 0.9794 0.9637 0.9088 0.9926 
P-value 0.3359 0.2960 0.3110 0.2741 0.3203 0.2823 
x2 heteroskedasticity 6 412.2952 7 668.7830 5 937.3102 7 100.7253 6 115.4311 7 313.7548 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Chow test F-statistic 137.2744 177.8486 127.1059 164.6746 130.9132 169.6156 
R-squared 0.0899*** 0.1686*** 0.0832*** 0.1561*** 0.0857*** 0.1608*** 
***, ** & * correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance respectively. Robust standard errors appear in 
parenthesis below the estimated coefficients.  
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2.13 Robustness Analysis. This table shows bank-level GMM regressions results with robust standard 
errors clustered at the bank level to correct for within-bank serial correlation. The ratio of non-performing 
loans to total loans, the equity to total assets ratio, cash deposits ratio and the z-score are the dependent 
variables and proxy for credit risk, capital risk, liquidity risk and insolvency risk respectively. The 
explanatory variables utilised in this study are outlined and defined in Table 2.1 and here we only report 
the results relating to our main competition proxy i.e. Boone indicator. The Boone indicator is instrumented 
using activity restrictions (ACTRES), banking freedom (BANFRE), and the percentage of banks that are 
government owned (PERGO). Loan loss provisions to total assets ratio, bank size, unemployment, inflation 
and GDP per capita are also built into all regressions to control for variations in the business environment, 
legal and bankruptcy laws and economic development of the respective countries. The first stage F-statistic 
tests the relevance, while Hansen’s J-statistic tests the validity of the instruments used. I use the Breusch–
Pagan and Cook–Weisberg tests to check for the presence of heteroscedasticity. I use and report the results 
of the chow test to ascertain whether there was a structural break in the data for the global financial crisis 
years i.e. 2007-2008; accepting the null hypothesis imply no structural breaks exist in the data. Robust 
standard errors appear in parentheses below estimated coefficients. A constant term is included but not 
reported. Refer to Table 2.1 for detailed descriptions of the variables used in this study. 
Dependent variable: Z-Score 
Winsorised 
Dep. variable 
Z-score 
Survivorship 
bias 
Z-score 
US stripped 
out 
Z-score 
Strictly 
linear 
Z-score 
Boone indicator 
4.3758 
(3.6193)* 
-2.6520 
(3.3114)* 
-0.2077 
(2.4376)** 
-4.4200 
(3.4413)** 
C5 ratio 
8.2013 
(0.2922)*** 
6.0647 
(0.3321)*** 
14.7120 
(3.3312) 
3.1766 
(0.3012)*** 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (loans) 
2.5445 
(0.0279)*** 
3.6932 
(0.0499)*** 
5.3428 
(3.1581)*** 
3.0464 
(0.0534)*** 
Loan loss provisions to total assets  
-13.4033 
(19.9862)*** 
-13.9318 
(-20.2598)*** 
-10.2933 
(-20.6054)*** 
-6.1212 
(-18.1146)*** 
Total assets (natural logarithm) 
-0.0226 
(0.0522) 
-0.0233 
(0.0755)* 
-0.0184 
(0.0583) 
0.0246 
(0.0681)** 
Unemployment 
-0.0271 
(0.0253) 
-0.0238 
(0.0207)* 
-0.0231 
(0.0232) 
-0.0254 
(0.0274)** 
Inflation 
-2.2251 
(0.0000)*** 
-2.4262 
(0.0000)*** 
-2.5058 
(0.0000)*** 
-2.4122 
(0.0000)*** 
GDP per capita 
-0.3772 
(-3.5401)*** 
-0.3794 
(-4.5326)*** 
-0.1283 
(-1.2751)*** 
0.3092 
(4.3503)*** 
Banking freedom 
-0.2074 
(0.1542) 
-1.1971 
(0.1774) 
-0.2194 
(0.1474) 
-1.2181 
(0.1463) 
     
Number of banks 2 889 2 858 2 838 2 838 
First stage F-test 22.7372 27.1025 22.7721 24.0208 
Prob > F (0.0000) (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0010) 
Hansen’s J x2 0.9794 0.9637 0.7283 0.9488 
P-value 0.3110 0.2741 0.3862 0.1678 
x2 test of heteroskedasticity 5 937.3102 7 100.7253 5 148.1197 6 025.6636 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Chow test F-statistic 127.1059 164.6746 137.1843 232.7066 
R-squared 0.0832*** 0.1561*** 0.0482*** 0.1431*** 
***, ** & * correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance respectively. Robust standard errors appear in parenthesis 
below the estimated coefficients. 
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Chapter 3 - Competition and financial misreporting 
                       in the light of the Global Financial Crisis 
 
3.1.     Introduction  
           The general consensus in the mainstream economics and finance domains has been 
that competition is a force for good in so far as the attainment of positive economic 
outcomes is concerned. The welfare-increasing effect of competition is largely through 
improved choice, product quality and competitive pricing. However, there is an emerging 
literature debunking and challenging this notion of competition as indisputably beneficial 
to the wider economy by probing the so-called ‘dark side’ of competition.  
           In this paper, I delve into this emerging debate on the pervasive effects of 
competition and focus on the interplay between competition and financial misreporting 
in the US financial services industry by using the Accounting and Auditing Enforcement 
Releases (AAERs) of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). For some context 
right from the onset, I define financial misreporting as the wilful misrepresentation of the 
true underlying economic performance of a firm. I advance two broad and diverging 
mechanisms through which competition can affect financial misreporting; these rely upon 
the competition-restraining and the competition-misreporting hypotheses.  
           The competition-restraining hypothesis posits the notion that firms in more 
competitive industries are less likely to misreport and follow better disclosure and 
financial reporting practices since not providing information and misreporting could be 
interpreted by potential entrants to the product market as good news. This line of 
argument establishes the idea of competition as a restraining mechanism in so far as 
financial misreporting is concerned. The counter theory to the competition-restraining 
hypothesis is what I refer to in this study as the competition-misreporting hypothesis. It 
postulates that firms that operate in more competitive environments will have less 
forthcoming and informative disclosure policies and are more likely to misreport. 
Specifically, the implications of the models advanced in these studies suggest that in more 
oligopolistic industries in which incumbents have more interdependent investment 
strategies it is optimal for firms to have less informative disclosure policies since 
information disclosed by one firm could be subsequently used against it by its rivals.   
           These contradictory notions on the relationship between competition and financial 
misreporting in theoretical studies across the accounting, economics and finance domains 
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provide the basis and theoretical underpinning for my study. The competition-
misreporting nexus is an emerging and hotly contested area of accounting and finance 
research and there is a burgeoning literature base coming through; yet the question can 
still be posed and probed from various alternative angles. Also, the existing empirical 
evidence building on the above analytical predictions is limited and unclear.  Several 
studies suggest that the disciplining role of product market competition is an important 
mechanism through which competition can relate to misreporting. Beginning with Hart 
(1983), it has long been argued that product market competition can be effective in 
curtailing managers’ misbehaviour. Numerous theoretical papers formalize this idea by 
examining the potential channels through which product market competition can impact 
financial misreporting. However, the recent literature documents that the probability of a 
firm to provide proprietary information is positively related to industry concentration 
consistent with the notion that product market competition and disclosure are negatively 
related.  
           Given the varied nature of the conclusions arrived at, and the shortcomings of 
research designs in extant literature, the question whether competition impacts financial 
accounting misreporting – as well as the direction of the impact - is very much an open 
one and remains fertile ground for further research. I update, extend and add to the 
competition-misreporting nexus by posing and investigating the hypothesis that the state 
of competition in an industry determines the extent of financial misreporting in that 
particular industry. I then proceed and probe - by way of a difference-in-difference 
analysis of the pre-crisis and post crisis situations - whether the financial crisis impacted 
on the competitive environment in the financial services industry. Finally, I establish a 
link between the global crisis of 2007-10 as an exogenous factor and financial 
misreporting. I follow the lead taken by Dechow et al. (2011) and utilise the US SEC’s 
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) from 2000 to 2016 as the 
financial misreporting proxy, with discretionary loan loss provisions coming in as an 
alternative for robustness purposes.  
           By way of contribution, firstly my paper adds to and extends the burgeoning 
research base probing the so-called the “dark side” of competition within markets that 
shines a light on the negative and undesirable effects of competition in altering the way 
firms behave in the market place Bennett et al. (2013). To the best of my knowledge, 
mine would be the first paper of its kind to exclusively focus on a financial services 
sample and establish a link between competition and financial misreporting. I further seek 
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to expound on the fact that at sufficiently higher levels, competition potentially yields 
undesirable consequences which ultimately may result in a reversal and undermining of 
its supposed benefits on the wider economy. Secondly, prior research on the interplay 
between competition and financial misreporting has tended to treat competition as being 
unidimensional and therefore utilised concentration measures to proxy for competition. 
This practice has since been comprehensively discredited in Industrial Organisation 
studies and I take heed of this fact in my study by adopting market size, ease of entry and 
product substitutability as my main competition measures, with the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI sales) also included merely as an alternative measure to strengthen 
my analysis. Utilising the three product market competition proxies allows me to 
circumvent and address the shortcomings of traditional concentration measures as proxies 
for competition. Berger et al. (2009) posit that the main difference between competition 
and concentration is that while competition measures market conduct; concentration 
essentially measures market structure. Finally, exclusive focus on the financial sector 
enables me to shed further light on whether the much-vaunted assertion that the 
disciplining role of competition is greater in industries where financial statements are 
highly comparable. This contention emanates directly from an analytical study by Besley 
and Prat (2006) highlighting that in an industry composed of various information 
suppliers, there is greater likelihood of there being at least one independent supplier who 
supplies accurate information. This way enhanced comparability becomes a deterrent and 
makes it difficult for the other peers in that particular industry to massage the information 
they disclose. 
           I regress my main financial misreporting proxy i.e. SEC AAERs against four 
competition measures (market size, ease of entry, product substitutability and HHI sales) 
and a battery of carefully selected control variables and find there exists a positive and 
significant effect of competition on financial misreporting. While it is undeniable that 
competition largely results in improved welfare for the population, there are potential 
problems associated with intense competition e.g. it escalates the possibility of financial 
misreporting incidences occurring. Governments, regulators and academics alike ought 
to critically consider the pervasive effects of competition in policy-making, compliance, 
welfare and other economic deliberations. 
           The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the related 
literature. Section 3 develops the hypotheses to be tested. Section 4 presents the data set, 
the model variables and the underlying empirical methodology as well as the relevant 
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descriptive statistics. Section 5 reports and discusses the empirical findings. Section 6 
presents the robustness analysis I conduct, whereas Section 7 offers a set of concluding 
remarks and discusses some policy implications. 
       
3.2.     Literature review 
           A lot has been written already about competition being a vital cog in determining 
the economic well-being and development of a nation state; and this belief has in turn 
informed the formulation of key economic policies of a great number of countries e.g. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) claim that “market competition is probably the most powerful 
force towards economic efficiency in the world.” There is a deeply held belief that 
competition promotes efficiency as well as fosters innovation as firms struggle to 
differentiate their products / reduce costs in a bid to maintain a competitive edge under 
intense competitive market conditions. However, there is an emerging literature on the 
“dark side” of competition and the relationship between competition and financial 
misreporting is prime territory for a study of this nature to be sustained. The literature on 
the competition-financial misreporting nexus can be distilled to two broad strands i.e. 
what I refer to in this paper as the competition-restraining and competition-misreporting 
hypotheses. 
 
     3.2.1.     The competition-restraining hypothesis  
           Darrough and Stoughton (1990) predict that firms in more competitive industries 
will follow better disclosure policies.  Their analytical model predicts that in industries 
with greater ease of entry / lower entry barriers, potential entrants could interpret 
withholding information as possible future good news about the industry due to expected 
positive shocks to product demand. Accordingly, firms in more competitive industries 
will follow better disclosure policies and are less likely to misreport financial information. 
In other words, firms in more competitive industries are less likely to misreport and follow 
better disclosure and financial reporting practices since not providing information and 
misreporting could be interpreted by potential entrants to the product market as good 
news. This line of argument firmly advances the notion of competition as a restraining 
mechanism in so far as financial misreporting is concerned. However, Gertner at al. 
(1988) counter this argument and contend that firms in more competitive industries face 
higher costs associated with disclosures and might find it optimal to misreport in order to 
provide less useful information to its current and future competitors.  
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           Regardless of this fact, recent theoretical papers from the economics literature 
provide another mechanism through which market competition constrains managers’ 
behaviour and ultimately disciplines reporting. Specifically, a firm releasing information 
that is competing with another firm that also releases information runs the risk that, if it 
distorts its public signal, the competitor’s report will expose the inaccuracy and thus 
reduce investors’ assessments of the distorting firm’s quality. The work of Gentzkow and 
Shapiro (2006) makes for some compelling reading here. By modelling the news market, 
they found that competition in the news market can result in a lowering of bias in news 
reporting i.e. a distorting firm that is in competition with another firm (news outlet) runs 
the risk that the competitor’s report will expose the inaccuracies; ultimately leading to 
reputational damage which could be terminal in an intensely competitive market. 
Reporting quality is construed by firms competing within a particular space to be a great 
source of competitive advantage such that any lowering of standards in this regard can be 
costly in terms of ceding market share to competitors. Competition therefore is taken to 
compel firms in competitive industries to maintain and constantly improve their financial 
reporting processes and standards, which ultimately leads greater quality in terms of the 
disclosures released by reporting firms.  
           Building on and corroborating Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) on the competition-
financial misreporting relationship is the work by Besley and Prat (2006). This is 
theoretical formulation which postulates that there is a higher likelihood of having at least 
one independent and objective supplier of accurate information in an environment 
punctuated by several competing suppliers. This provision of accurate information by the 
independent supplier serves as a reference point for greater comparability among rivals 
in that particular industry, thereby curbing their appetite to massage their financial 
reports. Also backing this conjecture and empirically examining the aspect of bias in 
earnings forecasts, Hong and Kacperczyk (2010) find that bias in earnings forecasts is 
reduced when analyst coverage is greater and they actually attribute this reduction in bias 
to the disciplining effect of competition among analysts. Running with the earnings bias 
theme, recent economics research is available which provides a convincing argument on 
how competition can reduce bias in the information provided. This literature contends 
that competition from suppliers of information makes it more difficult for a single supplier 
to suppress information. From this we can therefore surmise that, in the setting of a 
product market, the higher the number of firms, the costlier it will be for a single firm to 
present an exceedingly optimistic picture of its financial position and performance. 
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Indeed, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) posits that greater competition results in a greater 
variety and diversity of preferences among suppliers of information and thus ultimately 
increasing the possibility of having at least one independent information supplier whose 
preference is not to withhold news, but rather to avail financial reports of the highest 
quality. It is what is referred to as the “supplier’s independence” and provides another 
interesting avenue through which competition can have a restraining / disciplining effect 
on other suppliers of financial information. Put differently, higher competition levels can 
be construed to be indicative of the fact that there are more firms in an industry to serve 
as a yardstick against which performance can be measured, hence making the detection 
of fraud and other forms of misreporting much easier. All in all, this literature 
emphatically advances and supports the restraining effect competition has on financial 
accounting misreporting i.e. that incidences of misreporting should be fewer under highly 
competitive market conditions, thereby firmly endorsing the competition-restraining 
hypothesis as outlined in earlier paragraphs of this paper.  
           There is another emerging and interesting channel emerging from recent 
economics literature which chimes with the disciplining effect of competition on financial 
misreporting. The theory contends that a firm releasing information that is competing 
with another firm that also releases information runs the risk that the competitor’s report 
will expose the inaccuracy (misreporting), and thus ultimately reducing investors’ 
assessments of the distorting firm’s quality. However, it is also sensible to adopt the 
opposing view and discern from this postulation that there could be an incentive for firms 
in more competitive environments to misreport their performance as a means of fooling 
their competitors by making it difficult for the competitors to learn about the firms’ “true” 
performance. Further support for this argument is contained in the theoretical voluntary 
disclosure literature. The theory predicts that firms in more competitive industries may 
either misreport or withhold disclosure of performance in order to misinform their 
competitors Gertner et al. (1988). This view goes against the beneficial effects of 
competition on financial misreporting and supports the opposing theory instead i.e. the 
theory that holds that competition actually negatively impacts financial misreporting.  
           From an empirical perspective, recent studies seem to be advancing and supporting 
the idea that higher market competition provides incentives for managers to be more 
closely aligned with shareholders’ interests e.g. Giroud and Mueller (2010). Working 
with a sample of 10,960 firm-year observations from 1976 to 1995, Giroud and Mueller 
(2010) found no obvious evidence of ‘empire building’ by managers in competitive 
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industries in light of the enactment of business combination (BC) laws which essentially 
had the effect of increasing hostile takeovers. They found no change in capital 
expenditure in competitive industries in the aftermath of the passage of BC laws, strongly 
suggesting that competition was instrumental in reducing managerial slack as well as in 
better aligning managers’ interests with their shareholders. These findings contradict 
established thinking on the ‘myopia argument’ which contend that competitive pressure 
results in firms reducing capital expenditure and research & development (R&D) 
investment, accumulating cash reserves and equity; all this while decreasing debt Fresard 
and Valta (2012). Christie et al. (2003) also contradict Giroud & Mueller (2010)’s 
contention on competition aligning managers’ and investors’ interests by arguing that 
managers in competitive industries have a greater likelihood to focus on short-term 
actions aimed at enhancing their firms’ survival prospects and/or sustain competitive 
advantage. Financial misreporting is a handy tool for myopic managers who tend to be 
driven by short-term reported performance and this myopic orientation of managers could 
therefore ultimately result in an escalation of financial misreporting in competitive 
industries. To further support the myopia argument advanced above, von Thadden (1995) 
considers misreporting of accounting information as a classic example of an agency 
problem where firms’ managers forgo long-term shareholder value for short-term private 
gains.  
           Hart (1983) postulates that while the notion that competition disciplines managers’ 
incentives with regards to financial reporting practices is appealing, it is harder to 
establish the precise mechanism by which this occurs. What is certain though is the fact 
that this agency theory provides another avenue via which market competition can be an 
efficient disciplinary and monitoring mechanism to curb agency problems. Using data 
from publicly traded shares in 19 countries, Guadalupe & Perez-Gonzalez investigated 
the impact of product market competition on private benefits of control and the results 
came out in support of the competition-restraining hypothesis i.e. that product market 
competition brings closer the rights of managers with those of their shareholders. This 
postulation also wades directly into the broader issues around the agency theory that is so 
topical in finance and corporate governance literature. Markarian & Santalo (2014) is 
another of the recent papers that provide rather tame support for the competition-
restraining hypothesis in the competition-misreporting nexus. This was an empirical 
study using a large panel data set with earnings management as the financial misreporting 
proxy and found that competition ought to reduce, rather than increase, earnings 
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manipulation in intensely competitive markets. However, in the main the study broadly 
fell in the competition-misreporting sector of the argument. In another interesting paper 
extolling the virtues of competition as having a disciplining effect on financial 
misreporting, Verrecchia and Weber (2006) found a firm’s probability to provide 
proprietary information to be positively related to industry concentration, therefore 
implying a negative relationship between product market competition and disclosure as a 
result. In their paper, Berger and Hann (2007) however dampen the significance of this 
postulation by finding proprietary costs linked to product market competition to be an 
insignificant consideration in a firm’s decision to provide segment disclosures. 
           Finally, in another interesting take on the relationship between competition and 
financial misreporting, DeFranco, Kothari and Verdi (2011) classified industries based 
the comparability of financial statements and found that disciplining role of competition 
on financial misreporting is greatest in industries with higher levels of financial statement 
comparability. The scope as well as propensity to misreport is greatly reduced in 
environments with greater comparability because the report of one firm essentially 
informs and build expectations about the reports of the other firms in that industry. Any 
significant departures from established patterns and trends are likely to be easily seized 
upon and reacted to by the market. This postulation goes a long way in justifying our 
decision to restrict our study to just the financial services industry as it enhances and 
maximises our study’s potential to benefit from greater financial statement comparability.  
     
     3.2.2.     The competition-misreporting hypothesis 
           This is the opposing theory to the competition-restraining effect alluded to in the 
foregoing paragraph. Competition is an essential tenet of a capitalist system and has long 
been touted as welfare-increasing and synonymous with good economic outcomes all 
round is widely accepted. One could trace the evolution of the literature espousing the 
virtues of competition right from the early contributions of Adam Smith himself Smith 
(1776). Fairly modern contributions on economic thought have also backed this 
established notion of competition as a welfare-enhancing instrument e.g. Caves (1980). 
The central argument for the beneficial impact of competition on positive economic 
outcomes is the fact that it is believed to promote efficiency and foster innovation as firms 
differentiate products / reduce costs in quest to acquire a sustainable competitive edge. 
While the bulk of the contributions on this has advanced the positive impact competition 
and how it boosts efficiency within an economy, there is an emerging literature 
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documenting the so-called “dark side” of competition which associates intense 
competition with incidences of undesirable business practises. Among such malpractices 
is the escalation in incidences of financial misreporting in intensely competitive systems. 
I refer to this as the “competition-misreporting hypothesis” for purposes of our study. I 
establish the competition-misreporting hypothesis as a counter theory to the competition-
restraining hypothesis and it establishes the line of thought that competition increases the 
occurrence of incidences of financial misreporting. Milgrom and Roberts (1992) noted 
that the excessive risk taking and fraudulent behaviour that caused the Savings and Loan 
(S&L) crisis of the early 1980s was amplified by intense competition in the industry, and 
more recently Shleifer (2004) comes out in support of view by arguing that intense 
competition promotes unethical (and even criminal) behaviour among firms within an 
industry through triggering a typical ‘race to the bottom’. This “race to the bottom” results 
in otherwise conservative and ethical firms feeling compelled to imitate the questionable 
practices of their less ethical counterparts. The idea being that not doing so will force 
them out of business. This therefore implies that firms operating in competitive industries 
may engage in financial misreporting merely because its peers in this industry engage in 
this practice. Other examples of unethical practices that firms in competitive industries 
may be forced to mimic in a bid for survival include tax avoidance and bribery. Bringing 
a disclosure dimension to the debate, Gal-Or (1985) and Gertner (1988) among others 
posit that firms in more competitive industries will have less forthcoming and informative 
disclosure policies and are more likely to misreport. Specifically, the implications of the 
models advanced in these studies suggest that in more oligopolistic industries in which 
incumbents have more interdependent investment strategies it is optimal for firms to have 
less informative disclosure policies since information disclosed by one firm could be 
subsequently used against it by its rivals. In a similar vein, Verrecchia (1990) argues that 
greater product market competition inhibits better disclosures in markets comprised of 
mature competitors. Further, Wagenhofer (1990) shows that although there is always a 
full disclosure equilibrium, there might exist partial-disclosure equilibria suggesting that 
the relation between product market competition and a firm’s disclosure policies is 
unclear ex-ante. Prior research argues that market competition can be an efficient 
disciplinary and monitoring mechanism to curb agency problems e.g. Hart (1983). Also 
backing up this contention, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) claim that “product market 
competition is probably the most powerful force towards economic efficiency in the 
world.” The idea that market competition provides incentives for managers to be more 
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closely aligned with shareholders’ interests seem to be gaining quite some traction in 
recent empirical studies e.g. Giroud and Mueller (2010) and Christie et al. (2003) argue 
that managers in highly competitive industries are accorded greater discretion to engage 
in complex actions in the quest to attain and sustain a competitive advantage over peers 
in such an industry. Such a background makes it difficult for firms to maintain oversight, 
observe and comprehend such actions, hence allowing financial misreporting to fester 
and be common-place in intensely competitive environments. Allied to this argument is 
the contention that the greater uncertainty and volatility of performance in competitive 
industries provides a breeding ground of greater scope for financial misreporting which 
is primarily coined to mask such volatility. Against this backdrop, the expectation for an 
enhance scope for financial accounting misreporting is more pronounced in highly 
competitive industries. Still on earnings management specifically, Bloom et al. (2010) 
posits that greater competition increases the scope of earnings management by increasing 
its complexity, and therefore lowers the observability of managerial actions. We can infer 
from this that misreporting in an industry increases with the intensity of competition. 
Shleifer (2004) contributes on the ‘dark side’ of competition and argues that intense 
competition within an industry promotes unethical and even criminal behaviour among 
firms. The mechanism through this happens is via the fact that greater competition 
triggers a ‘race to the bottom’. This race to the bottom takes root when supposedly ethical 
firms are literally compelled to mimic the questionable practices of their less ethical 
counterparts and the cost of not doing is most likely to be bankruptcy. Shleifer proceeds 
and provides examples to further highlight his postulation. In the first example, he notes 
that intensely competitive industries are more likely to employ child labour because 
competition forces all firms to exploit the lower wages from child labour. A firm in such 
an industry that opts not to walk this path has a cost disadvantage in relation with its 
competitor peers and this will most likely result in its demise in such a highly competitive 
industry. The ethical firms are essentially left with no option, especially if such practices 
yield undue advantages and benefits to the unethical firms. Also on the dark side of 
competition, Shleifer (2004) argues that competitive pressures could act as an incentive 
for firms to adopt aggressive accounting methods as a means to inflate their stock price. 
Bagnoli and Watts (2010) developed a model scenario where a firm is motivated to 
misreport (manage earnings) if it believes that its peers are doing the same and this 
scenario is obviously amplified under intensely competitive market conditions, leading to 
widespread misreporting by all firms in the industry. Consistent with Shleifer’s 
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postulation, Linck et al. (2013) suggest that a firm can ease financial constraints and gain 
access to external funds through financial misreporting i.e. managing earnings, thus 
reducing its cost of capital as well as increasing firm value. They also find that accounting 
fraud actually tends to fool the market in the short term. Shleifer (2004) further treads this 
‘short-termism’ path and posits that higher earnings emanating from massaged figures 
could translate into higher managerial compensation and also higher stock prices which 
in turn could ultimately confer various advantages to the firm e.g. reduced cost of capital 
and increased ability to retain or attract employees. All these bring to the fore the 
undesirable effects of competition on financial accounting misreporting. 
           The catering view is another theory expounding on the negative impact of 
intensely competitive markets on financial accounting misreporting. The catering view 
suggests that competition can increase bias if the end users of financial information 
(investors) have an expectation to receive financial reports that conform to their priors 
Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005). According to Narayanan (1985), competition can also 
increase financial misreporting through the inducement of opportunistic behaviour. As an 
example, he observes that top managers may take actions that boost measures of short-
term performance at the expense of creating long-run shareholder value if they are 
concerned with their personal position in the labour market of top executives. This 
phenomenon can only be but exacerbated under competitive market conditions due to the 
fact that profitability and the ability to achieve superior performance decline with 
increased competition.  
           To further buttress the competition-misreporting hypothesis, DeFond and Park 
(1999) found CEO turnover to be higher in more competitive industries compared to 
concentrated ones. We establish a link and analyse this study with the conclusion arrived 
at by Burns and Kedia (2006) in their study when they examined the relationship between 
the occurrence of financial misreporting incidences and stock-based compensation for 
managers. The found that managers with stock-based compensation may misreport to 
boost stock prices and therefore obtain private gains. This phenomenon is more 
pronounced in competitive industries and the key takeaways from both studies suggest 
that financial reporting quality is expected to be lower in more competitive industries. In 
other words, the likelihood of financial accounting misreporting is amplified in 
competitive market conditions.  
           Verrecchia (1999) considers financial accounting misreporting as an outcome of a 
firm’s overall disclosure decision to withhold the true underlying information about the 
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firm’s economic performance given the costs and benefits of doing so. On one hand - 
based on this view - firms in more competitive industries face higher costs associated 
with disclosures and might find it optimal to misreport in order to provide less useful 
information to its current and future competitors Gertner et al. (1988). On the other hand, 
as expounded at length in an earlier paragraph, firms in more competitive industries are 
less likely to misreport and follow better disclosure and financial reporting practices since 
not providing information and misreporting could be interpreted by potential entrants to 
the product market as good news Gertner et al. (1988). While the pressure that comes 
with operating in intensely competitive environments can motivate the attainment of 
various positive economic outcomes e.g. improved productivity and innovation, it can 
also inadvertently exert pressure on managers in undesirable behaviours e.g. financial 
misreporting. This is especially so if the misreporting aids the respective firms in 
maintaining their competitive advantage over its peers in the same industry.  
           Financial misreporting (in the form of earnings management) could help boost the 
current stock price (Stein 1988), and this inflated stock price can then be used to the firm’s 
advantage in the M&A, capital, and labour markets; ultimately leading to a lowering of 
the firms’ overall cost of doing business and therefore aid in maintaining its competitive 
edge. This also is the crux of Shleifer’s thesis as expounded on in an earlier paragraph in 
this prose. A study by Graham (2003) makes for interesting in the context of what is under 
discussion in this paragraph. Graham (2003) surveyed and interviewed more than 400 
executives to determine the factors that drive reported earnings and disclosure decisions 
and found that 78% admitted to sacrificing long term earnings by smoothing earnings. 
The underlying aim being to boost prices, especially against the backdrop where 
executive compensation was via stock options. They further found that earnings, and not 
cash flows, were the key metric considered by outsiders in assessing the performance and 
prospects of a company. A competitive environment escalates these issues as managers 
adopt a short-term orientation towards decision as their tenure is becomes highly volatile 
with greater competition; therefore, providing greater incentives for firms to misreport 
i.e. through income smoothing. 
           In another recent paper on the competition-misreporting nexus, Datta et al (2013) 
examined the link between product market power and the degree of earnings 
management. They found that firms with inferior product market pricing power engage 
in greater use of discretionary accruals. Competition leads to greater financial 
misreporting for such firms because their ability to pass on costs to customers is blunted. 
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Firms with greater market have got better leeway to cushion themselves against the 
squeeze in profits ushered in by intense competition, thus are less likely to engage in 
financial misreporting (i.e. via earnings manipulation). Tying in with this paper, Irvine 
and Pontiff (2008) examined US time series of idiosyncratic volatility to probe why 
idiosyncratic return volatility had outpaced total market volatility. They found that the 
upward trend was attributable to an increasingly competitive environment in which firms 
have less market power which ultimately provide fertile ground for firms to misreport 
financial accounting information. Competition increases cash flow volatility and this 
creates incentives for managers engage in the smoothing of earnings. The greater 
uncertainty and volatility of performance in competitive industries provides greater scope 
for earnings management that masks this volatility to take place. According to Graham 
(2005) income smoothing is one of the most common forms of financial misreporting by 
firms. Wang and Winton (2012) also provide support to the competition-misreporting 
hypothesis when they studied the effect of product market competition on firms’ 
incentives to fraudulently report financial information and found fraud propensity to be 
greater on average in competitive industries. 
           Veenman et al (2011) examined whether managers’ decisions to exercise their 
stock options had any signalling effect in terms of providing incremental information 
regarding a firm’s future earnings performance and current earnings quality. They 
specifically hypothesised whether executive options liquidation exercises are associated 
with upward earnings management and found options causing managerial wealth to be 
more sensitive to price changes thereby inducing more risk-taking in terms of 
opportunistic financial reporting. Another interesting recent study by Markarian & 
Santalo (2014) posits that it is difficult for investors to observe real firm output and sales 
in a crowded and competitive market place which provides fertile ground for financial 
misreporting to take place. They further contend that the boost in market value resulting 
from misreporting is much more pronounced in competitive industries than in 
concentrated ones.  
           Finally, managers in competitive industries are accorded greater discretion to 
engage in complex actions to attain/sustain a competitive advantage in the industry 
(Christie et al. 2003, Bloom et al. 2010). This makes it difficult for firms to observe and 
comprehend such actions, thus allowing financial misreporting to be rampant in 
competitive environments. For these reasons, I expect that there is greater scope for 
financial misreporting by firms operating in more competitive industries. 
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3.3.     Hypotheses development 
           In this section, I rely on the relevant literature to review the channels through 
which product market competition impacts our financial misreporting proxy i.e. SEC 
Auditing and Accounting Enforcement Releases (SEC AAERs). This literature 
background provides the setting for the formulation of the four testable hypotheses that 
form the basis of our study. 
 
     3.3.1.     Crisis and misreporting hypothesis 
           The first two hypothesis builds up to and provide the premises and support for my 
formulation of the key hypothesis that is the basis of my study i.e. whether product market 
competition leads to an increase or decrease in financial misreporting in the financial 
services industry within the context of the global financial crisis of 2007-08. My first 
hypothesis seeks to establish a direct link between the financial crisis as an exogenous 
shock with incidences of financial misreporting in the financial services industry. I 
specifically assess how my financial misreporting proxy i.e. SEC AAERs responds to 
variations in the financial services industry ushered in by the global financial crisis. I 
uphold and follow Balakrishnan & Cohen (2013) and utilise Difference-in-Difference 
analysis to evaluate how the financial crisis impacted on the occurrence of incidences of 
financial misreporting in the financial services industry (and the direction of the impact). 
To achieve this, I compare the pre-crisis and post-crisis dispensations in this regard. This 
is in line with Bertrand et al (2014)’s postulation that the Difference-In-Difference 
approach is now increasingly popular in recent literature as the design of choice for 
identifying causal effects. According to De Franco et al (2011) the extent to which product 
market competition is a disciplining force in so far as financial misreporting is concerned 
is thought to be greater in industries where financial statements are comparable. I believe 
exclusive focus on a single industry i.e. financial services allow us to fully maximise on 
this comparability aspect as the financial statements are broadly similar in scope, content 
and form. Did the financial crisis impact on financial misreporting incidences in the 
United States? This background therefore forms the basis of my first supporting 
hypothesis thus: 
H1. The financial crisis as an exogenous factor led to an increase in financial 
misreporting incidences in the US financial services industry 
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     3.3.2.     Competition and crisis hypothesis  
           The second of my supporting hypotheses relates the crisis with the competitive 
environment in the US financial services industry. Under this hypothesis, I seek to assess 
how the financial crisis impacted the competitive environment in the financial services 
sector. The global financial crisis has its genesis deeply rooted in the financial services 
industry and it is also fair to surmise that the full force of its impact was largely felt and 
concentrated in this industry as well. I therefore follow the lead taken by Karuna (2007) 
and seek further confirmatory evidence of the nature of the relationship between product 
market competition and financial misreporting as articulated in my main hypothesis. This 
I achieve by probing whether the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-08 instigated an 
exogenous increase in competition in the financial services sector, which by extension 
ultimately resulted in a modification of the financial reporting and disclosure behaviours 
of financial services firms. Karuna (2007) used the deregulation in the 
telecommunications industry and tariff reductions emanating from the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to ascertain whether an exogenous shock (i.e. 
deregulation) culminated in an altering of the competition dynamics in the 
telecommunications industry. Balakrishnan and Cohen (2013) also took a similar path but 
instead used shifts in import tariffs to identify the exogenous intensification of 
competition emanating from the occurrence of a major event. As in the preceding 
supporting hypothesis, I make use of Difference-In-Difference analysis to identify 
exogenous shifts in competition in the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. In other words, I 
seek to establish how the financial crisis altered the competitive landscape in the financial 
services industry and, by extension, whether this ultimately modified the reporting 
behaviours of executives in the industry. This informs the formulation of my second 
supporting hypothesis thus:  
H2. The financial crisis increased (or decreased) the intensity of competition in the 
US financial services industry  
 
     3.3.3.     Competition and financial misreporting hypothesis  
           Having sought to establish how the financial crisis impacted on reporting 
behaviour and the competitive landscape in the US financial services industry in my two 
preceding supporting hypotheses, the stage is now set for me to pose my basic main 
hypothesis that intensely competitive industries tend to exacerbate firms’ propensity to 
partake in financial misreporting in all its guises e.g. around revenue recognition, outright 
72 
 
 
fraud or earnings management among other vices. I premise my hypothesis on both 
demand-side and supply-side factors. On the demand-side, I make the contention that 
competition abets managers’ willingness to misreport, while on supply-side factors I 
contend that competition increases the scope for managers to misreport. I expound on 
both contentions a little bit more. Cut-throat competition exerts pressure on managers to 
grow and maintain a competitive advantage over peers in the industry in which they 
operate. Once realised, sustenance of this competitive edge is paramount and an inability 
to do so ultimately results in a firm going out of business. While competitive pressure is 
touted to yield positive outcomes such as improved productivity and innovation, it is also 
true that it can impose pressure on managers to “cut corners” and engage in financial 
accounting misreporting if such practices are expected to help the firms attain their 
competitive edge. 
           I start by documenting various channels advanced in literature via which  
competition has a positive and beneficial impact on financial misreporting.  (Darrough  
& Stoughton (1990); Hart (1983)) argue that firms in competitive environments follow  
better disclosure while Giroud & Muller (2010) posited that product market competition  
incentivises managers to align with shareholders’ interests. Hong and Kacperczyk (2010)  
contend that competition makes it hard for a single firm to misreport i.e. eliminates bias  
and De Franco et al (2011) found the disciplining effect to be greater in industries with  
higher levels of financial statements comparability De Franco et al (2011). Against the  
backdrop of this literature base I formulate the first of my two-part main hypothesis,  
thus: 
H3a. The level of competition enhances the quality of disclosures thereby curbing the 
occurrence of financial misreporting incidences in the financial services industry  
I then proceed to document the literature contributing on the negative impact of  
competition on financial misreporting e.g. Gal-Or (1985) find firms in competitive  
industries less forthcoming in their disclosures. Verrecchia (1990) contends that  
competition inhibits better disclosure in mature markets while Mullainathan & Shleifer  
(2005) found competition to have the effect of increasing bias if end users expect to  
receive financials that conform to priors’ i.e. the Catering View. Burns & Kedia (2006)  
argue that managers with stock-based compensation misreport to boost stock prices.  
Markarian & Santalo (2014) also contribute by arguing that gains from financial  
misreporting are greater in competitive industries. Irvine and Pontiff (2009) argued that  
competition increases cash flow volatility and Valta and Fresard (2012) find that  
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competitive pressure results in firms reducing capital and R&D investment. This literature  
discussion informs the framing and positioning of the second bit of my two-part main  
hypothesis, thus: 
H3b. The intensity of competition in the financial services industry / banking increases 
the likelihood of firms operating in the industry misreporting 
 
3.4.     Empirical analysis  
 
     3.4.1.     Data and sample selection  
           I describe the data I use for purposes of my study in this section. I obtain and 
use data from various sources for the purposes of my analyses. For my financial 
misreporting proxy, i.e. AAER_ENF, I collect accounting enforcement data from the 
United States Securities & Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Releases (AAERs). My main focus is on the financial services industry 
which is four-digit SIC Codes from 6000 – 6999. I started with a population of 2 604 
industry-year observations and then applied some filtering rules to arrive at my final 
sample. I excluded auditing enforcement releases and accounting enforcement releases 
relating to individual CPAs, LLCs and LLPs. This ultimately left me with a final 
sample of 681 industry-year observations as per the breakdown in Table 3.2 and I 
winsorise all my variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles to dilute the likely impact of 
outliers. All my competition variables i.e. market size (MKTSZ), ease of entry 
(ENTRY), product substitutability (SUBST) and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHISL) are extracted from the Segments and Annual Industrial databases in 
Compustat. From the same Compustat database, I also derive two of my control 
variables i.e. cash flow volatility (CFVOL) and the leverage ratio (LEVRA). I obtained 
data for the control variable equity incentives (EQINS) from Execucomp and for the 
corporate governance index (GOVINS) from Risk Metrics9. I explain and justify my 
choice of variables for this study based on the most recent relevant literature in a later 
section in this study. 
           My primary sample encompasses the period from fiscal 2000 to 2016 and I have 
no specific data constraints with SEC AAERs in this regard. The period 2000 to 2016 
is particularly interesting for the financial services industry because of the occurrence 
                                                          
9 Descriptions, abbreviations, computations and sources of all the variables used in this study are 
presented by way of Table 3.1. 
74 
 
 
of the global financial crisis of 2007-2010 which emanated from this industry. This 
makes it possible for me to examine and make periodical comparisons about the 
competition-misreporting relationship based on conditions as they were before, in the 
build-up to and after the crisis period. I require five years of prior cash flow data to 
estimate one of my key variables i.e. cash flow volatility (CFVOL)) for a given year, 
thus commencing my study in the year 2000 makes sense since the Compustat 
Segments Data starts in 1992. My main thrust in this study to evaluate the effect intense 
market competition has on financial misreporting from a financial services industry 
perspective. Against this background, I therefore conduct my empirical analysis at the 
primary four-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) industry level as opposed to 
doing it at the firm level.   
 
     3.4.2.     Financial misreporting measure(s) 
           SEC AAERs: my analysis is strengthened by my use of an objective-based proxy 
of financial misreporting i.e. SEC AAERs. Unlike the accrual-based proxies used for 
earnings management which tend to be subject to measurement error during the 
estimation process Kothari et al. (2005), SEC enforcement releases are more robust to 
estimation errors since they are publicly reported incidences of financial misreporting. 
The US SEC’s Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) primarily 
serve as evidence that a firm committed an accounting violation to warrant being 
charged for that violation by the SEC. Because AAER releases are disclosed to the 
public via the medium of the SEC website well after the actual accounting violation 
has been committed, I have to read the AAER releases case by case to determine the 
period when the actual violation first occurred. Dechow et al. (2010) tout SEC AAERs 
as a robust financial misreporting proxy by remarking that “the AAER fraud sample 
represents the most egregious accounting manipulations that are identified by the SEC 
thereby providing me with a measure that unambiguously captures financial 
misreporting.”  Table 2 above detail the violation types and the frequency with which 
they are committed by firms. Close to 84% of the violations relate to presenting 
misleading financial information, with revenue recognition and internal control 
violations also featuring heavily at 66% and 48% respectively. In the majority of cases, 
a single AAER normally contains a combination of various of these infractions e.g. a 
company that violates revenue recognition conventions also automatically gets 
charged with presenting misleading financial information as well with issues 
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pertaining to the existence of a weak internal control environment. My study is based 
on industry-year observations; thus, I determine the proportion of firms in each four-
digit SIC code that are subject to a SEC enforcement action in a particular year. SEC 
AAERs constitute my main financial misreporting proxy for purposes of this study.  
           Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions: I estimate the absolute value of 
discretionary loan loss provisions (DISC_LLP) as an alternative financial misreporting 
proxy to SEC AAERs (AAER_ENF) for robustness purposes. I feel backing up my 
objective-based misreporting proxy (i.e. SEC AAERs) with a subjective-based one 
(loan loss provisions) strengthens and enriches the sensitivity of my analysis. In so far 
as banks are concerned, an opportunity exists for managers to misreport earnings 
through discretionary actions related to the recording of loan loss provisions. Loan loss 
provisions consists of two components i.e. a non-discretionary component and a 
discretionary portion which is supposed to be closely monitored and regulated. A 
challenge therefore exists as to how to quantify a measure of discretionary loan loss 
provisions (DISC_LLP), or more specifically, a proxy for financial misreporting (in 
the form of earnings management). I adopt the Beatty et al. (2002) model to estimate 
discretionary loan loss provisions and run fixed-effects OLS regressions based on the 
regression specification (1) below. I also follow the lead taken by Beatty et al. (2002) 
and Cornett et al. (2009) and use Cook's (1977) distance criterion to remove 
influential observations from the sample. Most specifically, I use the following 
regression model to estimate loan loss provisions as: 
 
𝐿𝑁𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐿𝐿𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑂𝑇𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡          (3.1) 
 
where: 𝑖 = bank; 𝑡 = year (2000 to 2016); 𝐿𝑁𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = loan loss provisions as a 
percentage of total loans; 𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = the natural log of total assets; 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = 
nonperforming loans (includes loans past due 90 days or more and still accruing 
interest and loans in nonaccrual status) as a percentage of total loans; 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = loan 
loss allowance as a percentage of total loans; 𝑂𝑇𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡 = all other loans (i.e. 
incorporating real estate loans, commercial and industrial loans, loans to depository 
institutions, agriculture loans, consumer loans and loans to foreign governments) as a 
percentage of total loans; 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 = error term. 
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In line with Beatty et al. (2002) and Cornett et al. (2008), I then proceed and designate 
the error term from this regression as the discretionary component of loan loss 
provisions. However, because my measure of earnings management (defined below) 
is standardized by total assets, I transform the error term and define my measure of 
discretionary loan loss provisions (DISC_LLP) as: 
 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶_𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = (𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ∗  𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐿𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡)/  𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡            (3.2) 
 
where: 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶_𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = discretionary loan loss provisions; 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐿𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = total loans; 
𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = total assets. 
 
     3.4.3.     Measures of competition 
           In this study, I follow the path established by Karuna (2007) and estimate 
market competition along three dimensions i.e. product substitutability (SUBST), 
market size (MKTSZ) and entry costs (ENTRY). I believe these three determinants of 
price competition capture the nature of competition in an industry better than the 
concentration measures which were widely used as competition proxies in much of 
prior literature on competition (e.g. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999). Industrial 
organizations literature e.g. Raith (2003) have effectively banished concentration 
measures as proxies for competition. For one, Ahn (2002) & Karuna (2007) lament 
that industry concentration fails to capture the threat from potential competition in the 
industry. I however include a concentration measure in our regressions i.e. the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHISL) to control for the level of concentration in an 
industry, as well as a robustness check for the competition proxies. (Vives, 2008) 
propounds that it is important to control for concentration as a means of capturing the 
multi-dimensional aspects of competition and avoid the correlated omitted variables 
bias that studies that treat competition as one-dimensional suffer from. HHISL is a 
commonly used measure of industry concentration and is calculated by taking the sum 
of squared market shares of firms in an industry and multiplying them by minus one. 
Industrial Organisation (IO) based competition proxies would still be superior for my 
study when pitted against purely banking competition type proxies. This is primarily 
because my sample (i.e. SIC Codes 6000-6999) includes some firms which can best 
be described as “quasi-banking” at best, and this makes it harder for me to estimate 
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the bulk of the variables required for banking competition proxies to be applicable. 
Also, I seek to make a comparison of the competitive landscapes between the financial 
services industry and the other industries and I run into all sorts of estimation 
challenges when trying to impose purely banking competition proxies to other industry 
types. For these reasons among others, I believe IO based competition proxies reflect 
market fundamentals that more directly capture the nature of competition in all 
industry types than both concentration and banking competition proxies. 
           Product substitutability (SUBST): basically, denotes the extent to which there 
are close (or perfect) substitutes for a product in a particular industry; the greater the 
availability of close substitutes, the greater the intensity of price competition. I tag 
along with prior studies in the Industrial Organizations literature and adopt use the 
price-cost margin as proxy for product substitutability Nevo (2001). Higher 
substitutability breeds greater competition and ultimately results in a lower price cost 
margin. In line with prior studies (e.g. Karuna (2007), Nevo (2001)), I compute 
SUBST as equal to the average operating industrial segment profit divided industrial 
segment revenue multiplied by minus one (at the four-digit SIC code level).  The 
intuition behind this is that intense competition is associated with lower profitability, 
and ultimately with greater values of SUBST. Greater values of SUBST therefore 
denote the existence of higher product substitutability in an industry.   
           Market size (MKTSZ): is considered to be reflective of the density of consumers 
in an industry. Raith (2003) argue that when market demand for a product increases, 
the sales of that particular product also increase in tandem. The prospects of greater 
profitability attract new firms to enter the market (industry) leading to an increase in 
price competition. I mimic Karuna (2007) and measure an industry’s market size by 
primary industry revenue at the four-digit SIC code level; larger industry revenue 
denotes larger market size. It is equal to the natural log of industrial segment revenue 
(at the four-digit SIC code level) averaged over the past three years and the current 
year. In other words, larger values of MKTSZ indicate greater market size and thus 
greater competition. 
           Entry costs (ENTRY): refer to the ease with which new firms can penetrate an 
industry i.e. the barriers to entry in an industry Bresnahan (1992). The higher these 
barriers to entry, the lower the intensity of price competition. I consider entry costs to 
be the minimum level of investment that must be incurred by an entrant firm into an 
industry before production commences. In this study, consistent with Karuna (2007), 
78 
 
 
the minimum level of investment is computed as the the natural log of the weighted 
average gross value of total assets weighted by each firm's market share in industry 
multiplied by minus one (at the four-digit SIC code level). This variable is averaged 
over the past three years and the current year. Market share is derived by dividing the 
segment revenue figure for the primary industrial segment of a firm by the sum of the 
segment revenue of all firms that have this particular industry as their primary industry 
at the four-digit SIC code level. To combat the skewness, I log-transform our entry 
costs measure and larger values of ENTRY reflect a lower level of entry costs and thus 
more intense competition.  
           Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHISL): this is widely used in literature as a 
proxy for industry concentration and is calculated by taking the sum of squared market 
shares of firms in an industry multiplied by minus one. I adopt and build HHISL into 
our study to control for the level of concentration in the financial services industry. It 
is an established convention in prior research to examine these dimensions of 
competition while controlling for concentration in the same instance e.g. Raith (2003); 
Vives (2008). This is important for two reasons: 1) to capture the incremental and more 
exogenous effects of each measure relative to the other competition measures as there 
could be associations among these variables, and 2) to carefully capture the multi-
dimensional aspects of competition and avoid the correlated omitted variables bias that 
studies that treat competition as one-dimensional suffer from. Recently, in support of 
this contention, Subramanian (2013) illustrate that it is important to distinguish the 
different dimensions of competition in both theoretical and empirical analyses of the 
effects of competition. By showing that industry concentration is endogenous, Sutton 
(1991) asserts that there is a historically determined lower bound to the level of 
concentration which must be controlled for in examining the effects of the three 
determinants of competition we examine. 
           Summing up, given the level of concentration, I examine how the three 
competition proxies (SUBST, MKTSZ and ENTRY) impact financial misreporting; 
all this at the primary four-digit SIC code level. I average each of the three competition 
proxies and the concentration measure HHISL) over the year of measurement and the 
prior three years. I do this as a means of ensuring my regressions capture any lagged 
effects of competition on financial misreporting.  
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     3.4.4.     Control variables  
           I build into the regressions a plethora of other control variables that bear some 
correlation with my measures of both competition and financial misreporting. Hribar 
and Craig Nichols (2007) suggest that unsigned financial misreporting measures are 
correlated with the volatility of cash flows and for this reason I control for cash flow 
volatility (CFVOL) in the regressions. I derive this as the standard deviation of cash 
flows from operations scaled by beginning assets for the four-digit SIC industry-year 
group (6000 – 6999). Consistent with the reasoning of Ivashina et al. (2009) who 
suggested that creditors may serve as corporate control in monitoring companies, I 
include the leverage ratio (LEVRA) to control for capital structure. This is computed 
as the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by total assets for 
the four-digit SIC industry-year group. I account for the likelihood that executive pay 
and compensation may influence financial misreporting by including CEO equity 
compensation incentives (EQINC). Prior studies e.g. Cheng and Warfield (2005) 
suggest that equity incentives of CEOs may drive financial misreporting. However, 
there is a lot of research arguing that the impact may actually be opposite i.e. that CEO 
equity incentives could actually lead to a reduction in incidences of financial 
misreporting Armstrong et al. (2010). I compute this as equal to the sum of restricted 
stock grants and Black-Scholes value of options granted divided by the total CEO 
compensation package. I follow Gompers et al. (2003) and include a corporate 
governance measure (GOVIN) to control for the feasible assertion that stronger 
governance frameworks discipline managers from engaging in financial misreporting. 
In line with Gompers et al. (2003), I denote this as the composite index of charter 
provisions and by-laws based on IRRC data for the four-digit SIC industry-year group 
(6000 – 6999). I proceed and acknowledge the role of quality auditors in restraining 
financial misreporting by including the percentage of big auditors (BIG4AUD) in an 
industry-year group. It is the percentage of the banks audited by large auditing firms 
in the four-digit SIC industry-year group. I identify large auditing firms to be the large 
international auditing firms i.e. Arthur Andersen (before 2002), Ernst & Young, 
Deloitte & Touche, KPMG and Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC). Finally, I control 
for firm size (LNTAS) because large firms may have more robust control systems that 
act as a deterrence for financial misreporting. This is equal to the natural log of a firm’s 
total assets over the sample period.  
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     3.4.5.     The regression specification 
           For purposes of this study, the dependent variable for my set of regressions is 
the financial misreporting proxy i.e. AAER_ENF, with DISC_LLP coming in as a 
robustness check. The three competition variables i.e. MKTSZ, SUBST, ENTRY, and 
HHISL (the industry concentration measure for robustness), are the main explanatory 
variables and these are common to each of our regressions. When slotting these 
continuous explanatory variables into the regressions, I standardize them at the mean 
value of zero so that the effects of these variables are comparable. I estimate the 
regressions at the firm level for each year, and because of this it follows that I also 
average each of the control variables at the firm level. To control for unobserved time 
effects, I include year fixed effects. I test my hypotheses using a regression 
specification which takes the following form:  
 
𝐴𝐴𝐸𝑅_𝐸𝑁𝐹𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑏𝑜 + 𝑏1𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑆𝑍𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑏2𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏3𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑏4𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑆𝐿𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝑏5𝐶𝐹𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑏6𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑅𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏7𝐸𝑄𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏8𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑁𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑏9𝐵4𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡  +
 𝑏10𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆07−10 +  ∑ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖  + 𝜀            (3.3) 
 
           Table 3.4 reports the descriptive statistics of the key variables I utilize in my 
research study.  The descriptive statistics are comparable to earlier studies conducted 
at the firm level even though I construct my variables at the industry level. As an 
example, the mean value of AAER_ENF at 0.63% and 10.84% for DISC_LLP 
indicates that incidences of reported financial fraud are rare occurrences within the 
financial services industry. This position isn’t at all out of line with the overall 
unconditional fraud ratio of 0.37% from Dechow et al. (2011). The difference could 
be attributable to the fact that Dechow et al. 2011’s AAER data spanned from 1971 to 
2003, whereas my sample period covers a period which witnessed significantly more 
AAER fraud cases in comparison. In addition, my variable is weighted at the industry 
level whilst the one in Dechow et al. (2011) is constructed at the firm level. Finally, 
the coefficients of the competition and concentration measures i.e. MKTSZ, ENTRY 
and HHISL are also very much in sync with Karuna (2007).      
           Table 3.5 presents the Pearson correlations for the various explanatory variables 
adopted for application in the baseline regressions. Whilst there are no particularly 
large correlations among the variables, the correlation between MKTSZ and ENTRY 
at 0.751 merits some further elucidation.  By implication, this is consistent with 
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Karuna (2007) in suggesting that firms operating in larger industries / or markets also 
invest in heavy capital stock such as plant and equipment i.e. that higher values of 
ENTRY are indicative of lower values of plant and equipment. I also find B4AUD and 
LNSLS (Firm Size) highly correlated at 0.5702 and this position is well in line with 
earlier studies e.g. Becker et al. (1998).      
 
3.5.     Discussion of the empirical results 
            
           Table 3.6 is a presentation of the results from the regressions on the product 
market competition-financial misreporting, most specifically looking at the 
relationship between market competition and financial misreporting in terms of the 
frequency with which the misreporting incidences occur. I utilise AAER_ENF as the 
dependent variable (i.e. SEC Auditing and Accounting Enforcement Releases) in this 
case. At the 5% significance level or better, the coefficients / values   on the three main 
competition measures (i.e. market size, product substitutability, and ease of entry) are 
all positive and statistically significant at conventional levels. It is fair to say that these 
coefficients are also economically significant e.g. a one standard deviation increase in 
SUBST, MKTSZ and ENTRY is associated with a relative increase of 3.4%, 19.2% 
and 11.7%, respectively, of the relative frequency of financial misreporting when 
AAER_ENF is the dependent variable. On the whole, the results from using the 
frequency of financial misreporting, and those based on the three main concentration 
measures (SUBST, MKTSZ & ENTRY) come out in support of the hypothesis that 
there is a greater likelihood of firms operating in competitive environments / industries 
to misreport compared to their peers in less competitive industries. However, there is 
a departure from this trend and I obtain conflicting evidence when I use the industry 
level concentration measure i.e. the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index (HHISL) as the 
competition proxy. At conventional levels, the HHISL coefficient is negative and 
statistically significant. I glean from these results the fact that greater industry 
concentration is not associated with / not related to AAER_ENF. The mixed nature of 
these serves to stress and reinforce the ambiguity emanating from using industry 
concentration measures to capture competition in line with the wider Industrial 
Organizations (IO) literature (e.g. Sutton (1991). The concentration measures e.g. 
HHISL have now been effectively cast as weak proxies for competition because they 
imply market structure while competition infers market conduct.  
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           In Table 3.7 I report the impact of the global financial crisis on the competitive 
environment in the financial services / banking industry. In this regard, I restrict the 
focus of my analysis to the two years prior to the financial crisis (2004-2006) and the 
two years after the crisis peak (2009-2010). In the first instance, I analyse whether the 
financial crisis results in an increase in competition in the banking industry by 
regressing each of the main competition proxies (SUBST, MKTSZ, and ENTRY) on 
the interaction term between the indicator variables for the global financial crisis 
(CRISIS) and the financial services industry (FSERV). The financial crisis (CRISIS) 
variable equals zero during the two years preceding the onset of the financial crisis and 
equals one in the two years after the financial crisis. The financial services industry 
(FSERV) variable equals one if the firm operates in the financial services industry and 
equals zero if it operates in another sector. I also control for competition variables not 
included as the dependent variable in the regression and other variables. By way of 
interpretation, the intuition is that I should observe a positive and significant 
coefficient on the interaction term CRISIS×FSERV. Did the onset of the financial 
crisis result in a relative increase in competition in the financial services sector? Using 
each of the competition and concentration measures as the dependent variable, the 
results show that the coefficient on this interaction term (CRISIS×FSERV) is indeed 
significantly positive across all the competition measures (MKTSZ, ENTRY & 
SUBST). This evidence bears testimony to the fact that that the global financial crisis 
resulted in increased competition in the financial services sector and this further 
validates my setting to examine how an exogenous increase in competition affects 
financial misreporting.  
           In Table 3.8 I report the results of the frequency of change of financial 
misreporting AAER_ENF around the CRISIS event. I consider whether the financial 
misreporting i.e. the SEC investigation starts in the prior or post-crisis period as a way 
of ensuring that the occurrence of the misreporting is due to the crisis event. The results 
are interesting in that while the financial services industry had fewer cases of financial 
misreporting before the onset of the global financial crisis in comparison to other 
industries, it experienced a higher proportion of misreporting firms compared to other 
industries after the crisis event. In other words, the change in financial misreporting 
incidences around the crisis is much more significant and pronounced in the financial 
services industry than it is in non-financial services industries (5.37% against -
1.5336% respectively; p-value = 0.0318). The economic importance of this change in 
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the frequency of financial misreporting stems from the fact that the increase in the 
financial services industry around the crisis event is four times in excess of the change 
in the non-financial services industries.  
           Table 3.9 reports the change in accruals management resulting from the CRISIS 
event. We average the absolute value of discretionary loan loss provisions over the 
prior (or post) financial crisis period to allow sufficient time for the crisis to have an 
effect on loan losses management (i.e. financial misreporting). A comparison of the 
two rows in Table 3.9 illustrate that the financial services industry experienced a 
marked upsurge in the absolute value of discretionary loan losses after the financial 
crisis (i.e. 0.2261 against 0.1247; with the p-value of difference in means equal to 
0.000). This can be contrasted with the values for ‘Other’ industries (i.e. non-financial 
services) where the DISC_LLP values also increased but the magnitude of increase 
was lower in comparison to financial services (i.e. 0.1706 against 0.1293; with the p-
value of difference in means equal to 0.000). The difference of the change in 
DISC_LLP between the financial services and the non-financial services industries is 
0.0601 and this is significant at the 1% level. I conclude from these results that the 
CRISIS event is positively associated with the magnitude of accruals-management 
(financial misreporting) in the financial services industry. 
           Overall, Tables 3.8 & 3.9 provide insightful and robust evidence on the causal 
nature of the relation between competition and financial misreporting in that the results 
suggest that crisis in the financial services industry - which yielded an exogenous 
increase in the intensity of competition in that industry-led to greater financial 
misreporting via the medium of higher likelihood of SEC enforcement actions.  
 
3.6.     Robustness / sensitivity analysis 
           To ensure the robustness of my results, I conduct a battery of other analyses 
across a range of our variables. Firstly, I adopt and use discretionary loan loss 
provisions (DISC_LLP) as the main dependent variable in place of AAER_ENF and 
present results of the regressions in Table 3.10. The positive coefficients we report on 
SUBST, MKTSZ and ENTRY are suggestive of the fact that firms in industries that 
are subject to fierce product market competition are blighted by poorer discretionary 
loan losses quality. This ultimately lends support to one of my hypothesis where I 
contend that firms operating in more competitive industries engage in greater financial 
misreporting (i.e. earnings management) than their peers in less competitive 
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environments. The coefficients for the three competition proxies (i.e. SUBST, MKTSZ 
and ENTRY) are statistically significant. I draw from the results for the variable 
DISC_LLP in Table 3.10 to illustrate this point. The coefficient estimate on the 
standardized variable SUBST is 0.0136, and this is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. At 0.0317, the coefficient estimate for the competition proxy MKTSZ is also 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This also holds true with regards to the 
coefficient estimate on ENTRY is 0.0116 and is statistically significant at the 10% 
level. My results corroborate and are consistent with the findings from when I use 
AAER_ENF in the baseline regressions. 
           Secondly, I substitute and utilize HHIL as the main competition/concentration 
proxy in place of  MKTSZ, ENTRY & SUBST and my results hold. In Table 3.11 the 
coefficient on the interaction term (CRISIS×FSERV) and the concentration measure 
HHISL is positive and significant, implying that concentration decreases in the 
financial services industry after the financial crisis i.e. the sector became competitive. 
A key policy response in the aftermath of the financial crisis was to reduce the systemic 
impact of too-big-to-fail financial institutions on the system as a whole. This result 
attests to that policy thrust as moves have certainly been made to inject some 
competition into the financial services sector as one among a plethora of other 
initiatives to make the banking system more competitive. The results support my 
finding that the global financial crisis resulted in increased competition in the financial 
services sector. 
           Finally, I am highly cognizant of the fact that the entry and exit of firms in both 
the pre and post crisis periods could potentially wreak havoc with my analysis. To this 
end, I actually find that 347 firms continue to operate in both the pre- and post-crisis 
periods, and 164 firms leave or join the industry after the crisis. As a robustness check, 
I therefore redo my analysis based only on firms that consistently remain in my sample 
before and after the crisis event to allay, eliminate or mitigate this concern. Based on 
this tweaked sample, I find that the frequency of financial misreporting increases by 
2.46% (from 0% to 2.46%), which is significantly larger than the change for the non-
financial services industries (0.6%). My results for this constant-firm sample are robust 
(if not stronger) to this change. 
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3.7.     Concluding remarks 
           I empirically examined the relationship between product market competition and 
financial misreporting. I document a positive relationship between the intensity of 
competition and financial misreporting incidences by using product substitutability, 
market size, entry costs and HHI Sales to capture competition; and SEC AAERs 
(Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases to proxy for financial misreporting. I 
draw causal inferences regarding the impact of competition on financial misreporting by 
conducting an independent natural experiment. I examine whether an exogenous increase 
in competition via the financial crisis in the financial services industry culminated in an 
increase in financial misreporting incidences for firms within that particular industry. The 
results provide some intriguing insight into the competition-misreporting nexus by 
attesting to the robust nature of the positive effect competition has on financial 
misreporting. While the notion that competition ultimately improves welfare and provides 
a myriad of economic benefits is established and uncontested in established economic 
thought, it is vital that a competing narrative around the potential problems synonymous 
with competition be developed in academic literature. If not diligently addressed, these 
pitfalls of competition have the potential to reverse and undermine the economic benefits 
associated with healthy levels of competition. According to Durnev and Mangen (2009), 
financial misreporting is harmful to firms and ultimately to the economy at large. My 
findings are thus suggestive of the fact that governments, regulators and academia ought 
to critically consider the pervasive effects of competition in policy-making, compliance, 
welfare and other economic deliberations. 
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Table 3.1 Variable definitions, abbreviations and sources. This table presents all the variables that we utilize in our econometric analysis in this study. The abbreviations, 
descriptions and sources of each variable we use are also presented. 
Variable  Abbreviation Description and computation Data source 
Dependent variables:    
Accounting & auditing enforcement releases AAER_ENF 
The percentage of firms that commit accounting fraud by manipulating 
earnings in a four-digit SIC industry-year group. Firms that commit 
fraud in a given year are identified from the SEC investigations in 
AAERs 
SEC AAER Website 
    
Discretionary loan loss provisions   DISC_LLP The provision for loan losses deflated by beginning loans.  Compustat Annual Data 
    
Competition variables:    
Market size MKTSZ 
Market size of the four-digit SIC industry-year group. It is equal to the 
natural log of industrial segment revenue (at the four-digit SIC code 
level) averaged over the past three years and the current year  
Compustat Segments Data 
    
Ease of entry ENTRY 
Ease of entry into four-digit SIC industry-year group. It is equal to the 
natural log of the weighted average gross value of total assets weighted 
by each firm's market share in industry multiplied by minus one (at the 
four-digit SIC code level). This variable is averaged over the past three 
years and the current year 
Compustat Annual and 
Segments Data 
    
Product substitutability SUBST 
Product substitutability i.e. the extent to which there are close 
substitutes in a four-digit SIC industry-year group. It is equal to average 
operating industrial segment profit divided industrial segment revenue 
multiplied by minus one (at the four-digit SIC code level). The variable 
is averaged over the past three years and the current year 
Compustat Segments Data 
    
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (sales) HHISL 
Concentration in the four-digit SIC industry-year group, denoted by 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index multiplied by minus one 
Compustat Segments Data 
    
Other independent variables:    
88 
 
 
Cash-flow volatility CFVOL 
The standard deviation of cash flows from operations scaled by 
beginning assets  
Compustat Segments Data 
    
Leverage ratio LEVRA 
is equal to the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities 
divided by total assets  
Compustat Segments Data 
    
Equity incentives EQINC 
is equal to the sum of restricted stock grants and Black-Scholes value 
of options granted divided by total compensation 
Execucomp 
Governance index GOVIN 
 
denoted as the composite index of charter provisions and bylaws based 
on IRRC data 
Gompers et al. (2003) 
    
Big 4 auditor 
B4AUD The percentage of firms audited by the big auditors in an industry-year 
group i.e. PWC, Deloitte, KPMG and Ernst & Young 
 
    
Firm size LNTAS The natural log of firm assets   
    
Financial services  
FSERV An indicator variable that captures whether firms belong to the 
financial services industry 
 
    
Global financial crisis CRISIS 
An indicator variable that captures whether firms are in the post-crisis 
period 
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Table 3.2 Auditing and accounting enforcement releases breakdown. This table presents the breakdown of 
the AAERs showing how we arrived at the industry-year observations used in our study at a glance. 
Description Observations 
Total SEC AAERs from 2000-2016 2 604 
Auditing enforcement actions & individual CPAs, LLCs & LLPs 1 923 
Corporate accounting enforcement actions 681 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.3   Distribution of misreporting methods. Table presents violation types via which firms misreport, 
the number of firms per violation and the violation types as percentage of the total infractions in our sample. 
Violation type Number of firms Percentage of total 
Misleading presentation 577 84 
Revenue recognition 453 66 
Insufficient internal controls 330 48 
Understatement of expenses 82 33 
Backdating stock options 96 14 
Improper payments / bribery 282 41 
Inventory valuation misconduct 55 8 
Note: The bulk of the AAERs detail multiple infractions, hence table cannot aggregate to 100% 
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Table 3.4    Descriptive statistics. This table reports the summary statistics for our industry-year sample from 2000 – 
2016. We collect financial data from Compustat and data to construct the variable AAER_ENF from the Securities & 
Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs). The data specifically 
includes Accounting Enforcement Releases of Corporates in all the 4-digit SIC Code industry classifications. We 
exclude Auditing Enforcement Releases and enforcement releases for accounting and auditing practices. All variables 
are defined, outlined, described and provided by way of Table 3.1. 
Variables  Obs. Mean Std. Dev Minimum Maximum 
Accounting enforcement releases (AAER_ENF)  681 0.0063 0.0253 0.0021 0.2371 
Discretionary loan loss provisions (DISC_LLP)  608 0.1084 0.1362 -0.0136 0.1964 
Market size (MKTSZ)  681 8.1107 2.2734 0.0000 0.0423 
Ease of entry (ENTRY)  681 -6.1964 2.2726 4.4978 9.6637 
Product substitutability (SUBST)  681 -0.0698 2.2093 0.0084 0.8362 
HHI index (sales) (HHISL)  681 -0.4137 0.2764 0.0073 0.8174 
Cashflow volatility (CFVOL)  681 0.5987 3.2458 0.3268 2.7732 
Leverage ratio (LEVRA)  681 0.5106 1.4826 0.0689 0.5147 
Equity incentives (EQINC)  681 0.2964 0.1904 0.0000 0.7387 
Governance index (GOVIN)  681 8.8213 1.8936 5.9758 13.0086 
Big 4 auditor (B4AUD)  681 0.7707 0.1852 1.1964 4.0000 
Firm size (LNTAS)  681 4.6693 1.6088 4.3821 9.5843 
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Table 3.5     Correlation matrix. This table provides information on the Pearson correlations among the independent variables used in our regressions i.e. the competition 
proxies, as well as the various control variables used throughout this paper. The p-values that indicate the signiﬁcance of the correlation are reported in parentheses and all the 
variables and their computational details are defined and provided by way of Table 3.1. 
Variables MKTSZ ENTRY SUBST HHISL CFVOL LEVRA EQINC GOVIN B4AUD LNTAS 
Market size 1.0000          
Ease of entry 
-0.7512 
(0.0000) 1.0000         
Substitutability 
-0.3718 
(0.0000) 
0.2241 
(0.0000) 1.0000        
HHI index (sales) 
-0.2067 
(0.0000) 
-0.2471 
(0.0000) 
-0.2326 
(0.0000) 1.0000       
Cash-flow volatility 
0.0894 
(0.0000) 
0.0822 
(0.0000) 
0.0894 
(0.0000) 
-0.0432 
(0.0018) 1.0000      
Leverage ratio 
0.0632 
(0.0000) 
0.0592 
(0.0000) 
0.0674 
(0.0000) 
0.0109 
(0.4222) 
0.1187 
(0.0000) 1.0000     
Equity incentives 
0.0214 
(0.1050) 
-0.0337 
(0.0158) 
-0.0218 
(0.1216) 
0.0134 
(0.3871) 
0.0249 
(0.0891) 
0.0244 
(0.0852) 1.0000    
Governance index 
0.0542 
(0.0000) 
-0.0517 
(0.0000) 
0.0542 
(0.0000) 
-0.0417 
(0.0046) 
-0.0536 
(0.0009) 
-0.0258 
(0.0976) 
-0.0271 
(0.0794) 1.0000   
Big 4 auditor 
-0.1247 
(0.0000) 
-0.2574 
(0.0000) 
-0.1094 
(0.0000) 
0.1437 
(0.0000) 
-0.1761 
(0.0000) 
-0.1468 
(0.0000) 
0.0762 
(0.0000) 
0.0082 
(0.5621) 1.0000  
Firm size 
-0.0811 
(0.0000) 
-0.4933 
(0.0000) 
-0.0723 
(0.0000) 
-0.0227 
(0.1072) 
0.0103 
(0.0000) 
0.0327 
(0.0274) 
-0.0438 
(0.0047) 
0.0723 
(0.0000) 
-0.0241 
(0.5702) 1.0000 
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Table 3.6     Competition & financial misreporting (SEC AAERs). This table reports the OLS 
regressions conducted on the basis of Equation 1 in our empirical model. The dependent variable is 
AAER_ENF and the sample period span from 2000 to 2016. The regression we run is as follows: 
𝐴𝐴𝐸𝑅_𝐸𝑁𝐹 = 𝑏𝑜 + 𝑏1𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑆𝑍 + 𝑏2𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌 + 𝑏3𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝑇 + 𝑏4𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑆𝐿 + 𝑏5𝐶𝐹𝑉𝑂𝐿 + 𝑏6𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑅𝐴 +
 𝑏7𝐸𝑄𝐼𝑁𝐶 + 𝑏8𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑁 + 𝑏9𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆07−08 +  𝑏12𝐵4𝐴𝑈𝐷 + ∑ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 +  𝜀. The variable 
definitions, sources and computational details are provided by way of Appendix A. We estimate 
standard errors by clustering by year and industry and ***, ** & * correspond to 10%, 5% and 1% 
significance level respectively.   
Variables AAER_ENF 
  
Market size 0.0054 
(0.0068)*** 
Ease of entry 0.0028 
(0.0394)** 
Product substitutability 0.0009 
(0.0757)* 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (sales) -0.0002 
(0.8332) 
Cash-flow volatility 0.0012 
(0.1472) 
Leverage ratio 0.0009 
(0.3989) 
Equity incentives 0.0004 
(0.5631) 
Governance index 0.0006 
(0.2874) 
Big 4 auditor -0.0015 
(0.0523)* 
Bank size 0.0011 
(0.3964) 
  
Year indicator Included 
Observations 681 
Adjusted R2 0.0278 
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Table 3.7 Crisis and competition. This table presents the results of the Difference-In-Difference 
Analysis of the effect of the 2007 – 2010 global financial crisis on financial misreporting in the 
financial services / banking industry. CRISIS = 1 for the seven-year period (2011-2016) after the crisis 
event of 2007-10, otherwise equals 0 for the seven-year period (2000-2006) before the crisis event. 
FSERV = 1 if a firm belongs to the financial services industry (4-digit SIC Codes 6000 to 6999), 
otherwise equals zero if not so. The standard errors are estimated by clustering by firm. *, ** and *** 
correspond to 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
Variables Market size Ease of entry Substitutability 
CRISIS 0.3296 
(0.0000)*** 
0.1284 
(0.0019)*** 
0.0024 
(0.0781)* 
    
FSERV -0.4174 
(0.0000)*** 
-1.5876 
(0.0000)*** 
-0.0526 
0.0000*** 
    
CRISIS * FSERV 0.2712 
(0.0048)*** 
0.4284 
(0.0000)*** 
0.0637 
(0.0000)*** 
    
Control variables Included Included Included 
Observations 681 681 681 
Adjusted R2 0.3681 0.6343 0.5664 
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Table 3.8 Crisis and financial misreporting (AAER_ENF). This table presents results of the 
Difference-In-Difference analysis of the impact of the 2007-2010 global financial crisis on the SEC’s 
Auditing & accounting enforcement releases (AAERs) in the financial services industry. The 
proportion of accounting fraud in the industry is estimated as the number of accounting fraud cases 
divided by the number of firms in the industry during the investigation window. The estimation is 
presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * correspond to 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively. 
Period Financial services Other FServ (-) Other 
    
Pre-crisis period 
(2000-2006) 
3.1915% 
(= 12 / 376) 
3.3769% 
(= 354 / 10 483) 
-0.1854% 
(p-value = 0.1492) 
    
Post-crisis period 
(2009-2015) 
8.5575% 
(= 35 / 409) 
1.8433% 
(= 208 / 11 284) 
6.7142%* 
(p-value = 0.0661) 
    
Difference 
(Post – Pre) 
5.3660% 
(p-value = 0.0000) 
-1.5336 
(p-value = 0.0058) 
6.8996% 
(p-value = 0.0318) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
95 
 
 
 
Table 3.9 Crisis and financial misreporting (DISC_LLP). This table presents results of the Difference-
In-Difference analysis of the change in the absolute value of Discretionary loan loss provisions 
(DISC_LLP) caused by the 2007-2010 Global Financial Crisis on in the financial services industry 
compared to other industries. The estimation is presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * correspond to 
10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively. 
Period Financial Services Other FServ (-) Other 
    
Pre-Crisis Period 
(2000-2006) 
0.1247 
(n = 228) 
0.1293 
(n = 7 109) 
-0.0046 
(p-value = 0.793) 
    
Post-Crisis Period 
(2009-2015) 
0.2261 
(n = 262) 
0.1706 
(n = 8 139) 
0.0555*** 
(p-value = 0.0023) 
    
Difference 
(Post – Pre) 
0.1014*** 
(p-value = 0.0000) 
0.0413*** 
(p-value = 0.0000) 
0.0601*** 
(p-value = 0.0019) 
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Table 3.10 Competition & financial misreporting (DISC_LLP). This table reports the OLS 
regressions conducted on the basis of Equation 1 in our empirical model. The dependent variable 
is DISC_LLP and the sample period span from 2000 to 2016. The regression we run is as follows: 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶_𝐴𝐶𝐶 = 𝑏𝑜 + 𝑏1𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑆𝑍 + 𝑏2𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌 + 𝑏3𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝑇 + 𝑏4𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑆𝐿 + 𝑏5𝐶𝐹𝑉𝑂𝐿 + 𝑏6𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑅𝐴 +
 𝑏7𝐸𝑄𝐼𝑁𝐶 + 𝑏8𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑁 + 𝑏9𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆07−08 +  𝑏12𝐵4𝐴𝑈𝐷 + ∑ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 +  𝜀. The variable 
definitions, sources and computational details are provided by way of Table 3.1. We estimate 
standard errors by clustering by year and industry and ***, ** & * correspond to 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level respectively.   
Variables DISC_LLP 
  
Market size 0.0317*** 
(0.0000) 
Ease of entry 0.0116* 
(0.0762) 
Product substitutability 0.0136*** 
(0.0000) 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (sales) 0.0076** 
(0.0394) 
Cash-flow volatility 0.0018 
(0.5842) 
Leverage ratio 0.0053 
(0.1843) 
Equity incentives 0.0071*** 
(0.0009) 
Governance index -0.0082** 
(0.0232) 
Big 4 auditor -0.0043 
(0.3242) 
Bank size -0.0496 
(0.0000) 
  
Year indicator Included 
Observations 681 
Adjusted R2 0.1584 
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Table 3.11     Crisis and competition (HHISL). This table presents the results of the Difference-In-
Difference analysis of the effect of the 2007 – 2010 global financial crisis on financial misreporting 
in the financial services / banking industry. CRISIS = 1 for the seven-year period (2011-2016) after 
the crisis event of 2007-10, otherwise equals 0 for the seven-year period (2000-2006) before the crisis 
event. FSERV = 1 if a firm belongs to the financial services industry (4-digit SIC Codes 6000 to 
6999), otherwise equals zero if not so. The standard errors are estimated by clustering by firm. *, ** 
and *** correspond to 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively. P-values are reported in 
parentheses. 
Variables HHI sales 
CRISIS -0.0257 
(0.0000)*** 
  
FSERV 0.0663 
(0.0000)*** 
  
CRISIS * FSERV 0.0186 
(0.0009)*** 
  
Control variables Included 
Observations 681 
Adjusted R2 0.3911 
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Chapter 4 - Corporate governance & misreporting in US 
                   banks subject to SEC Enforcement Actions 
 
4.1.     Introduction 
           The twin forces of globalisation and widespread liberalisation of the financial 
sector ushered in unprecedented levels of innovation in banking that significantly altered 
the conventional wisdom around which banking architecture and operations were 
premised. One such area of great disruption in banking through innovation was the 
consolidation of commercial and investment banking activities into a composite structure. 
Investment banking is widely believed to have been responsible for the 2008 credit crunch 
that emanated from the US before then becoming a global phenomenon Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Huizinga (2010). According to Acharya and Richardson (2009) the financial crisis 
can actually be attributed to the degree of complexity ushered into banking on the back 
of innovation resulting from liberalisation of financial services. The degree of complexity 
of banking activities is closely aligned with the corporate governance of banks, thus all 
these issues relating to complexity and structure raise serious corporate governance issues 
and make this a compelling setting for empirical based research to be instituted. Allied to 
the opacity and complexity synonymous with the banking intermediation model, it also 
is indisputable that corporate governance failures were at the heart of the advent of the 
crisis that paralysed the global markets at the top end of the last decade. Johnston (2004) 
tout effective corporate governance as leading to greater accountability, which in turn 
implies transparent, honest and informative reporting of financial information. In other 
words, increased transparency is one of the key aims of corporate governance reforms 
worldwide. The SOX guidelines Sarbanes (2002) also aim to improve corporate 
governance through measures that will strengthen internal checks and balances and 
ultimately strengthen corporate accountability. Effective governance by boards of 
directors is seen as influencing the quality of financial reporting.  
           In this paper, I focus and shine a light on the effect of corporate governance on 
financial misreporting in US commercial banks subject to enforcement actions from 2000 
to 2016. The governance of financial institutions has really come to the fore in the crisis 
aftermath Beltratti and Stulz (2012); Pathan and Faff (2013). Indeed, attempting to define 
corporate governance is no mean feat and the corporate governance of banks is 
particularly cumbersome because of the uniqueness of these institutions in comparison to 
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others. For some perspective on the definition of corporate governance however, I borrow 
from Gillan and Starks (2000) who described corporate governance as an internal 
mechanism that is linked closely to the system of acts, laws and dynamics that control the 
operations of a firm. Because of the unique and distinctive nature of banks as institutions, 
corporate governance plays a particularly central role. I outline and proffer three main 
characteristics that motivate a separate evaluation of corporate governance in banks. 
Firstly, banks are opaquer in comparison to other institutions due to the nature of financial 
intermediation as a model Levine. In other words, the complexity of the bank business 
model is highly reflective of the “special nature” of banks Furfine (2001). This issue of 
opacity - married to the complexity of the bank business model - imposes a certain level 
of difficulty for shareholders to keep track of bank operations, thus creating information 
asymmetries this way De Andres and Vallelado (2008). Secondly, according to 
Hagendorff (2014) banks are highly leveraged firms and this in turn has some corporate 
governance implications. Even though equity is relatively low in banks compared to other 
firms, shareholders in banks tend to control the main corporate governance mechanisms 
e.g. executive compensation and the board. Thirdly, because of the importance of banks 
to the wider economy and also the opacity of bank activities, the need for regulation is 
critical for banking institutions Hagendorff (2014). This special monitoring of regulations 
can be considered to be supplementary to governance. To go with this, governments can 
also own banks and act in their own interests which may not necessarily comply with the 
basic tenets of good corporate governance. Government-owned banks have been shown 
to underperform in previous studies Hagendorff (2014).  
           Against the backdrop of my postulations in the foregoing paragraphs, I hypothesise 
that corporate governance is responsible (in part) for financial misreporting in firms 
Abbott et al. (2004); Agrawal and Chadha (2005). According to Cremers and Nair (2005), 
corporate governance systems have internal and external components. Internal 
governance includes mechanisms and procedures related to oversight of firm 
management by the board while external governance addresses statutory and charter 
provisions that determine the costs to shareholders of challenging both the management 
and the board. In this study I focus on how five carefully selected corporate governance 
factors (i.e. board size, block ownership, CEO duality, compensation mix and insider 
representation) affect financial misreporting. The relationship between corporate 
governance and financial misreporting is of continuing importance due to the fact that 
literature on this is largely mixed e.g. Zhao and Chen (2008); Armstrong et al. (2012) find 
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that staggered boards (weak corporate governance) are associated with lower likelihoods 
of committing fraud and a smaller magnitude of absolute unexpected accruals. In contrast 
to this, Bowen et al. (2008) indicate that firms with a higher G-Index (strong corporate 
governance) are more likely to smooth earnings, report small positive earnings surprises 
and exercise greater accounting discretion. 
           This study is an innovation that contributes to extant literature by bringing together 
two hot and current topics in banking literature (i.e. corporate governance and financial 
misreporting) into one paper based on a sample of 90 listed US commercial banks from 
2000-16. This paper contributes to existing literature in various ways. Firstly, I am the 
first to examine the interplay between corporate governance and financial misreporting 
on a sample of banks that are subject to SEC enforcement actions in the pre-crisis and 
post-crisis periods. Secondly, I deploy a comprehensive set of corporate governance 
measures to proxy board size, equity ownership, CEO duality, compensation mix and 
insider representation. Thirdly, I use simple-to-understand objective (i.e. SEC AAERs) 
and subjective (i.e. discretionary loan loss provisions) accounting-based indicators to 
proxy for financial accounting misreporting. 
           I regress my main financial misreporting dependent variable (i.e. SEC AAERs) 
against the corporate governance proxies (i.e. board size, equity ownership, CEO duality, 
compensation mix and insider representation) and a battery of control variables (i.e. 
financial leverage, large international auditor, insolvency risk, bank size, SOX and 
financial crisis). Consistent with the ‘agency cost’ hypothesis, the results show a negative 
association between board size and financial misreporting. However, the relationship 
reverses when using a quadratic term of the same variable. Moreover, the CEO power 
asserts a positive effect on misreporting in violation of both the ‘stewardship’ and 
‘entrenchment’ hypotheses. Additionally, the equity portion of executive compensation 
is negatively related with misreporting; whereas the association is positive between the 
cash portion and misreporting. My results have some important policy implications for 
policymakers, practitioners and regulators alike. Firstly, my research amplifies how 
important it is to simultaneously probe multiple corporate governance dimensions in one 
study. Investigating a single dimension in isolation e.g. compensation mix could reveal a 
significant association with misreporting; yet when studied as an element of a set of 
corporate governance dimensions, the result could yet be just about marginally significant 
Baysinger & Butler (1985). Secondly, I believe the applicability and explanatory power 
of the conventional agency theory is limited in so far as the banking industry is concerned. 
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There is therefore a need to carefully consider peculiarities in terms of the organizational 
settings and regulatory environment which may markedly interfere with and compromise 
the monitoring power of different corporate governance mechanisms e.g. while agency 
theory touts the virtues of stronger independent representation on the board, the role some 
of the insider-related mechanisms e.g. CEO duality and insider representation play in 
curtailing financial misreporting – as contended by stewardship theory – warrants further 
examination according to alternative theoretical paradigms. In so far as practical 
implications go, my study speaks to the wider discussion around executive compensation 
as a critical aspect of bank regulation. I contribute to and motivate compliance monitors, 
regulators and shareholders alike with regards to the ongoing agenda for reforms to 
executive compensation packages. The direction of travel should be towards the adoption 
of compensation packages with a long-term orientation e.g. via options or restricted stock. 
           The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the related 
literature. Section 3 develops the hypotheses to be tested. Section 4 presents the data set, 
the model variables and the underlying empirical methodology as well as the relevant 
descriptive statistics. Section 5 reports and discusses the empirical findings. Section 6 
presents the robustness analysis I conduct, whereas Section 7 offers a set of concluding 
remarks and discusses some policy implications.         
 
4.2.     Literature review 
           In this section, I review the key papers relating to the relationship between 
corporate governance and our explanatory variable i.e. financial misreporting. My main 
thrust in this paper is to document how five carefully selected corporate governance 
variables (i.e. board size, equity ownership, CEO duality, compensation mix and insider 
representation) impact financial accounting misreporting in banking. I however also 
extensively refer to literature on the interplay between corporate governance and bank 
performance because I believe a failure to attain expected performance targets is what 
breeds or incentivises the urge to misreport in the first instance.  
      
     4.2.1.     Board size and financial misreporting  
           Literature on how board size affects financial misreporting in firms is broadly split 
into two clusters that have a solid underpinning in agency theory. One side of the 
argument generally allude to the beneficial impact a larger board of directors has on firm 
operations. In support of this postulation, Dalton et al. (1999) contend that a larger board 
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is beneﬁcial to firm operations as it increases the collection of expertise and resources 
accessible to a ﬁrm. Building on this and in a study observing the impact of board size on 
the performance of 35 bank holding companies for the period between 1965–1999, 
Adams and Mehran (2012) found board size to be positively related to bank performance 
using Tobin’s Q and the ROA ratio as bank performance proxies. Yermack (1996) also 
tout the virtues of big boards in terms of them pooling together experts from a diversity 
of fields and backgrounds, but however also finds excessively large boards to be a drag 
on efﬁciency of the board as well as an impediment on the effectiveness of corporate 
governance mechanisms. An earlier study by Pfeffer (1972) found a positive link between 
board size and the performance of large firms in particular. This was largely attributed to 
the need for large firms to have more board members who can legitimate the company to 
its external environment. I draw from this literature on the beneficial impact of a large 
board on firm performance and extend it further in the direction of financial misreporting. 
To this end I posit that if a large board positively impacts bank performance, it also 
follows that the improved performance outcomes ought to result in lower financial 
misreporting incidences i.e. that there is a statistically significant negative association 
between board size and financial misreporting Xie et al. (2003); Abed et al. (2012). In a 
study examining whether financial misreporting is systematically related with the internal 
corporate governance structures of a firm, Davidson et al. (2005) used a cross-sectional 
sample of 434 listed Australian firms for the year 2000 and found having a majority of 
non-executives on the board significantly associated with a lower likelihood of financial 
misreporting (i.e. discretionary accruals). I read the results from this study in conjunction 
with the intuition behind Dalton et al. (1999) and contend that the majority of non-
executives alluded to here would be on a large board for the firm to fully exploit the 
benefits of an expanded talent pool synonymous with large boards. Consistent with this 
assertion, Peasnell et al. (2005) examined whether financial misreporting in US firms 
depended on board monitoring and found the likelihood of managers making income-
increasing abnormal accruals to be negatively related to having a large presence of 
outsiders on the board. Ghosh et al. (2010) used discretionary accruals as a financial 
misreporting proxy to examine whether board characteristics (i.e. size, composition and 
structure) are associated with financial misreporting before and after the enactment of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. They also found board size to be negatively associated with the spate 
of discretionary accruals. Finally, Dechow et al. (1996) investigated firms subject to SEC 
enforcement actions for GAAP violations and found that firms with weak internal 
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corporate governance engaged in financial misreporting on a greater magnitude than 
those that have strong governance structures. Weak governance was considered to include 
management-dominated board, CEO duality, founder CEO, no Audit committee and no 
independent outsiders among other factors. The benefits of large boards dominated by 
independent non-executives can never be underestimated for banking institutions given 
the opacity and complexity that underlie the intermediation model that guide and inform 
banking operations. 
           To the contrary, there is also an established literature base touting the demerits of 
large boards on firm performance. In fact, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) emphatically 
argue of there being a “consensus” in the economic literature on larger boards negatively 
impacting ﬁrm performance; ultimately implying an upsurge in incidences of financial 
misreporting. In an earlier study, Jensen (1993) found an increase in board size to 
seriously impair a board’s ability to monitor and provide effective oversight over 
management; all this largely due to a greater ability to shirk and an increase in decision-
making time. Agency theory actually attributes this inefficiency on the part of a large 
board to a rise in “agency conflicts” arising from inefficient communication and 
cooperation costs Lipton and Lorsch (1992). In a recent study on the detrimental effects 
of large board size on firm performance and using a sample of US bank holding 
companies from 1997-20111, Pathan and Faff (2013) used Tobin’s Q, return on assets 
(ROA), return on equity (ROE) and pre-tax operating income (POI) ratios as bank 
performance ratios and observed a negative relationship between the board size and 
performance. In a departure from the above two positions, a study of 69 commercial banks 
from six European countries for the period from 1995–2005 by De Andres and Vallelado 
(2008) show that there exists an inverted U-shaped association between board size and 
bank performance. This is indicative of the fact that an increase in the number of board 
members only enhances the performance of banks to certain point; beyond which point 
the impact of board size on performance reverses to negative due to high information 
asymmetries among the board members. Adams and Mehran (2005) ﬁnd that banks have 
larger boards due to their unique operating environment, complex organizational structure 
and the presence of more committees i.e. the lending and credit risk committees. I contend 
that depressed firm performance owing to large boards should imply greater incidences 
of financial misreporting. Vafeas (2000) probed whether the informativeness of earnings 
changes with the proportion of external directors being a part of board and concluded that 
a small board size might be an effective technique in attaining higher quality controlling. 
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In a study examining the use of discretionary accruals by firms making seasoned equity 
offerings (SEOs), Ching et al. (2006) found firms borrow futures income to manage 
earnings in pre-issue years and consequently earnings decrease in post-issue years. They 
specifically found SEO firms that have a large board size to also have a higher degree of 
financial misreporting around SEOs. Related to this, Haniffa et al. (2006) used a sample 
of 97 firms listed on the Malaysian Stock Exchange to investigate the extent of the 
effectiveness of the board, Audit Committee and concentrated ownership in reducing 
financial misreporting. They concluded that larger boards were positively associated with 
financial misreporting i.e. that larger boards were ineffective in their oversight duties 
relative to smaller boards. I expect that ﬁnancial performance increases with board size, 
and for the increased financial performance to suppress the incentives for firms to 
misreport. However, the relationship becomes negative when the board becomes too large 
which might impair bank performance due to a lack of efﬁcient monitoring by the board 
and increased agency conﬂicts De Andres and Vallelado (2008). 
 
     4.2.2.     Block-ownership and financial misreporting  
           Literature advances mixed predictions and results on the relationship between 
financial misreporting and large shareholders. In an earlier study Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) found the distinction between the ownership and the managerial control of a firm 
to result in a misalignment of the interests of shareholders and those of the boards they 
nominate to represent their interests. Grove et al., 2011) characterises “blockholders” as 
typically holding at least ﬁve percent of a ﬁrm’s outstanding shares and can also serve as 
directors and ofﬁcers of the firm. Ultimately, this means they wield so much inﬂuence 
over the ﬁrm’s decision-making, thus from this we could therefore surmise that the higher 
the ownership stake, the greater the blockholder’s incentive to acquire information and 
monitor managers. In recent times in the post-financial crisis period, there has been a 
steady flow of literature examining the corporate governance of banking entities in terms 
of managers’ incentives in the context of the crisis period e.g. Fahlenbrach and Stulz 
(2011) found no statistical evidence indicating a misalignment of CEO incentives with 
shareholders’ interests during the crisis period. 
           The first argument vouches for a negative relationship between large shareholders 
and financial misreporting i.e. that having large shareholders (block ownership) is 
associated with a reduction in incidences of financial misreporting. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) show that large shareholders often play an active monitoring role of corporate 
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managers, and this role is particularly essential in banking given the opaque and complex 
nature of banking business. They perform this role through avenues such as leading 
securities fraud class actions, selecting board members and voting initiatives. This “active 
monitoring role” of large shareholders and the influence they wield over managers’ real 
actions lead to better alignment of managers’ and shareholders’ interests. This alignment 
allows managers to focus more on activities that create long-term value and worry less 
about misreporting current performance to achieve short-term performance benchmarks 
Stein (1988); Giroud and Mueller (2010). In addition, more closely monitored managers 
are less likely to engage in the extraction of private benefits and therefore they have less 
to conceal from shareholders by managing earnings. Murphy (1999) leans on the agency 
framework and contend that managers’ interests are in line with those of shareholders 
when the former have partial ownership of the company. Under this framework, higher 
block ownership facilitates more active monitoring and mitigates agency costs. Prowse 
(1995) supports the importance of the monitoring role of block-holders in the banking 
industry given the rarity of disciplinary takeovers, the acquisition of and holding of low 
equity stakes, and the fact that bank directors are less aggressive than other directors in 
removing poorly performing managers. Against this background, block ownership can be 
taken as a vehicle through which managers’ and shareholders’ interests are aligned 
through increased monitoring and oversight. Dechow et al. (1996) and Farber (2005) used 
firms subject to SEC accounting enforcement actions as a financial misreporting proxy 
and found that manipulating firms are less likely to have a large shareholder in 
comparison to control firms.  
           The alternative view posits the existence of a positive relationship between block-
holders and financial misreporting i.e. that having large shareholders leads to greater (and 
not less) financial misreporting Vafeas (2000). According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997), 
large shareholders have incentives to extract gains from creditors and other shareholders. 
In other words, block-holders may benefit from financial misreporting via the reduction 
in the firm’s cost of external financing and debt covenant violations emanating directly 
from having a massaged view of a firm’s performance Jiang (2008). They also could 
benefit from disposing higher-priced stocks to second generation shareholders Lopez and 
Rees (2002). In light of this, block-holders may motivate greater managerial discretion in 
terms of financial reporting, ultimately culminating in greater financial misreporting. In 
a recent study and for a sample of US banks over the 2007-08 crisis period, Beltratti and 
Stulz (2012) found banks with a higher proportion of board ownership to have operated 
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worse than their peers with less board ownership. I reason that the need for financial 
misreporting arises from a failure to hit performance targets, thus greater block-ownership 
in the case of US banks alluded to above imply greater risk of financial misreporting for 
these banks. 
           The third view on the relationship between large shareholders and financial 
misreporting is what I refer to as the “neutral view” for purposes of this study. This 
contends that most investors do not actively engage with management, thus have no 
influence on a firm’s financial misreporting Dou et al. (2016). In fact, according to 
McCahery et al. (2016) shareholders tend to ‘vote with their feet’ and exit the firm rather 
than to ‘use their voice’ in dealing with a firm’s management; implying no significant 
relationship between block-holders and financial misreporting. There is solid support for 
this neutral view e.g. Agrawal and Chadha (2005) and Larcker et al. (2007) do not find a 
significant relationship between large shareholdings and SEC enforcement actions, 
earnings restatements and abnormal accruals respectively. 
 
     4.2.3.     CEO duality and financial misreporting  
           Views on the relationship between CEO power and financial misreporting 
essentially fall into two broad clusters based on the agency framework i.e. those arguing 
for more CEO power having a beneficial impact on financial misreporting and those 
pining for the alternative view in favour of less power. Agency theory contends that the 
roles Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Board chairman should be separated to mitigate 
agency costs. As leader of a firm’s board, the chairman is essentially charged with having 
oversight on the CEO’s decision-making and also assume responsibility over the process 
of hiring, ﬁring, evaluating and compensating the CEO. Combining the two roles thus 
dilutes the chairman’s effectiveness in playing the monitoring and oversight role without 
the additional burden of executive decision making. 
           The dominant view on the CEO duality – financial misreporting nexus is the one 
arguing for less CEO power. Combining the two roles is thought to promote CEO 
‘entrenchment’ and intensify agency conﬂicts. Finkelstein and D'aveni (1994) opine that 
‘entrenchment risk’ occurs when managers obtain so much power and are able to use it 
to maximize their own utility rather than the value of shareholders. Contributing on power 
dynamics in top management teams, Finkelstein (1992) concluded that more powerful 
CEOs can exert their will and influence corporate decisions to a greater extent than less 
powerful CEOs, including those related to Chief Financial Officers (CFOs). CFOs are the 
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custodians of the financial reporting function in most firms. Building on this analysis, 
Feng et al. (2011) conducted a study examining why Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) 
become involved in material accounting manipulations. They found that CFOs engage in 
financial misreporting mainly because they succumb to pressure from CEOs, rather than 
because they seek to immediate financial gain from their equity incentives. A closer look 
at SEC AAERs content reinforces this conclusion as CEOs are more likely to be described 
by the SEC as having orchestrated accounting manipulations as well as having benefitted 
from such manipulations. In fact, further support to the ‘entrenchment’ hypothesis was 
provided by Beasley et al. (1999) who found CEO duality to have been involved in 72 
per cent of the frauds examined by the SEC. According to Adams et al. (2005), the 
effectiveness of governance in reducing the extent of upward real financial misreporting 
(e.g. earnings management) is stronger for firms with less powerful CEOs than for other 
forms.  In support of this contention, Cheng et al. (2015) examined whether internal 
governance affects the extent of financial misreporting in US corporations and found 
internal governance to be stronger for firms where CEOs are less powerful. This is mainly 
attributable to the fact that other key executives’ contributions to governance are stronger 
when CEO is less powerful. I therefore expect subordinate executives to have lower 
ability to influence CEOs’ decisions when CEOs hold substantial power and authority 
within the firm. Conversely, I expect internal governance to be more effective in 
constraining the extent of financial misreporting when CEOs are less powerful. A recent 
study by Lisic et al. (2015) found CEO duality to reduce or completely eliminate the 
effectiveness of an audit committee, despite regulations adopted to improve audit 
committee effectiveness. In other words, the monitoring effectiveness of board 
committees is contingent on CEO power. Effective audit committees should serve as 
vehicles to enhance the reporting quality of firms, thus reducing the potential for financial 
misreporting within the respective firms. 
           Running counter to the ‘entrenchment’ hypothesis discussed above is the 
‘stewardship’ theory fronted by the likes of Barney (1991) & Donaldson and Davis 
(1991). The stewardship theory suggests that a strong CEO acts as a good agent for a 
company’s assets and the company should take advantage of the unity of direction and 
strong command and control that the powerful CEO offers. A recent study conducted by 
Pathan (2009) on a sample of US bank holding companies from 1997-2004 found CEO 
duality to have effect of reducing risk-taking; which in turn could ultimately lead to 
improved bank performance. Firms engage in financial misreporting mainly to make up 
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for depressed performance, thus if CEO duality is associated with improved firm 
performance, it also follows that greater CEO power should have a restraining effect on 
financial misreporting. In support of this argument, Armstrong et al., 2010) found that 
accounting irregularities occur less frequently at firms where CEOs have relatively higher 
levels of equity incentives, thus greater CEO power results in lower financial 
misreporting this way. For banking firms, I surmise that the opacity and lack of market 
for control can further weaken CEO discipline, making it even more essential to have a 
separation of the two roles of CEO and Board chairman. I consider duality as a key driver 
of agency conﬂicts due to reduced monitoring and allowing the CEO to act in his or her 
own interests. 
 
     4.2.4.     Compensation mix and financial misreporting  
           Compensation mix refers to various types of incentive pay in an executive 
compensation package, including an annual performance bonus and stock-based 
compensation Grove et al. (2011). Executive compensation as an item has really been a 
headline item in the news on a global scale, more so in the aftermath of the debilitating 
global financial crisis of 2007-2008 e.g. Crawford et al. (1995); Bebchuk et al. (2009). 
Executive compensation is typically structured to incorporate two aspects i.e. the cash 
that includes base salary and bonus, and the equity-based compensation that includes 
stock options and restricted stock grants which constitute a form of long-term 
compensation Grove et al. (2011). Literature broadly advances two conflicting notions 
based on the agency framework on how executive compensation impacts financial 
misreporting in firms.  
           The conventional view which is firmly rooted in agency theory posits that 
increases in CEO stock options, along with effective monitoring, produce better 
alignment between the interests of management and shareholders. In other words, both 
CEOs and shareholders benefit from rising long-run stock prices, thereby reducing the 
likelihood of moral hazard Jensen and Murphy (1990). From this postulation I therefore 
reason that CEOs with stock options will most likely strive to ensure that their financial 
disclosures and accounting practices are legitimate, credible and robust. I lend support to 
this postulation by drawing and making inferences from literature on how executive 
compensation affects firm performance. The long-term orientation behind stock-based 
compensation is thought to positively impact ﬁrm value as long-term pay tends to reward 
managers when they meet firms’ performance goals Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990); 
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Hall and Liebman (1998). Recent studies based by Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) and 
Vallascas and Hagendorff (2013) probing the impact of executive compensation on bank 
performance also reported a positive association between equity compensation and 
performance. I extend to this literature and argue that the incentives to misreport financial 
accounting information primarily stems from a failure to attain set performance 
benchmarks. I therefore expect the incentives to misreport to diminish when banks 
perform in line with market expectations. Ali and Zhang (2015) examined changes in the 
CEOs’ incentive to misreport during their tenure. They found the propensity to misreport 
to be greater early on in a CEO’s tenure as the market is uncertain about the CEO’s ability 
to steer the ship in these early years. A new CEO is thus most likely to engage in financial 
misreporting in the early years of their reign simply as a means of convincing the market 
they are a safe pair of hands. They also found CEOs’ incentives to misreport greater in 
later years when they are coming to the end of their tenure because they would like to 
cash in their equity options at a higher price. It follows therefore that oversight over the 
accounting function and disclosures should be naturally more robust and vigilant at these 
phases of a CEO’s tenure to counter the increased threat of financial misreporting.   
           The alternative view contradicts this established view and argues in favour of the 
notion that considers stock-based compensation as undermining corporate governance. I 
contrast the conventional view that CEO stock options aid corporate governance by 
reducing moral hazard with the proposition that CEO stock options may subvert sound 
corporate governance instead O'Connor et al. (2006). The results from O'Connor et al. 
(2006) were rather mixed, finding support for both the conventional and alternative views 
on how executive compensation impacts financial misreporting.  Large CEO stock option 
grants were sometimes associated with a lower incidence of fraudulent reporting and 
sometimes with a greater incidence, and this depended upon whether CEO duality was 
present and whether directors also held equity options in the firm. In a much more 
emphatic fashion, Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) came out in support of the 
alternative view that equity options resulted in greater financial misreporting. They used 
data from Compustat and Execucomp and found that the use of discretionary accruals to 
manipulate reported earnings is more pronounced at firms where the CEO’s potential total 
compensation is more closely tied to the value of stock and option holdings. Leaning on 
how equity/stock options impact firm performance to further support the alternative view, 
Mehran (1992) ﬁnds a positive relationship between the ﬁrm’s leverage ratio and the 
percentage of executives’ total compensation in incentive plans; while Peng and Röell 
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(2008) argue that stock options cause executives to focus on short-term stock price. Chen 
et al. (2006) assume and exclusively banking focus and find that stock option-based 
executive compensation is more prevalent at banks versus ﬁrms in other industries. They 
found equity option-based compensation to ultimately promote risk-taking in the banking 
industry. I seize upon these studies to make the argument the nature of banking business 
in terms of both opacity and complexity amplifies the pitfalls associated with widespread 
use of equity options as an executive compensation mechanism. To the extent that equity 
options align shareholders’ and managers’ interests in the long term, I hypothesize that 
they should be an effective vehicle to combat and minimise financial misreporting if used 
in conjunction with other corporate governance measures e.g. independent/unaffiliated 
directors, CEO duality, board size and block-ownership, among other metrics.  
 
     4.2.5.     Insider representation and financial misreporting 
           The presence of a majority of non-independent or afﬁliated directors is likely to 
impair board independence, given the fact that these directors are less likely to be 
independent from the CEO or other top executives. The accumulation of large holdings 
of stocks by executives is a form of insider representation. According to Lasfer (2006), 
as managerial ownership increases, managers tend to use their ownership power to select 
a board that is unlikely to monitor. The opaque and complex nature of banking business 
catalyses information asymmetry at banking ﬁrms, which in turn makes it easier for the 
outside investors to be exploited by the insiders Grove et al. (2011). From this I surmise 
that higher insider representation would worsen agency problems in banking ﬁrms, which 
in turn depresses firm performance and ultimately this decreased performance is the 
central reason behind managers’ misreporting financial accounting information. 
           The dominant view here vouches for the beneficial impact of boards dominated by 
independent outsiders over those dominated by insiders / affiliates. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) contend that boards with a more independent orientation are positively associated 
with firm performance Jensen and Meckling (1976); Dalton et al. (1998); Busta (2007). 
Using a sample of seventeen banking institutions in the UK from 2001 to 2006, Tanna et 
al. (2011) also examined the impact of board independence on performance. They utilised 
various efficiency measures as performance proxies and concluded that there exists a 
positive and significant relationship between board independence and bank efficiency. I 
extrapolate this positive impact on performance to imply a lessening of the incentives to 
misreport for firms i.e. firms that meet or exceed their performance targets have no / less 
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real incentives to misreport accounting information. Klein (2002) used a sample of 692 
firm-years from 1992-1993 to examine whether the audit committee and board 
characteristics are related to financial misreporting and found abnormal accruals to 
increase with a reduction in board independence i.e. boards structured to be more 
independent of the CEO are more effective in monitoring the firm’s corporate accounting 
process. Some studies however paint a mixed picture of the impact of majority 
independent director representation on the board. In response to widespread and massive 
accounting scandals in the late 1990s and early 2000s e.g. Enron and WorldCom, the 
NASD and the NYSE proposed new corporate governance rules which were approved by 
the SEC in 2003. These rules specifically required firms to have a majority of independent 
directors on their boards. Chen et al. (2015) examined whether these regulatory reforms 
requiring majority board independence lead to a reduction in financial misreporting and 
found that noncompliant firms do not experience a signiﬁcant reduction in earnings 
management from the pre to post-regulation periods in comparison to compliant ones. 
They however found non-compliant ﬁrms with low information acquisition cost 
experience a signiﬁcant decrease in earnings management compared to those with high 
information acquisition cost. These findings suggest that board independence in itself 
does not reduce earnings management, but a richer information environment can facilitate 
independent directors’ monitoring; ultimately resulting in a reduction in earnings 
management. In support of this, (Davidson et al. 2005); (Peasnell et al. 2005) found 
having a majority of non-executives on the board significantly associated with a lower 
likelihood of financial misreporting in the form of discretionary accruals; and Baysinger 
and Butler, 1985) also came out in support of having a majority of independent directors 
on the board when finding companies to perform worse if boards have more affiliated / 
insider representations. 
           The alternative view on the relationship between independent directors and 
financial misreporting advances the contrary narrative based on the ‘stewardship’ theory. 
Again, this construct borrows heavily from how the existence of a majority independent 
/ unaffiliated directors impact on firm performance. Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998) 
posit that a rise in the proportion of non-independent directors on the board could actually 
positively contribute to firm performance as insiders have more experience and better 
firm-specific knowledge; while Westphal (1999) argue that a higher level of 
independence could result in infertile political activity by non-independent members that 
could lessen the productivity of the outsiders and decrease the cooperation among the 
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board members. Recent studies by Erkens et al. (2012) and Pathan and Faff (2013) also 
came out in support of this argument by reporting a negative association between 
independent directors and performance. Erkens et al. (2012) specifically used a sample 
of 296 banks across 30 countries over the 2007-08 crisis period for their study. I extend 
the intuition behind these studies and posit that a failure to hit set performance targets is 
the chief reason why firms misreport financial accounting information. If having a 
majority of independent and unaffiliated directors on the board depresses performance in 
ways argued above, it follows that the incentives for a firm’s managers to misrepresent 
financial disclosures increases in tandem.  
           On the balance of our literature discussion on the relationship between independent 
directors and financial misreporting, I consider a board dominated by inside directors to 
be symptomatic of a weak corporate governance environment and thus to be most likely 
positively associated with financial misreporting. The opacity and complexity that typify 
bank structures and operations makes the need for more independent directors on bank 
boards paramount. Firms exhibit high managerial ownership are less likely to have a 
majority of independents on the board, are less likely to separate the roles of the CEO and 
chairman and are less also likely to appoint a non-executive director as board chairman. 
This setting provides fertile ground for insiders to promote their own interests at the 
expense of shareholder interests, ultimately translating to greater financial misreporting 
among other vices.  
 
4.3.     Hypothesis development 
     4.3.1.     Board size and financial misreporting hypothesis 
           Literature on how board size affects financial misreporting in firms is broadly split 
into two clusters that have a solid underpinning in agency theory. One side of the 
argument generally allude to the beneficial impact a larger board of directors has on firm 
operations as it increases the collection of expertise and resources accessible to a ﬁrm 
Yermack (1996); Dalton et al. (1999); Adams and Mehran (2012). I draw from this 
literature on the positive association between board size and firm performance and extend 
it further in the direction of financial misreporting. To this end, I posit that if a large board 
positively impacts bank performance, it also follows that the improved performance 
outcomes ought to result in lower financial misreporting incidences. In other words, there 
is a negative association between board size and financial misreporting Xie et al. (2003); 
Davidson et al. (2005); Abed et al. (2012); Peasnell et al. (2005); Ghosh et al. (2010). The 
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opposite view touts the demerits of large boards on firm performance Lipton and Lorsch 
(1992); Jensen (1993); Hermalin and Weisbach (2003); Pathan and Faff (2013). I contend 
that depressed firm performance owing to large boards imply greater incidences of 
financial misreporting. Researching on how board size affects financial misreporting 
Vafeas (2000); Ching et al. (2006); Haniffa et al. (2006) concluded that larger boards 
were positively associated with financial misreporting. Consistent with Adams and 
Mehran (2005) I expect banks to have larger boards due to their unique operating 
environment, complex organizational structure and the presence of more board 
committees. I expect improved ﬁnancial performance resulting from having a large board 
to suppress the incentives for firms to misreport. I draw from this literature base and 
formulate our first hypothesis, thus:  
H1. There is a negative association between large boards and financial misreporting 
in commercial banks owing to better monitoring and access to a wider talent pool 
 
     4.3.2.     Block-ownership and financial misreporting hypothesis 
           Literature advances mixed predictions and results on the relationship between 
financial misreporting and large shareholders. The first argument vouches for a negative 
relationship between large shareholders and financial misreporting because large 
shareholders often play an active monitoring role of corporate managers Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997). This “active monitoring role” of large shareholders leads to better 
alignment of managers’ and shareholders’ interests Stein (1988); Giroud and Mueller 
(2010). Closely monitored managers are less likely to engage in the extraction of private 
benefits and therefore they have less to conceal from shareholders by managing earnings. 
Prowse (1995) specifically underline the importance of the monitoring role of block-
holders in the banking industry. Dechow et al. (1996) and Farber (2005) used firms 
subject to SEC accounting enforcement actions and found manipulating firms less likely 
to have a large shareholder compared to control firms. The alternative view posits the 
existence of a positive relationship between block-holders and financial misreporting 
Vafeas (2000). According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997) large shareholders have 
incentives to extract gains from creditors and other shareholders via the reduction in the 
firm’s cost of external financing emanating directly from financial misreporting Jiang 
(2008); Lopez and Rees (2002). A recent study by Beltratti and Stulz (2012) found banks 
with a higher proportion of board ownership to have operated worse than their peers with 
less board ownership. I reason that the need for financial misreporting arises from a failure 
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to hit performance targets, automatically implying greater risk of financial misreporting 
for these banks. The third view is what we refer to here as the “neutral view”. It contends 
that most investors have no influence on a firm’s financial misreporting Larcker et al. 
(2007); Dou et al., 2016; (McCahery et al. (2016). I consider the better information 
acquisition and more efﬁcient monitoring of block-holders to be more crucial to banking 
ﬁrms given the opaque and complex nature of banking business. This background informs 
the framing of our second hypothesis, thus: 
H2. There exists a negative association between increased equity ownership and           
            financial misreporting in commercial banks 
 
     4.3.3.     CEO duality and financial misreporting hypothesis 
           The dominant view on the CEO duality – financial misreporting nexus is the one 
arguing for less CEO power as combining the two roles promotes CEO ‘entrenchment’ 
and intensify agency conﬂicts Finkelstein (1992); Finkelstein and D'aveni (1994); Feng 
et al. (2011). Further support to the ‘entrenchment’ hypothesis was provided by Beasley 
et al. (1999) who found CEO duality to have been involved in 72 per cent of the frauds 
examined by the SEC for a sample of US corporations Cheng et al. (2015) also found 
internal governance to be stronger for firms where CEOs are less powerful. A recent study 
by Lisic et al. (2015) found CEO duality to reduce or eliminate the effectiveness of an 
audit committee, despite regulations adopted to improve audit committee effectiveness. I 
expect effective audit committees to enhance the reporting quality, thus reduce the 
potential for financial misreporting within firms. The alternative view to the entrenchment 
hypothesis is the ‘stewardship’ theory fronted by the likes of Barney (1991) & Donaldson 
and Davis (1991). It contends that a strong CEO is good as he / she provides the unity of 
direction and strong command over the company. A recent study conducted by Pathan 
(2009) on a sample of US bank holding companies from 1997-2004 associates CEO 
duality with improved bank performance. I expect improved performance to have a 
restraining effect on financial misreporting. In support of this argument, Armstrong et al. 
(2010) found that accounting irregularities occur less frequently at firms where CEOs 
have relatively higher levels of equity incentives. For banking firms, I surmise that the 
opacity and lack of market for control can further weaken CEO discipline, making it even 
more essential to have a separation of the two roles of CEO and Board chairman. I 
consider duality as a key driver of agency conﬂicts due to reduced monitoring and this 
literature background in forms the framing of our third hypothesis, thus: 
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H3. There is a positive relationship between greater CEO power (i.e. CEO duality) 
and financial misreporting in commercial banks 
 
     4.3.4.     Compensation mix and financial misreporting hypothesis 
           Literature advances two conflicting notions on how executive compensation 
impacts financial misreporting. The conventional view posits that increases in CEO stock 
options reduce moral hazard and produce better alignment between the interests of 
management and shareholders Jensen and Murphy (1990). Executives with stock options 
will strive to ensure that their financial disclosures are legitimate because both CEOs and 
shareholders stand to benefit from rising long-run stock prices. The long-term orientation 
behind stock-based compensation is thought to positively impact ﬁrm value as long-term 
pay tends to reward managers when they meet firms’ performance goals Baysinger and 
Hoskisson (1990); (Hall and Liebman (1998); Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011); Vallascas 
and Hagendorff (2013). I expect the incentives to misreport to diminish when banks 
perform in line with market expectations. Ali and Zhang (2015) found the propensity to 
misreport to be greater early on in a CEO’s tenure as he strives to convince a sceptical 
and uncertain market about his ability to successfully steer the ship. The alternative view 
argues in favour of the notion that considers stock-based compensation as undermining 
corporate governance O'Connor et al., 2006; Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) i.e. result 
in greater financial misreporting. Chen et al. (2006) concluded that equity incentives 
ultimately promote risk-taking in the banking industry. I seize upon these studies to make 
the argument that the nature of banking business in terms of both opacity and complexity 
amplifies the pitfalls associated with widespread use of equity options as an executive 
compensation mechanism. To the extent that equity options align shareholders’ and 
managers’ interests, we hypothesize that they can be an effective vehicle to combat 
financial misreporting if used in conjunction with other corporate governance measures. 
Against this background, I expect equity incentives to ultimately reduce the incentives to 
misreport in financial disclosures. We pose our fourth hypothesis, thus:  
H4. Higher levels of equity-based executive compensation have got a negative 
association with financial misreporting in commercial banks 
 
     4.3.5.     Insider representation and financial misreporting hypothesis 
           The dominant view here vouches for the beneficial impact of boards dominated by 
independent outsiders over those dominated by insiders Jensen and Meckling (1976); 
116 
 
 
Dalton et al. (1998); Busta (2007). Tanna et al. (2011) also concluded that there exists a 
positive and significant relationship between board independence and bank efficiency. I 
extrapolate this positive impact on performance to imply a lessening of the incentives to 
misreport for banks Klein (2002). In support of this, Davidson et al. (2005); Peasnell et 
al. (2005) and Baysinger and Butler (1985) all found having a majority of independent, 
non-executives on the board significantly associated with a lower likelihood of financial 
misreporting in the form of discretionary accruals. The alternative is based on 
‘stewardship’ theory and posit that a rise in the proportion of non-independent directors 
contributes to firm performance as insiders have more experience and better firm-specific 
knowledge Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998); Westphal (1999). Recent studies by 
Erkens et al. (2012) and Pathan and Faff (2013) also came out in support of this argument 
by reporting a negative association between independent directors and performance. I 
extend the intuition behind these studies and posit that a failure to hit set performance 
targets is the chief reason why firms misreport financial accounting information. If a 
majority of independent directors on the board depresses performance in ways argued 
above, it follows that the incentives misrepresent financial disclosures increase in tandem. 
Based on our literature discussion, I consider a board dominated by inside directors to be 
symptomatic of a weak corporate governance environment and thus to be most likely 
positively associated with financial misreporting. The opacity and complexity that typify 
bank structures and operations makes the need for more independent directors on bank 
boards paramount. I borrow from this discussion and formulate my fifth hypothesis, thus: 
H5. Greater insider representation on the board of directors is positively related with 
financial misreporting in commercial banks. 
 
4.4.     Empirical Analysis 
4.4.1.     Data & sample selection  
           My sample (as outlined in Table 4.2) consists of 17 major listed commercial banks 
which were the subject of SEC enforcement actions (SEC AAERs), are headquartered in 
the US and are within the Standard Industry Classification (SIC Code) range from 6020 
to 6029. I include only the listed commercial banks as information on corporate 
governance data are standardised through the SEC Edgar platform. My unbalanced panel 
dataset includes 279 observations over the period 2000 – 2016. I collected data relating 
to the main explanatory variable i.e. SEC AAERs from the SEC website and I extract data 
for the alternative dependent variable i.e. discretionary loan loss provisions from 
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Compustat. The corporate governance data are hand collected from DEF 14A proxy 
statements of annual meetings found in the SECs EDGAR filings. I follow the lead of 
Adams and Mehran (2012); Pathan and Faff (2013) and measure governance data from 
the date of the proxy statement. Financial information on commercial banks come from 
Thomson Financial Banker and Bankscope. I obtained compensation variables from 
ExecuComp, which provides executive compensation data for ﬁrms in the S&P 500, S&P 
MidCap 400, and S&P SmallCap 600 indices. 
 
     4.4.2.     Corporate governance variables 
           Consistent with the literature review and hypothesis development sections, my 
corporate governance factors are premised on five general dimensions i.e. board size, 
block (equity) ownership, CEO power, compensation mix and insider representation. This 
allows me to account for a wide variety of board characteristics framed around these five 
pillars.  
           Board size is the number of members that constitutes a bank’s board of directors.  
I crystallize this variable into three factors to better capture the board characteristics in so 
far as board size is concerned. Total board size (BRDSZE) is the total number of directors 
on a bank’s board. Number serving on Audit Committee (BRDADT) is the proportion of 
the total board members who constitute the board’s Audit Committee. Number serving 
on Compensation Committee (BRDCMP) is the proportion of the total board members 
serving on the Compensation Committee. Gender diversity (BRDFML is the fraction of 
females on the bank’s main board Campbell and Mínguez-Vera (2008). 
           I go along with Baber et al. (2015) and designate a block-holder to be a shareholder 
who holds more than ﬁve percent of the outstanding shares of a bank. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) and Cremers and Nair (2005) tout the monitoring and disciplining effect of 
institutional investors (large outside block-holders) on management. I build on this 
construction and therefore anticipate the relationship between financial misreporting and 
the number of outside block-holders / institutional ownership to be a negative one. For 
purposes of this study, I develop three variables under this block-ownership cluster Grove 
et al. 2011. I include the fraction of outstanding shares owned by block-holders 
(BHEQT%), the number of block-holders (BHEQT#) and the shareholding of the largest 
block-holder (EQT%OS).  
           I employ three measures to proxy for CEO power i.e. CEO duality, CEO tenure 
and CEO age. Dechow et al. (1996) and Agrawal and Chadha (2005) report that the 
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likelihood of an accounting failure increases when a founder is the CEO or board 
chairperson. Abbott et al. (2004) ﬁnd that the probability of accounting failure increases 
with board size; while Dechow et al. (1996) and Farber (2005) ﬁnd that AAER ﬁrms are 
more likely to have a CEO who also serves as the board chair. CEO duality (CEODUA) 
is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the CEO also chairs the board, and 0 otherwise 
Donaldson and Davis (1991); (Dalton et al. (1998); Ballinger and Marcel (2010). CEO 
tenure (CEOTNR) is estimated as the number of years that the CEO has served in the 
position Mishra and Nielsen (2000); Pathan and Faff (2013). CEO age (CEOAGE) is a 
variable that denotes the age of the CEO Mishra and Nielsen (2000); Cornett et al. (2008).  
           In order to examine how the compensation mix impacts financial misreporting in 
banks, I account for the portion of total executive compensation that’s in cash (EXCCSH) 
which I compute as the ratio of bonus over total cash compensation of the executives 
Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011). I also consider the portion of total executive compensation 
that’s paid in stock or equity (EXCEQT) Baber et al. (2015). Finally, I control for the 
total executive holdings in the bank (EXC%OS) i.e. the number of shares held by the 
executives as a percentage of total outstanding number of a bank’s shares Beltratti and 
Stulz (2012). Insider representation stands for board composition in so far as the 
proportion of independent members on the board is concerned. The fraction of a bank’s 
board constituted by insiders or affiliates (INDPBD) proxies for the proportion of 
independent directors on a bank board compared to non-independents Grove et al. (2011). 
I also consider the fraction of independent members on the audit committee (INDPAC) 
Baber et al. (2015). Finally, I control for the fraction of independent members that 
constitute the board vis-a-vis the affiliated members or insiders INDPCC. An outside 
director is classiﬁed as “afﬁliated” if he/she is a former employee or mentioned in the 
“certain transactions” section of the proxy statement.  
           The variables reﬂect and characterize five broad clusters of corporate governance 
i.e. board size, block-ownership, CEO power, compensation mix and insider 
representation. The variable definitions, sources and computations are outlined in detail 
in Table 4.1. 
  
     4.4.3.     Financial misreporting variables 
           SEC Auditing & Accounting Enforcement Releases: i.e. the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s Auditing and Accounting Enforcement Releases 
(US SEC AAERs). I believe my analysis is strengthened by my use of SEC AAERs (i.e. 
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MISREP_AAER) as an objective-based proxy of financial misreporting. Unlike the 
accrual-based proxies used for earnings management for example, which tend to be 
subject to measurement error during the estimation process Kothari et al. (2015), SEC 
AAERs are more robust to estimation errors since they are publicly reported incidences 
of financial misreporting. The US SEC’s AAERs primarily serve as evidence that a firm 
committed an accounting violation to warrant being charged for that violation by the SEC. 
Because AAERs are disclosed to the public via the medium of the SEC website well after 
the actual accounting violation has been committed, I have to read the AAER releases 
case by case to determine the period when the actual violation first occurred. Dechow et 
al. (2010) tout SEC AAERs as a robust financial misreporting proxy by remarking that 
“the AAER fraud sample represents the most egregious accounting manipulations that 
are identified by the SEC thereby providing us with a measure that unambiguously 
captures financial misreporting.” SEC AAERs represent the main financial misreporting 
proxy for purposes of this study. 
     
     4.4.4.     Control variables 
           In line with Markarian and Parbonetti (2007) I expect bank-specific characteristics 
to influence the corporate governance structure; and thus by extension also potentially 
affect how corporate governance impacts financial misreporting e.g. bank size may be 
crucial in influencing a board’s financial disclosure policies. I constructed a plethora of 
variables to control for bank-speciﬁc characteristics that are suggested in extant / prior 
literature as potentially related to my dependent and explanatory variables Abbott et al. 
(2004); Larcker et al. (2007); Bowen et al. (2008). Firstly, I acknowledge the role of 
quality auditors in restraining financial misreporting by including a variable on whether 
a bank is audited by a large international auditing firm (BIG4AUD). It is an indicator 
variable which equals 1 when a bank is audited by a large auditor; otherwise equals 0 if 
not. I identify large auditing firms to be the large international auditing firms i.e. Arthur 
Andersen (before 2002), Ernst & Young, Deloitte & Touche, KPMG and Price 
Waterhouse Coopers (PWC). Consistent with the reasoning of Ivashina et al. (2009) who 
suggested that creditors may serve as corporate control in monitoring companies, I 
include financial leverage (FINLEV) to control for capital structure. I compute this as 
interest-bearing debt divided by total assets for the bank. I also build into the regressions 
the z-score introduced by Boyd and Graham (1986) to control for insolvency risk 
(ZSCORE). I compute bank size (LNTAS) as the natural log of a bank’s total assets; I 
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however do not include size as a control variable in the alpha regressions because of 
multi-collinearity concerns. Additionally, I tag along with Pathan and Faff (2013) and 
account for the regulatory mandates in my analysis by introducing the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (SOX) of 2002 as an indicator variable (SOX_2002). This variable takes the value of 
0 the years 2000 and 2001, otherwise its equal to 1 for all other years. Finally, I impose a 
crisis dummy (CRISIS_0710) in order to account for the financial crisis period De Jonghe 
et al. (2012); Pathan and Faff (2013). This variable takes the value of 1 if year is 2007–
2010 and zero otherwise. 
      
     4.4.5.     The regression specification 
           Dynamic Panel Analysis: I use a multiple regression model to examine the impact 
of the 16 corporate governance factors on ﬁnancial misreporting. I opt for, adopt and 
utilise the two-step ‘system’ GMM estimator Arellano and Bover (1995); Blundell and 
Bond (2000) to account for and address potential endogeneity issues that could arise in 
examining the relationship between corporate governance and financial misreporting De 
Andres and Vallelado (2008); Pathan and Faff (2013). In line with Blundell and Bond 
(2000) the two-step estimates of standard errors are likely to be downward biased, I thus 
follow the finite sample correction introduced by Windmeijer (2005). To test for 
instrument validity, I subject my estimates to Hansen’s diagnostic test; and consistent 
with Arellano and Bond (1991) I then test for second-order autocorrelation of error terms. 
Against this background, my dynamic panel model specification takes the following 
form: 
 
𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼0 +   𝜑(𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑒𝑝)𝑖,𝑡−1  +  𝛽𝑗 ∑ (𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝_𝐺𝑜𝑣)𝑖,𝑡
5
𝑗 = 1 +
 𝛾𝑘 ∑ (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙)𝑖,𝑡 
7
𝑘 = 1 + 𝛼1(𝑆𝑂𝑋_2002)𝑡 + 𝛼2(𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆_0710)𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
           (4.1) 
 
where 𝑖 signifies individual commercial bank (𝑖 = 1, 2, ..., 17) and 𝑡 is the period that we 
cover (𝑡 = 2000, 2001, ..., 2016). 𝛼, 𝛽 & 𝛾 are the parameters to be estimated, while 
𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑖,𝑡  is the dependent variable and stands for incidences of financial misreporting 
in commercial banks as estimated by MISREP_AAER; (𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝_𝐺𝑜𝑣)𝑖,𝑡 comprise of the 
five unique dimensions of corporate governance variables: 1) board size, number of 
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directors on audit committee number of directors on compensation committee and gender 
diversity 2) fraction of outstanding shares owned by block-holders, number of block-
holders and shareholding of largest block-holder 3) CEO duality, CEO tenure and CEO 
age 4) executive compensation that’s cash, executive compensation that’s equity / stock 
and executive shares as a fraction of total outstanding shares 5) fraction of the board that 
are independent directors, proportion of independent directors on the audit committee and 
proportion of independent directors on the compensation committee; (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙)𝑖,𝑡 
stands for the mix of bank-specific and regulatory control variables; (𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑒𝑝)𝑖,𝑡−1 
stands for the lagged misreporting dependent variable; (𝑆𝑂𝑋_2002) is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 0 in the post SOX period (2000–2001), otherwise equals 
1. (𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆0710) is a crisis dummy that takes the value of 1 if the year is 2007–2010, 
otherwise equals 0; while 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 denotes the error term. 
 
     4.4.6.     Descriptive statistics   
           I provide the descriptive statistics for the corporate governance variables in Table 
4.3. The sample mean of board size in Panel A of Table 4.3 is 10.50 which is broadly in 
line with the 12.48 in Xie et al. (2003) and the 9 in Francis et al. (2012). At 0.116 the 
sample mean of gender diversity is comparable to the 0.076 in Pathan and Faff (2013). In 
so far as CEO characteristics go, the sample mean of CEO Duality is 0.073 which is 
similar to that of 0.085 in Xie et al. (2003). The average sample CEO age at 57.81 (years) 
is well in sync with the 56.26 (years) in Cornett et al. (2008); and the average tenure of 
the sample CEO is 7.52 (years) which is consistent with the 8.85 in Pathan and Skully 
(2010). Similar to Baysinger and Butler (1985), independents account for 67.4% of total 
board seats with the balance split between insiders and affiliated directors. Even though 
these percentages are similar to those reported in the studies cited above, it is important 
to note that there are wide variations in the board compositions of my sample firms. At 
74.1% and 100%, audit and compensation committees in my sample were composed of a 
majority of independent directors, perhaps largely testifying to the impact of more 
rigorous compliance enforcement on banks in the post-SOX and post-crisis dispensations. 
           I present the descriptive statistics for my control variables in Panel B of Table 4.3 
i.e. LNTASS, FINLEV, AUDINT and ZSCORE. About 76.7% of the banks in the sample 
are audited by large international auditing firm (AUDINT). The banks are also lowly 
geared on average, a factor largely attributable to tighter requirements on bank equity 
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holdings and asset quality on bank balance sheets in the crisis aftermath. Another 
phenomenon showing the impact of SOX guidelines in relation to independent 
representation on boards of directors is the notable increase in the mean percentage of 
independent directors in Panel D. From about 60.1% in 2002, the average percentage of 
independent members rose to a high of 71.4% by 2006 and has since been largely above 
65% ever since.  
           Table 4.5 displays the correlations among the governance characteristics and the 
control variables. I am particularly on the lookout for high correlations among the 
corporate governance variables as these could potentially introduce noise into my 
baseline in the form of multi-collinearity. Correlations between the corporate governance 
variables and the control variables are generally low (typically < 0.30), with the highest 
correlation of 0.502 between block-holder ownership (BHEQT%) and large international 
auditor (AUDINT). I find a negative association between the fraction of independent 
outsiders on the board (INDPBD) and the financial misreporting variable. This is in line 
with prior literature and further illustrates alternative evidence in favour of greater 
independent representation being associated with better monitoring. Against established 
wisdom in favour of smaller boards in terms of effective monitoring, I find larger boards 
associated with lower levels of enforcement releases. The main argument for larger 
boards is that they may bring a greater number of experienced directors to a board. 
Experienced directors seem to play a role in constraining financial misreporting.  
      
4.5.     Discussion of the empirical results      
           My first hypothesis predicts that there is a negative association between large 
boards and financial misreporting in commercial banks owing to better monitoring and 
access to a wider talent pool in comparison to smaller boards. In other words, I 
hypothesise that, all things being equal, the larger the bank board the less the incidences 
of misreporting. Support for H1 in our results is evidenced by a negative and linear 
relationship between board size (BRDSZE) and AAER_ENF (t = -1.817) in Table 4.6. 
However, as a robustness check, I also run and report the results for BRDSZE2 and a 
positive association emerges (2.136) i.e. that a large board actually results in greater (not 
less) incidences of financial misreporting for commercial banks. Taken together, the 
direction and signiﬁcance of the linear and quadratic coefﬁcients for the AAER_ENF 
regressions suggest that the relationship between board size and financial misreporting 
could yet be non-linear. These ﬁndings are consistent with the ﬁndings of Andres & 
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Vallelado (2008) when analysing the relationship between corporate governance and 
performance. I posited that financial misreporting essentially results from a failure to hit 
set performance outcomes. Against this backdrop, it also follows that if a large board 
positively impacts bank performance, the improved performance outcomes ought to 
result in lower financial misreporting incidences as well. Board size is negatively 
associated with ﬁnancial misreporting up to a certain point, beyond which size it actually 
starts to fuel (not impair) financial misreporting. The conflicting nature of the results of 
the linear and quadratic coefficients places a demand for the adoption of non-linear 
models in future research on the relationship between board size and financial 
misreporting. 
           My second hypothesis investigates the association between block-ownership with 
ﬁnancial misreporting. H2 predicts the existence of a negative association between 
increased equity ownership (block-ownership) and financial misreporting in commercial 
banks. In Table 4.6 I ﬁnd and report a negative and signiﬁcant association between block-
ownership (BHEQT%) and financial misreporting (AAER_ENF) (t = -2.286). Given the 
strength and consistency of the association between block-ownership and ﬁnancial 
misreporting, I conclude that large equity block-holders strongly account for the reduction 
in financial misreporting incidences in commercial banks in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis. These results lend solid support H2 i.e. that the existence of large equity block-
holders has a restraining effect on executives’ propensity to misreport. In other words, 
large equity block-holders have got a positive effect on the quality of financial accounting 
disclosures by commercial banks. To further augment this analysis on the impact of 
block-holders on the financial misreporting, I also report a negative association between 
the number of block-holders (BHEQT#) and financial misreporting (AAER_ENF). This 
implies that the greater the number of institutional ownership of a firm’s equity, the less 
the likelihood of the bank misreporting its financials. These results strongly attest to the 
contention by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) who vouched for a negative relationship 
between large shareholders and financial misreporting on the basis that large shareholders 
often play an ‘active monitoring role’ of corporate managers. This “active monitoring 
role” of large shareholders leads to better alignment of managers’ and shareholders’ 
interests in line with agency theory Stein (1988); Giroud and Mueller (2010). I further 
surmise from this that closely monitored managers are less likely to engage in the 
extraction of private benefits and therefore they have less to conceal from shareholders 
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by misreporting. In fact, Prowse (1995) underlines the importance of the monitoring role 
of block-holders in the banking industry. 
           My third hypothesis predicts that there is a positive relationship between greater 
CEO power (i.e. CEO duality) and financial misreporting in commercial banks. In other 
words, I posit that concentrating power in an all too powerful CEO is detrimental to banks 
in so far as financial misreporting is concerned. The separation of the roles of CEO and 
chair of the board has since become embedded as best practice in corporate governance 
literature. This background guided and informed the formulation of H3 i.e. greater CEO 
power is anticipated to result in the escalation of financial misreporting incidences in 
commercial banks. In Table 4.7 I ﬁnd some support for H3 from the positive and statistical 
signiﬁcance of the Duality factor in the AAER_ENF regressions i.e. (t = 2.174). I 
extrapolate and further refine my analysis by restating the fact that financial misreporting 
as a phenomenon is basically a by-product resulting from a failure to hit set performance 
targets. Drawing from literature on the relationship between financial misreporting and 
bank performance, and consistent with my ﬁndings, Larcker et al. (2007) reported a 
negative association between CEO Duality and bank performance (proxied by ROA). I 
marry these findings with my own findings on the association between CEO duality and 
financial misreporting and they are suggestive that CEO duality accounts for or explains 
financial misreporting in commercial banks in some respect. An over-powerful CEO can 
hinder bank performance, and this in turn increases the propensity to misreport as a means 
of trying to plug gaps in performance and bring results to be in line with market 
expectations. Taking from this logic, the study of financial misreporting should therefore 
never be divorced from bank performance studies for a deeper and well-rounded insight 
to emerge. I also reported the results on how the variable CEOAGE is associated with 
financial misreporting to further augment my analysis on the relationship between CEO 
characteristics and financial misreporting. The coefficient for CEOAGE in the 
AAER_ENF regression is negative and significant (t = -2.114). These results suggest that 
older CEOs are associated with lower incidences of financial misreporting in commercial 
banks. Taking a detour to bank performance literature, Grove et al. 2011 found director 
age to be beneficial to bank performance up to a certain point before diminishing returns 
set in. I build from this and contend that the beneficial impact of CEOAGE on 
performance goes a long way in explaining the negative association between CEOAGE 
and financial misreporting. Older CEOs are naturally better networked in their market 
which helps them secure and generate more business for the bank, and thus the propensity 
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to misreport is significantly lower as a result. Another feasible line of thought would be 
that older CEOs generally tend to be more conservative than their younger peers since 
they no longer have nothing much to prove. My results are broadly consistent with agency 
theory in that they cast CEO duality as a weakness in corporate governance which 
negatively affects both financial misreporting and bank performance.  
           My fourth hypothesis predicts that higher levels of equity-based executive 
compensation have got a negative association with financial misreporting in commercial 
banks. In other words, in line with agency theory, equity incentives have got the effect of 
harmonising the interests of executives and shareholders in the long term. In the context 
of the relationship between executive compensation and financial misreporting, I expect 
equity-based compensation to have a beneficial impact on financial misreporting. The 
results show some variation based on the various kinds of compensation i.e. whether cash-
based or equity-based compensation. In Table 4.7 I find a negative impact of the equity-
based executive compensation (EXCEQT) on financial misreporting at the 10% 
significance level; whereas there exists a positive association between the cash-based 
executive compensation (EXCCSH) on financial misreporting at the 1% significance 
level. I find these results not surprising at all as they speak to and conform with the wider 
agency theory i.e. that equity-based compensation constitutes a mechanism through 
which the interests of executives and shareholders are better aligned Jensen & Murphy 
(1990). I thus expect equity-based compensation to result in a reduction in the incentives 
for executives to misreport. As far as cash-based compensation goes, I do not find these 
findings surprising at all because cash-based compensation is not thought to sufficiently 
incentivise executives to “maximise shareholder wealth”. I proceed to make the additional 
point that the impact of executive compensation on financial misreporting could vary 
owing to the complex nature of the bank intermediation model as well as the regulatory 
regime obtaining in a specific jurisdiction. A good example of this would be the existence 
of deposit insurance which tends to have the effect of diluting the level of monitoring by 
regulators and shareholders, thereby enabling executives to maximize short-term 
compensation through greater risk-taking. 
           My ﬁfth hypothesis predicts that greater insider representation on the board of 
directors is positively related with financial misreporting in commercial banks. In other 
words, the more the proportion of insiders to independents on a bank’s board, the greater 
the likelihood of the bank engaging in financial misreporting. The positive impact of 
independents on a bank’s board is underlined by the listing requirements of all major US 
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stock exchanges having a stipulation that all public companies ought to have completely 
independent audit and compensation committees in conformity with the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act. These rules do not however prohibit prior employees and other related parties (e.g. 
as family members) from sitting on the audit or compensation committees. I follow the 
lead of Larcker et al. (2007) and designate former employees sitting on either the audit or 
compensation committees as “afﬁliated” and I therefore consider “afﬁliated committee 
membership” as indicative of a deficit of independence on the board. I draw from agency 
theory and posit that a majority of affiliates and insiders on the board relative to 
independents will significantly compromise the effectiveness of the oversight and 
monitoring functions of the audit and compensation committees. Consistent with H5, in 
Table 4.8 I find the three corporate governance characteristics under the insider 
representation cluster negatively associated with financial misreporting. These are the 
fraction of independents on the board (INDPBD), the fraction of independents on the 
audit committee (INDPAC) and the fraction of independents on compensation committee 
(INDPCC) with coefficients of -0.783, -0.321 and -0.672 respectively. I do not find these 
results surprising at all given the impact SOX guidelines have had with regards to the 
constitution of company boards i.e. that there ought to be a majority of independents on 
boards of directors, with the audit and compensation committees almost exclusively 
composed of independent directors. I consider the oversight of independent audit 
committees particularly vital in banking given the discretionary nature of key accounting 
estimates such as loan loss provisions and investments. According to Zhou & Chen 
(2004), an independent audit committee is a crucial factor in constraining earnings 
management with respect to banks’ loan loss reserves. Similarly, the need for an 
independent compensation committee cannot be emphasised against the backdrop of the 
opacity and complexity that characterise the banking business model. An independent 
compensation committee is essential in ensuring that executive compensation packages 
result in better alignment of the interests of managers and shareholders. A board 
dominated by affiliates and insiders over independents does nothing but heighten agency 
conflict issues due to reduced monitoring, thereby culminating in greater financial 
misreporting ultimately.  
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4.6.     Robustness / sensitivity analysis 
           To ensure the robustness of my results, I conduct a battery of other analyses across 
a range of the variables in Table 4.9. Firstly, I drop two of our five corporate governance 
dimensions i.e. executive compensation and insider representation and adopt CEO 
compensation (CEO Cash Compensation & CEO Equity Compensation) and operational 
complexity (number of different business segments & total number of subsidiaries) in 
their place.  I proceed and use alternative corporate governance variables for the five 
factors / dimensions adopted i.e. board size, block-ownership, CEO power, CEO 
compensation and operational complexity. My results are robust to this change. I find 
both cash-based and equity-based portions of CEO positively associated with financial 
misreporting in US commercial banks. In addition, the dynamic panel estimations reveal 
a positive relationship between operational complexity and financial misreporting in US 
commercial banks over the study period. I use the number of different business segments 
and the total number of outstanding subsidiaries to proxy for operational complexity. I 
find that an increase in both the number of different business segments and the total 
outstanding number of subsidiaries increases bank financial misreporting. These findings 
imply that there is a greater likelihood for banks characterized by higher operational 
complexity to misreport compared to banks of lower operational complexity. This is so 
because in banks of high business complexity, co-ordination problems between 
specialists rise, and this can correspondingly increase the communication costs of the 
bank Lawrence and Lorch (1967). Secondly, I replace financial leverage and insolvency 
risk as control variables with fees and return on assets and my main results hold. Thirdly, 
I completely exclude SOX and CRISIS from the baseline regressions and my results still 
hold in the main. Finally, I run each of the regressions with no controls and then with two 
control variables and the results are comparatively similar across these regressions.  
 
4.7.     Concluding remarks 
           I probe the relationship between financial misreporting and a plethora of carefully 
selected corporate governance characteristics and dimensions i.e. board size, block-
ownership, CEO Power, Compensation mix and insider representation. I summarise and 
outline the results from the dynamic panel regressions in line with the formulated 
hypothesis for this paper. Consistent with H1, I find a negative association between board 
size (BRDSZE) and financial misreporting (AAER_ENF). The association reverses to 
positive when I use the squared BRDSZE variable, suggesting that the relationship 
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between board size and financial misreporting could yet be non-linear. Consistent with 
H2, I report a negative and signiﬁcant association between block-ownership (BHEQT%) 
and the financial misreporting variable (AAER_ENF). Consistent with H3, I ﬁnd support 
for the positive and statistical signiﬁcance of the relationship between the Duality factor 
(CEODUA) and the misreporting variable (AAER_ENF). Consistent with H4, I find a 
negative impact of the equity-based executive compensation (EXCEQT) on financial 
misreporting; whereas there exists a positive association between the cash-based 
executive compensation (EXCCSH) and financial misreporting. Consistent with H5, I 
find the three corporate governance characteristics under the insider representation (i.e. 
INDPBD, INDPAC, INDPCC) cluster negatively associated with financial misreporting. 
           My research has got both theoretical and practical implications. Firstly, my 
research amplifies the how important it is to simultaneously probe multiple corporate 
governance dimensions in one study. Investigating a single dimension in isolation e.g. 
compensation mix could reveal a significant association with misreporting; yet when 
studied as an element of a set of corporate governance dimensions, the result could yet be 
just about marginally significant Baysinger & Butler (1985). Secondly, I believe the 
applicability and explanatory power of the conventional agency theory is limited in so far 
as the banking industry is concerned. There is therefore a need to carefully consider 
peculiarities in terms of the organizational settings and regulatory environment which 
may markedly interfere with and compromise the monitoring power of different corporate 
governance mechanisms e.g. while agency theory touts the virtues of stronger 
independent representation on the board, the role some of the insider-related mechanisms 
e.g. CEO duality and insider representation play in curtailing financial misreporting – as 
contended by stewardship theory – warrants further examination according to alternative 
theoretical paradigms. In so far as practical implications go, my study speaks to the wider 
discussion around executive compensation as a critical aspect of bank regulation. I 
contribute to and motivate compliance monitors, regulators and shareholders alike with 
regards to the ongoing agenda for reforms to executive compensation packages. The 
direction of travel should be towards the adoption of compensation packages with a long-
term orientation e.g. via options or restricted stock. I conclude by re-emphasising that 
financial misreporting essentially results from the need to paint a rosier picture of the 
financials after a failure to hit set performance targets in line with market expectations. A 
study of the impact of corporate governance on financial misreporting has to therefore 
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borrow heavily from literature on the corporate-governance-performance nexus for richer 
insight.  
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Table 4.1   Variables, abbreviations and descriptions and sources. Appendix presents all the variables that we utilize in our econometric analysis in this study. The abbreviations, descriptions 
and sources of each variable we use are also presented. 
Variable  Abbreviation Description & computation Data source 
Financial misreporting variables:    
SEC AAERs MISREP_AAER 
The percentage of banks that are cited by the SEC for committing 
accounting fraud. Banks that commit fraud in a given year are identified 
from the SEC investigations in AAERs 
SEC AAER Website 
    
Corporate governance variables:    
Total board size BRDSZE Number of directors serving on the board DEF 14A Proxy Stmts 
    
No. of directors serving on audit committee BRDADT Number of directors serving on the Audit committee DEF 14A Proxy Stmts 
    
No. of directors serving on compensation committee BRDCMP Number of directors serving on the Compensation committee DEF 14A Proxy Stmts 
    
Gender diversity BRDFML The percentage of female directors on the board DEF 14A Proxy Stmts 
    
Fraction of outstanding shares owned by block-holders BHEQT% Fraction of outstanding shares owned by block-holders 10-K Annual Reports 
    
Number of block-holders BHEQT# Number of block-holders 10-K Annual Reports 
    
Shareholding of the largest block-holder BHOEQT Shareholding of the largest block-holder 10-K Annual Reports 
    
CEO duality CEODUA Indicator variable equal to 1 if CEO also holds the position of board chair 10-K Annual Reports 
    
CEO tenure CEOTNR 
The number of years that the CEO has served in the position (we use the 
natural log in our panel estimations) 
10-K Annual Reports 
    
CEO age CEOAGE The age of the CEO (we use the natural log in our panel estimations) 10-K Annual Reports 
    
Executive compensation: cash EXCCSH 
The proportion of total Executive annual compensation that’s base salary 
and cash bonus incentive 
Execucomp 
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Executive compensation: equity EXCEQT 
The proportion of total executive compensation that’s stock / equity 
options and grants 
Execucomp 
    
Executive shares as a % of outstanding shares EXC%OS 
The proportion of a bank’s total outstanding shares that’s held by the top 
executives 
Execucomp 
    
Fraction of board: insiders INDPBD 
The proportion of the total board membership that’s comprised of insiders 
/ executives or affiliated directors  
10-K Annual Reports 
    
Fraction of independents on audit committee INDPAC The percentage of independent members of the board Audit committee 10-K Annual Reports 
    
Fraction of independents on compensation committee INDPCC 
The percentage of independent members of the board Compensation 
committee 
10-K Annual Reports 
    
Control variables:    
Financial leverage FINLEV 
is equal to a bank’s interest-bearing debt as a percentage of total assets 
sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by total assets  
Thomson Financial Banker 
    
Large international auditor AUDINT 
An indicator variable for whether a bank is audited by one of the big 
international audit firms i.e. PWC, Deloitte, KPMG and Ernst & Young 
10-K Annual Reports 
    
Insolvency risk ZSCORE The inverse proxy for bank insolvency  Bankscope 
    
Bank size LNTASS The natural log of a bank’s total assets  Bankscope 
    
Sarbanes-Oxley Act SOX_2002 
A dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the year is 2000 and 2001, 
and 0 otherwise 
 
    
Global financial crisis CRISIS_0710 
A dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the year is 2007 – 2010, 
otherwise its equal to 0 for all other years. 
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Table 4.2 Auditing and accounting enforcement releases breakdown. This table presents the breakdown 
of the AAERs showing how we arrived at the industry-year observations used in our study at a glance. 
Description Observations 
Total SEC AAERs from 2000-2016 (All SIC codes) 2 604 
Auditing enforcement actions & individual CPAs, LLCs & LLPs (1 923) 
Corporate accounting enforcement actions (585) 
Of which financial services enforcement actions (SIC codes 6000 – 6999) (74) 
Of which duplicates or appearing twice (5) 
Commercial banks (SIC codes 6020 – 6029) 17 
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Table 4.3     Descriptive statistics. The table reports the descriptive statistics of the variables employed in the dynamic panel 
regressions. All variables are in absolute values except of the compensation determinants (EXCCSH, EXCEQT) which are stated 
in million dollars. BRDSZE: the total number of members on the board; BRDADT: the % of total board in Audit Committee; 
BRDCMP: the % of total board in Compensation Committee; BRDFML: the % of female directors on board; BHEQT%: the % 
of outstanding shares owned by block-holders; BHEQT#: the number of block-holders; BHOEQT: the % of outstanding shares 
held by the largest block-holder; CEODUAL: a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the CEO chairs the board as well, and 0 
otherwise; CEOTEN: the number of years that the CEO has served in the position; CEOAGE: the age of the CEO; EXCCSH: 
the cash compensation of executive management (including base salary & bonus); EXCEQT: the equity compensation of 
executive management (including restricted stock and stock options); EXC%OS: executive shares as a % of outstanding shares; 
INDPBD: the fraction of independents on the board; INDPAC: the fraction of independents in Audit Committee; INDPCC: the 
fraction of independents on Compensation Committee; LNTASS: bank size; FINLEV: financial leverage; AUDINT: audited by 
large international auditor; ZSCORE: insolvency risk. . *, ** & *** correspond to 10%, 5% and 1% significance level 
respectively.  
Variables Mean. Std. Dev Minimum Maximum Median 
PANEL A: Corporate governance variables 
BRDSZE 10.498 3.545 5 17 9 
BRDADT 0.367 1.370 2.000 4.492 2.370 
BRDCMP 0.266 1.260 3.000 4.396 2.327 
BRDFML 0.116 0.101 0.000 0.413 0.114 
BHEQT% 0.509 0.266 0.000 0.972 0.572 
BHEQT# 4.100 1.476 0.000 8.000 1.000 
BHOEQT 0.107 0.139 0.000 0.194 0.911 
CEODUA 0.073 0.482 0.000 1.000 1.000 
CEOTNR 7.523 8.632 0.000 43 5.000 
CEOAGE 57.810 9.231 41.000 74 57 
EXCCSH 42 122.160 21 600 0.000 152 000 8 132 
EXCEQT 52 398.300 32 300 0.000 227 000 7 386 
EXC%OS 0.073 0.083 0.000 0.781 0.043 
INDPBD 0.674 0.263 0.401 0.961 0.742 
INDPAC 0.741 0.162 0.000 1.000 0.183 
INDPCC 1.001 0.191 0.000 1.000 0.280 
PANEL B: Bank-specific & regulatory variables 
LNTASS 16.470 1.729 2.287 10.471 6.738 
FINLEV 0.889 0.216 0.000 0.893 0.236 
AUDINT 0.767 0.321 0.000 1.000 1.000 
ZSCORE 24.415 6.230 -46.276 53.714 2.108 
PANEL C: Financial misreporting variables 
MISREP_AAER 0.015 0.009 0.003 0.022 0.018 
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Table 4.4     Descriptive statistics. Corporate governance variables: Year-by-year 
Year Board size Block-ownership CEO power 
Compensation 
mix 
Insider 
representation 
2000 8.723 10.402 0.801 6.780 0.656 
2001 8.217 9.751 0.923 5.682 0.649 
2002 7.832 9.892 0.874 6.921 0.601 
2003 7.461 11.110 0.802 6.911 0.613 
2004 8.942 9.232 0.874 7.973 0.694 
2005 8.547 9.641 0.811 7.452 0.682 
2006 9.086 13.573 0.832 7.301 0.714 
2007 8.574 14.201 0.822 6.394 0.662 
2008 8.108 13.052 0.601 2.843 0.641 
2009 8.462 14.844 0.593 7.354 0.661 
2010 8.116 12.912 0.560 5.270 0.660 
2011 8.032 14.573 0.472 4.081 0.663 
2012 8.411 14.050 0.461 3.732 0.674 
2013 8.255 14.095 0.522 5.109 0.665 
2014 8.204 13.907 0.504 4.548 0.665 
2015 8.225 14.156 0.490 4.368 0.667 
2016 8.274 14.052 0.494 4.439 0.668 
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Table 4.5     Correlation matrix. This table presents the Pearson correlation coefficients for our corporate governance proxies and control variables for a sample of US commercial banks over the 2000 – 2016 periods.  BRDSZE: the 
total number of members on the board; BRDADT: the % of total board in Audit Committee; BRDCMP: the % of total board in Compensation Committee; BRDFML: the % of female directors on board; BHEQT%: the % of outstanding 
shares owned by block-holders; BHEQT#: the number of block-holders; BHOEQT: the % of outstanding shares held by the largest block-holder; CEODUAL: a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the CEO chairs the board as well, and 
0 otherwise; CEOTEN: the number of years that the CEO has served in the position; CEOAGE: the age of the CEO; EXCCSH: the cash compensation of executive management (including base salary & bonus); EXCEQT: the equity 
compensation of executive management (including restricted stock and stock options); EXC%OS: executive shares as a % of outstanding shares; INDPBD: the fraction of independents on the board; INDPAC: the fraction of independents 
in Audit Committee; INDPCC: the fraction of independents on Compensation Committee; LNTASS: bank size; FINLEV: financial leverage; AUDINT: audited by large international auditor; ZSCORE: insolvency risk. The variable 
abbreviations, sources and outlines are presented by way of Appendix A right at the bottom of the paper. *, ** & *** correspond to 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively.  
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
BRDSZE 1 1.000                    
BRDADT 2 0.725**
* 
1.000                   
BRDCMP 3 0.129 0.598**
* 
1.000                  
BRDFML 4 0.054 -0.058 0.002 1.000                 
BHEQT% 5 0.095* 0.017 0.142** 0.006 1.000                
BHEQT# 6 0.235**
* 
-0.004 0.086 -0.037 0.245**
* 
1.000               
BHOEQT 7 0.044 0.039 0.208**
* 
0.004 0.176**
* 
0.188**
* 
1.000              
CEODUA 8 0.004 -0.019 -0.039 0.014 -0.171c -0.11** -0.12** 1.000             
CEOTNR 9 0.139** 0.011 0.002 -0.001 -0.041 -0.074 -0.090* -0.010 1.000            
CEOAGE10 -0.123 0.108* 0.136** -0.013 0.092* 0.156**
* 
0.090* -0.095* -0.080 1.000           
EXCCSH 11 -0.109* 0.078* -0.040 -0.104* -0.078 -0.11** -0.200c -0.14** 0.010 0.076 1.000          
EXCEQT 12 -0.15** -0.028 -0.084 0.080 0.066 -0.168c 0.142**
* 
-0.036 -0.022 -0.052 0.008 1.000         
EXC%OS13 -0.089 -0.006 -0.089* -0.078 -0.014 -0.212c -0.169c -0.042 0.057 -0.022 0.263**
* 
0.086 1.000        
INDPBD 14 -0.164c 0.027 0.059 -0.026 0.018 0.148**
* 
0.049 0.008 -0.036 0.019 -0.016 -0.051 -0.057 1.000       
INDPAC 15 0.159**
* 
-0.030 -0.016 0.020 -0.041 0.506**
* 
0.086 -0.046 0.002 0.049 -0.009 -0.163* -0.204c -0.018 1.000      
INDPCC 16 0.078 -0.089 -0.008 0.066 -0.226c 0.250**
* 
0.152**
* 
0.275**
* 
-0.106* 0.014 -0.281c -0.219c -0.256c 0.055 0.200**
* 
1.000     
LNTASS 17 0.146** 0.043 0.111** 0.008 0.043 0.102* 0.211**
* 
0.037 0.004 0.024 -0.191c -0.078 -0.090* -0.094 -0.055 0.095* 1.000    
FINLEV 18 -0.068 -0.076 0.054 0.067 -0.048 -0.087* -0.050 0.133** 0.009 -0.032 -0.159c -0.057 -0.11** 0.042 0.006 0.284**
* 
-0.192c 1.000   
AUDINT 19 0.035 0.034 0.095* 0.005 0.502 0.231**
* 
0.044 0.011 -0.129 0.004 -0.085 -0.022 -0.024 -0.041 -0.025 0.111** 0.402**
* 
-0.202 1.000  
ZSCORE 20 -0.077 0.106* -0.072 -0.092* -0.041 -0.13** -0.068 -0.168c -0.078 0.049 -0.249c 0.071 0.051 0.038 -0.057 -0.352 0.067 -0.210 -0.048 1.000 
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Table 4.6    Regression analysis for BOARD SIZE & BLOCK-OWNERSHIP governance factors. The table 
reports the dynamic panel regression results for US commercial banks subject to SEC enforcement actions over 
the period 2000 to 2016. The dependent variable is AAER_ENF i.e. the US SEC Auditing & Accounting 
Enforcement Releases (SEC AAERs). As independent variables I employ BRDSZE: the total number of 
members in the board; BRDADT: the number of directors serving on the audit committee; BRDCMP: the 
number of directors serving on the compensation committee; BRDFML: the percentage of female directors; 
BHEQT%: the fraction of shares owned by block-holders; BHEQT#: the number of block-holders holding a 
firm’s shares; BHOEQT: the shareholding of the largest block-holder; FINLEV: is the interest-bearing debt 
scaled by total assets; AUDINT: a dummy which takes the value of 1 if the  ﬁrm is audited by a Big 4 ﬁrm, and 
0 otherwise; ZSCORE: bank insolvency risk = (1+ROE) / Standard Deviation of ROE; LNTASS: the natural 
log of total assets; SOX_2002: dummy which takes the value of 1 if  year is 2000–2001, and 0 otherwise; 
CRISIS_0710: a dummy which takes the value of 1 if year is 2007–2010, and 0 otherwise. *, ** & *** correspond 
to 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively.   
Variables BOARD SIZE BLOCK OWNERSHIP 
 Coefficient Test-statistic Coefficient Test-statistic 
BRDSZE -1.817 0.032   
BRDADT 0.473 0.0001   
BRDCMP -0.604 -0.0002   
BRDFML 0.126 0.753   
BHEQT%   -2.286*** 0.0031 
BHEQT#   -0.807 0.0028 
BHOEQT   0.013** 0.006 
LAGMRP 0.342** 0.148 0.196* 0.123 
FINLEV 0.376 0.462 -0.013 0.241 
AUDINT 0.048 0.059 0.057* 0.022 
ZSCORE 0.007 0.011 0.007 0.014 
LNTASS -0.028 0.041 -0.041 0.017 
SOX_2002 -0.087** 0.036 -0.088 0.106 
CRISIS_0710 -0.092 0.045 -0.138*** 0.029 
Constant -0.138 0.374 0.275 0.372 
Wald chi2 322.16***  452.86***  
Hansen J-statistic 1.000  0.511  
Instruments 17  17  
Observations 145  145  
Number of banks 17  17  
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Table 4.7    Regression analysis for CEO POWER & COMPENSATION MIX governance factors. The table reports 
the dynamic panel regression results for US commercial banks subject to SEC enforcement actions over the period 
2000 to 2016. The dependent variable is AAER_ENF: the US SEC Auditing & Accounting Enforcement Releases 
(SEC AAERs). As independent variables I employ CEODUA: a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the CEO chairs 
the board as well, and 0 otherwise; CEOTNR: the number of years that the CEO has served in the position; 
CEOAGE: the age of the CEO; EXCCSH: the cash compensation of executive management which includes the 
base salary and bonus; EXCEQT: the equity compensation of executive management which includes restricted 
stock and stock options; EXC%OS: executive management shares as a percentage of total outstanding shares; 
FINLEV: is the interest-bearing debt scaled by total assets; AUDINT: a dummy which takes the value of 1 if the  
ﬁrm is audited by a Big 4 ﬁrm, and 0 otherwise; ZSCORE: bank insolvency risk = (1+ROE) / Standard Deviation 
of ROE; LNTASS: the natural log of total assets; SOX_2002: dummy which takes the value of 1 if  year is 2000–
2001, and 0 otherwise; CRISIS_0710: a dummy which takes the value of 1 if year is 2007–2010, and 0 otherwise. 
*, ** & *** correspond to 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively.   
Variables CEO POWER COMPENSATION MIX 
 Coefficient Test-statistic Coefficient Test-statistic 
CEODUA 2.174** 0.118   
CEOTNR -0.143 0.067   
CEOAGE -2.114 0.263   
EXCCSH   -0.045 0.029 
EXCEQT   -0.017 0.013 
EXC%OS   0.007** 0.002 
LAGMRP 0.198** 0.091 0.371** 0.184 
FINLEV -1.438 0.231 -1.952*** 0.721 
AUDINT 0.552*** 0.136 -0.027 0.054 
ZSCORE -0.0003 0.006 0.012* 0.061 
LNTASS 0.024 0.026 -0.032 0.078 
SOX_2002 0.057*** 0.019 0.031 0.047 
CRISIS_0710 0.034 0.017 -0.122 0.058 
Constant -0.134 1.352 0.876 0.662 
Wald chi2 122 367.42***  338.24***  
Hansen J-Statistic 0.664  0.874  
Instruments 17  17  
Observations 145  145  
Number of banks 17  17  
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Table 4.8     Regression analysis for INSIDER REPRESENTATION governance factors. The table reports the 
dynamic panel regression results for US commercial banks subject to SEC enforcement actions over the period 
2000 to 2016. The dependent variable is AAER_ENF: the US SEC Auditing & Accounting Enforcement 
Releases (SEC AAERs). As independent variables I employ INDPBD: the fraction of the board that’s insiders; 
INDPAC: the fraction of independents on the audit committee; INDPCC: the fraction of independents on the 
compensation committee; FINLEV: is the interest-bearing debt scaled by total assets; AUDINT: a dummy 
which takes the value of 1 if the  ﬁrm is audited by a Big 4 ﬁrm, and 0 otherwise; ZSCORE: bank insolvency 
risk = (1+ROE) / Standard Deviation of ROE; LNTASS: the natural log of total assets; SOX_2002: dummy 
which takes the value of 1 if  year is 2000–2001, and 0 otherwise; CRISIS_0710: a dummy which takes the 
value of 1 if year is 2007–2010, and 0 otherwise. *, ** & *** correspond to 10%, 5% and 1% significance level 
respectively.   
INSIDER REPRESENTATION AAER_ENF 
Variables Co-efficient Test-statistic 
INDPBD -0.783 -0.0002 
INDPAC -0.321 -0.0001 
INDPCC -0.672 -0.0007 
LAGMRP 0.178*** 0.062 
FINLEV 0.219 0.447 
AUDINT 0.015 0.017 
ZSCORE 0.021*** 0.007 
LNTASS 0.013 0.009 
SOX_2002 -0.087 0.024 
CRISIS_0710 -0.153*** 0.038 
Constant -0.321 0.334 
Wald chi2 82.742***  
Hansen J-statistic 0.776  
Instruments 17  
Observations 145  
Number of banks 17  
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Table 4.9     Robustness tests.   The table reports the dynamic panel regression results for US commercial banks subject to SEC 
enforcement actions over the period 2000 to 2016 for BOARD SIZE, BLOCK-OWNERSHIP, CEO POWER, CEO 
COMPENSATION & OPERATIONAL COMPLEXITY governance factors. The dependent variable is AAER_ENF: the US SEC 
Auditing & Accounting Enforcement Releases (SEC AAERs). As independent variables we employ BRDCMP: the number of 
directors serving on the compensation committee; BRDFML: the percentage of female directors; BHOEQT: the shareholding of 
the largest block-holder; CEOAGE: the age of the CEO; CEOCSH: the cash compensation of the CEO which includes base salary 
and bonus; CEOEQT: the cash compensation of the CEO which includes base salary and bonus; NUMSEG: the number of 
different business segments; NUMSUB: number of subsidiaries; EXC%OS: executive management shares as a percentage of total 
outstanding shares; INDPCC: the fraction of independents on the compensation committee; FEES: of net fees, commission and 
net trading income over total assets; ROAA: net income before interest and taxes as a proportion of the average book value of 
total assets; FINLEV: is the interest-bearing debt scaled by total assets; AUDINT: a dummy which takes the value of 1 if the  ﬁrm 
is audited by a Big 4 ﬁrm, and 0 otherwise; ZSCORE: bank insolvency risk = (1+ROE) / Standard deviation of ROE; LNTASS: 
the natural log of total assets; SOX_2002: dummy which takes the value of 1 if  year is 2000–2001, and 0 otherwise; CRISIS_0710: 
a dummy which takes the value of 1 if year is 2007–2010, and 0 otherwise. *, ** & *** correspond to 10%, 5% and 1% significance 
level respectively. 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Variables Board size Block-ownership CEO power 
CEO 
compensation  
Operational 
complexity 
BRDFML 0.126     
BRDCMP -0.604     
BHOEQT  0.013**    
CEOAGE   -2.114   
CEOCSH    0.0263***  
CEOEQT    0.0074**  
NUMSEG     0.0323 
NUMSUB     0.0467 
LAGMRP 0.342** 0.196* 0.198** 0.371** 0.178*** 
FINLEV 0.376 -0.013 -1.438 -1.952*** 0.219 
AUDINT 0.048 0.057* 0.552*** -0.027 0.015 
ZSCORE 0.007 0.007 -0.0003 0.012* 0.021*** 
LNTASS -0.028 -0.041 0.024 -0.032 0.013 
SOX_2002 -0.087** -0.088 0.057*** 0.031 -0.087 
CRISIS_0710 -0.092 -0.138*** 0.034 -0.122 -0.153*** 
Constant -0.138 0.275 -0.134 0.876 -0.321 
Wald chi2 322.16*** 452.86*** 122367.42*** 338.24*** 82.742*** 
Hansen J-statistic 1.000 0.511 0.664 0.874 0.776 
Instruments 17 17 17 17 17 
Observations 145 145 145 145 145 
Number of banks 17 17 17 17 17 
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Chapter 5 - Conclusion 
 
           In this thesis, I broadly examine the impact of competition and corporate 
governance on financial stability and financial misreporting in the context of the global 
financial crisis of 2007-10 using the setting of the G7 bloc and the US financial services 
industry. Firstly, I investigate the relationship between market power, bank risk and 
financial stability in the G7 group from 2000-15. I find support for the competition-
fragility view; yet without necessarily disproving the competition-stability view i.e. the 
results are mixed based on the individual risk proxies used for purposes of this study. 
Even though overall bank risk (insolvency risk) as proxied by the z-score falls with 
greater banking sector concentration, loan portfolio risk (credit risk) increases. The 
explanation lies in the results relating to the liquidity and capital risk proxies. The key 
takeaway therefore is greater concentration in the banking industry leads to an increase 
in credit risk, but also in lower insolvency risk. This can be attributed to banks 
maintaining higher capitalisation thresholds and liquidity profiles as they compete more. 
The individual risks must be analysed for a much more refined picture of the results to 
emerge. By way of policy implications, as a key policy response during and after the crisis 
of 2007-10, many countries adjusted and made their deposit insurance schemes more 
generous. This ultimately exacerbated moral hazard risk in more competitive 
environments. With generous deposit insurance schemes in place in the post-crisis period, 
the sensitivity of the z-score (or profit volatility) to changes in the lerner index and boone 
indicator increased. This strongly suggests a reduction in banks’ pricing power after the 
crisis. My findings underline the overbearing influence of banking regulatory policies and 
market structure on financial stability. Not only do these policies directly affect banks’ 
risk-taking incentives, they also influence the effect of competition on banks’ riskiness. 
The international dimension of banking competition is a potential limitation in so far as 
the results and dataset used for this study are concerned. It is a fair assumption to make 
that if banks operate internationally, they also compete on an international basis and the 
price-cost margins ought to be reflective of this reality. Because I use consolidated data, 
there is a real likelihood of conflict in terms of the measurement of market power between 
domestic and international banks. It is unfortunate that bank-level data on the 
decomposition of bank assets and liabilities between domestic or cross-border origin is 
not available, even though most smaller banks still operate virtually entirely domestically. 
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Further research on a truly international sample (not just the G7) could be useful in 
bolstering understanding around the influence of market power on financial stability 
across diverse banking jurisdictions internationally. The results could yet provide far 
richer and broader insights on the subject than is the case based on a G7 sample.  
           Secondly, I probe and provide novel evidence on the relationship between 
competition and financial misreporting in the US financial services industry from 2000-
2016. I formulate hypotheses based on the interrelationships among three factors i.e. 
competition, the financial crisis and financial misreporting. I document a positive 
relationship between the intensity of competition and incidences of financial misreporting 
in the US financial services industry. I also examine whether an exogenous increase in 
competition via the financial crisis culminated in the proliferation of financial 
misreporting incidences in the US financial services industry. There is wider convergence 
and awareness in mainstream economics about the potential for competition to undermine 
economic outcomes and the efficient operation of the markets. Left unchecked, 
competition potentially can reverse and undermine the economic benefits associated with 
healthy levels of competition. Financial misreporting (e.g. earnings management) has a 
damaging and harmful effect on firms and a country’s wider economy Kedia and 
Philippon (2009; Durnev and Mangen (2009). My findings are suggestive of the fact that 
governments, regulators and academia ought to critically consider the perverse effects of 
competition on policymaking, welfare and other economic deliberations. My study 
contributes to existing literature in broadening understanding on the impact product 
market competition has in shaping the corporate financial information environment. I 
advance the notion that product market competition operates through an agency channel, 
in itself a key departure from the proprietary cost view widely examined up to this point 
in existing accounting literature. In so far as my analysis of the relationship between 
competition and financial misreporting is concerned, the use of an objective proxy for 
financial misreporting i.e. the Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases of the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC AAERs) is an undoubted strength. However, 
broadening the study sample beyond the remit of the US SEC AAERs to factor in 
violations from other regulatory jurisdictions will lend credibility to my findings in this 
study. The challenges of gathering, as well as the validity and authenticity of the acquired 
data, are obvious considerations before going this route with this study. I believe a 
comparison of the results across national regulatory regimes will offer so much more 
breath and scope to the study. 
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           Thirdly, I empirically examine the impact five carefully selected corporate 
governance dimensions on financial misreporting. To this end, I adopt and utilise five 
dimensions of corporate governance i.e. board size, block-ownership, CEO Power, 
compensation mix and insider representation. I analyse the relevant literature and 
formulate hypotheses based on these five corporate governance dimensions. I find a 
negative association between board size & block-ownership and the financial 
misreporting proxy. The relationship between CEO power and financial misreporting is 
however positive, implying separation of the roles of CEO and Board Chair as the best 
way to combat financial misreporting in banks. In so far as compensation mix is 
concerned, a mixed picture is returned i.e. the association between equity-based 
compensation and misreporting is negative, whereas it is positive for cash-based 
compensation. Finally, I also find our three characteristics under the insider 
representation dimension all negatively associated with financial misreporting. The 
results remain robust after controlling for the effects of alternative corporate governance 
dimensions, dropping the exogenous variables (i.e. financial crisis & SOX) from the 
controls, using alternative control variables and running the regressions with no controls 
at all. My results indicate that the governance structure at commercial banks does indeed 
influence the actions of bank managers. Indeed, governance mechanisms, whether they 
pertain to executive, compensation, board independence, board size, CEO power or 
block-ownership of shares, really affect the CEO's ability to misreport financial 
information (e.g. manage earnings). As regulators formulate and implement codes of best 
practice in so far as corporate governance standards are concerned, they should consider 
the collective impact of all governance mechanisms employed rather than consider the 
effect of each governance mechanism in isolation. Hagendorff, Collins, & Keasey (2010) 
argue that there is a complementary association between regulation and some governance 
mechanisms. This therefore suggests that they ought to be developed in synchrony. Given 
the central role that banks play in the financial markets, their effective and synchronous 
regulation is vital. The repercussions resulting from improperly managed and regulated 
banks can be paralysing as evidenced by the global financial crisis of 2007-10. Last but 
not least, with regards to my analysis of the relationship between corporate governance 
and financial misreporting, it will be useful for future research to incorporate bank 
performance as an additional variable to this study over and above corporate governance 
and financial misreporting. Financial misreporting essentially arises from the need to 
massage accounting disclosures after a bank’s failure to hit set performance targets; thus, 
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factoring in bank performance proxies to go with the corporate governance and 
misreporting ones would fundamentally enrich current insights on the corporate 
governance-misreporting nexus in banking.  
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